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Summary
Philosophy has always turned to literature, but its engagement with Shakespeare in 
particular has been problematic. Stanley  Cavell and Jacques Derrida do better than most 
other philosophical readers to meet the three criteria for worthwhile philosophical 
engagement with Shakespeare recently outlined by  Martha Nussbaum: namely, that it 
should actually  do philosophy, that it should illuminate the world of the plays, and that 
it should account for why  literature can do something for philosophy  that philosophy 
cannot do for itself. Cavell’s and Derrida’s acts of reading Shakespeare are, however, 
marked by a seemingly  unphilosophical aural sensitivity. This thesis argues that we will 
only begin to grasp their singular and radical understanding of the relationship between 
literature and philosophy once we get to the bottom of these auricular preoccupations. 
The first part will show that in Cavell’s readings of Shakespeare the figure of the ear 
and actual process of listening not only  mark “separateness,” but are also instrumental 
in helping us to “acknowledge.” Although Derrida does not listen for separateness but 
différance, the second part argues that for him too the ear both actually and figurally 
inaugurates an act of reading which not only  blurs the borders between the 
philosophical and the literary, but also fundamentally  changes the way  we relate the one 
to the other. The way Derrida and Cavell listen to Shakespeare, therefore, suggests three 
criteria to be added to Nussbaum’s. First, the philosopher’s act of reading must resonate 
beyond the conventional boundaries of philosophy and literature. Second, a 
philosopher’s account needs to be based on a textual model describing how the very 
encounter between text  and reader can become part of the philosophical endeavour. 
Third, this realisation must be internalised in the very way philosophy is written. 
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Introduction: Thinking Through Shakespeare 
Philosophers do not always know what to do with Shakespeare. As much is at least 
suggested by Martha Nussbaum’s review of three books written on Shakespeare and 
philosophy in The New Statesman, published in May 2008. From the very beginning her 
judgment is rather damning: “Philosophers often try to write about Shakespeare. Most 
of the time they are ill-equipped to do so” (“Stages” 1). Although Nussbaum 
acknowledges that “there is something irresistibly  tempting in the depth and the 
complexity of the plays,” she concludes that most philosophers “lured” into responding 
“to that complexity with abstract thought” are “for the most part … utterly unprepared, 
emotionally or stylistically, to write about literary experience” (1). She continues: 
“armed with their standard analytic equipment, they frequently  produce accounts that 
are laughably reductive, contributing little or nothing to philosophy or to the 
understanding of Shakespeare” (1). Although Nussbaum covers a small sampling, her 
review’s implicit  claim that any philosophical reading of Shakespeare should aim to 
contribute to the progress of at  least either, and at best both, disciplines allows us to 
propose a taxonomy of philosophical approaches to Shakespeare. 
 Studies belonging to the first category include Colin McGinn’s Shakespeare’s 
Philosophy: Discovering the Meaning Behind the Plays, reviewed by Nussbaum. 
McGinn attempts “a systematic treatment of the underlying philosophical themes of the 
plays,” including “skepticism and the possibility of human knowledge; the nature of the 
self and personal identity; the understanding of causation; the existence and nature of 
evil [and] the formative power of language,” which he claims are “woven deeply into 
Shakespeare’s plots and poetry” (viii). His is precisely the kind of reading that  Toril Moi 
criticises in “The Adventures of Reading: Literature and Philosophy, Cavell and 
Beauvoir”: “I have long been frustrated with criticism that reduces the literary  text  to an 
example of pre-existing theory  or philosophy” (18). Equally, for Nussbaum there is 
nothing “subtle or new” in McGinn’s approach, who “just identifies familiar 
philosophical themes that figure in the plays” (“Stages” 2). The impression conveyed is 
thus, writes Nussbaum, “that Shakespeare has gotten a good grade in Phil 101, with 
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McGinn as his professor and his superior in understanding. This is a terrible way to 
approach Shakespeare’s complexity” (“Stages” 2). 
 Studies in the first category also often tend to identify  a Shakespearean 
philosophical credo which often enough is uncannily similar to their own. David 
Bevington, for instance, concludes his Shakespeare’s Ideas: More Things In Heaven and 
Earth by  listing some of Shakespeare’s supposed wisdom: “One can still be a practicing 
Christian and still be a sceptic about so many  important things” or “men and women 
must learn to get along with one another and to practice forbearance, because otherwise 
human life will have no way to continue” (215, 217). Shakespeare is thus, as Marjorie 
Garber puts it, chopped up into “sound bites,” small palatable nuggets of wisdom, to be 
used to give a certain unquestionable ring of authority to one’s statement: “Shakespeare 
said it: therefore it  must be true. True, somehow, to human nature, whatever that is. 
Universally, transhistorically true” (Symptoms of Culture 155). Therefore, these studies 
are on a fundamental level similar to studies belonging to the second category which, 
like Michael Macrone’s Shakespeare's Guide to Life search the sonnets and the plays for 
philosophical tenets or “wisdoms” to be transformed into readily  available and 
marketable snippets. 
 The third category  of studies focusing on Shakespeare and philosophy identifies 
philosophical themes or stances in the plays, but does not ascribe them to Shakespeare. 
In showing how different philosophical themes are addressed and developed in the 
plays, these studies, to which A.D. Nuttall’s Shakespeare the Thinker (also reviewed by 
Nussbaum) belongs, do not seek mainly  to illustrate either a philosophical tenet  or to 
illuminate the play in which we find them. Rather, they seek to show that whatever we 
may think of, Shakespeare will have thought of it first. Yet, for Nussbaum, Nuttall “has 
nothing to say about why someone interested in philosophical problems should turn to 
Shakespeare” (“Stages” 2). Nuttall is also criticised for being unable to contribute 
significantly to an understanding of Shakespeare in general, or the plays in particular. 
His analysis of the plays speak of a critic “who is no longer electrified by the dramas 
and who finds the task of interpretation rather boring” (2). Whilst  Nussbaum is right to 
find problems with Nuttall’s book, they are, as I shall suggest  in a moment, different to 
what she sets out.
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 Studies in the fourth category, for example Julia Reinhard Lupton’s Thinking 
With Shakespeare, use the plays as a launching pad for their own philosophical 
ruminations. Reinhard Lupton argues that although 
 we can choose any  number of conceptual environments to refresh our sense of 
 the plays … all readings … risk turning into what Ian Kott calls ‘costume 
 drama,’ productions constrained by the corsets and laces of their own apparatus, 
 whether the interpretation is flooded by  too much contact or left high and dry  by 
 too much concept. (17-8) 
In contrast, Reinhard Lupton imagines Thinking with Shakespeare as a return to Kott’s 
project in Shakespeare Our Contemporary, namely “to engage Shakespearean drama 
with a sense of playfulness, experiment, and historical awareness, but without too much 
make-up, in order to touch what is timely in Shakespeare” (18). Thinking With 
Shakespeare is, however, less concerned with “reconstructing the significance of 
Shakespeare for later traditions of thinking or staging his uncanny echoing of current 
events” than with excavating those “constellations” or “ensembles of meaning, 
character and setting … that persist, that appear in, before, and after Shakespeare” (18). 
What Reinhard Lupton is after is thus “a kind of thinking with Shakespeare” which does 
not “analy[ze] Shakespeare per se” but follows “the rhythm and images of thought in 
Shakespeare in order to achieve original interpretative ends, effecting a kind of 
renaissance in and through them” (20). In contrast to studies in the second category, for 
Reinhard Lupton the plays have such a hold on us not because they are a “thesaurus of 
eternal messages,” but because they are able “to establish real connections with the 
successive worlds shared and sustained by actors and audiences over time” (18). 
Nussbaum’s incisive account not only  allows us to portray the different approaches 
currently characterising the interdisciplinary encounters between philosophy and 
Shakespeare, but also outlines lucidly how philosophers might do better. “Stages of 
Thought” names three criteria that a worthwhile philosophical engagement with 
Shakespeare should fulfil: 
 First and most centrally, it should really  do philosophy, and not just allude to 
 familiar philosophical ideas and positions. It  should pursue tough questions and 
 come up with something interesting and subtle – rather than just connecting 
 Shakespeare to this or that idea from Philosophy 101. A philosopher reading 
 Shakespeare should wonder, and ponder, in a genuinely philosophical way. 
 Second, it should illuminate the world of the plays, attending closely enough to 
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 language and to texture that the interpretation changes the way we see the work, 
 rather than just uses the work as grist for some argumentative mill. And finally, 
 such a study should offer some account of why philosophical thinking needs to 
 turn to Shakespeare's plays, or to works like them. Why must the philosopher 
 care about these plays? Do they supply to thought something that a 
 straightforward piece of philosophical prose cannot supply, and if so, what? (1)1
I would like to argue that Stanley Cavell and Jacques Derrida do better than most 
philosophers to meet these criteria. Shakespeare occupies a prominent space in Cavell’s 
corpus: his encounters with the plays – from the earliest reading of King Lear in “The 
Avoidance of Love,” first published in Must We Mean What We Say?, to his discussion 
of Othello in The Claim of Reason and his most recent reading of Macbeth – are all 
collected in the seminal Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare. Cavell 
is, in Nussbaum’s own words, “by a long distance” the “most distinguished Anglo-
American philosophical writing on Shakespeare in recent years” (“Stages” 2). She 
continues:
 Cavell's essays, collected in the book Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of 
 Shakespeare, amply fulfil my first and second standards for this enterprise. His 
 sometimes mysterious and idiosyncratic readings of a group of plays offer 
 philosophical insights that are surprising and subtle, while genuinely 
 illuminating themes of love, avoidance, skepticism, and acknowledgment in the 
 dramas. (2) 
Derrida has written less prolifically and less systematically about Shakespeare than has 
Cavell: in his published work Shakespeare is only referred to in six pieces: “Aphorism 
Countertime,” “My Chances,” Specters of Marx, “What is a ‘Relevant’ Translation?,” 
“The Time is Out of Joint” and “This Strange Institution Called Literature.” Nussbaum 
does not mention Derrida’s writings on Shakespeare at all in “Stages of Thought,” but, 
given that she deems him “simply not worth studying,” it does not take much 
imagination to guess what her verdict would have been (Cultivating 41). In Love’s
Knowledge, for example, she describes her reaction on reading Derrida’s “witty analysis 
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1  For Nussbaum, these three criteria are met by the third book she reviews in her article, Tzachi 
Zamir’s Double Vision: Moral Philosophy and Shakespearean Drama. According to Nussbaum, it 
offers new insights into the plays, it actually does philosophy and it gives an account for why – and in 
what manner – philosophy must turn to Shakespeare. Nussbaum is particularly struck by Zamir’s 
analysis of Shakespeare’s depiction of mature love in Antony and Cleopatra (“Stages” 3). The ways in 
which this account clashes and resonates with Cavell’s understanding of love deserves more attention 
than I can give it in this thesis. Similarly, the discussion of how Nussbaum’s own philosophical 
practice stands in relation to Cavell’s and Derrida’s must remain for another time. 
of Nietzsche’s style” in Spurs: “After reading Derrida and not Derrida alone, I feel a 
certain hunger for blood; for, that  is, writing about literature that talks of human lives 
and choices as if they matter to us all” (171). Nussbaum here appears to be joining the 
long line of critics (to which Cavell also to some extent belongs) that accuse Derrida of 
a certain nihilism and scepticism, on the grounds that “attention to textuality” indicates 
a lack of humanity, or of “blood.”2  Despite the opinion she holds of Derrida, this project 
will argue that his readings meet her criteria just like Cavell’s do. Both do philosophy, 
illuminate the plays and give reasons why the philosopher should care about 
Shakespeare. For our philosophers, literature is not  a simple reflection of the 
“philosophy” espoused by its author. Both “offer some account of why  philosophical 
thinking needs to turn to Shakespeare’s play, or to works like them” (“Stages” 1). More 
importantly, neither sees literature merely as a repository  for convenient illustrations 
philosophers can draw on. 
 Whilst this project will illustrate how Cavell and Derrida meet Nussbaum’s 
criteria, its main aim is to sound out the ways they draw on Shakespeare in their 
philosophical writing which are not anticipated by Nussbaum’s approach, which is here 
representative of what is thought of as the pinnacle of literary-philosophical pursuits. 
Although the model she outlines does not stand at odds with Cavell and Derrida’s 
readings, it cannot fully account for two crucial aspects of their literary-philosophical 
writing. First, it cannot offer an explanation for what, for want of a better term, I will 
call the inefficiency  of their writing and their oblique approaches to the plays. 
Nussbaum’s criteria hence cannot fully contain their different mode of 
interdisciplinarity; the fact that, as Colin Davies suggests in Critical Excess: 
Overreading in Derrida, Deleuze, Levinas, Žižek and Cavell, we are now moving in a 
modality  of reading, writing and thinking where “literature and philosophy have equal 
but different, distinct but interdependent, roles to play if we are to release ourselves 
from ingrained habits of thought” (1). Second, if we want to account for their 
idiosyncratic philosophical voices and what Davies calls their “bold, inspiring, 
outrageous and sometimes implausible encounters with literature,” we must be prepared 
11
2 In a short essay on “Deconstruction and Love” Peggy Kamuf sums up Nussbaum’s argument thus: “too 
much attention to textuality leads to bloodlessness.” She then adds “but is this a good thing or a bad 
thing? Says who?” (168). In line with Kamuf, I will challenge Nussbaum’s view in Chapter 5 and in the 
Second Interlude.
to make room for a view of the encounter between literature and philosophy that is 
different from the one voiced by Nussbaum: one where literature and philosophy are not 
merely friendly  neighbouring precincts, but where literature and philosophy become 
two aspects of the same modality of thought and of writing (Davies 1). 
Although this project is the first to consider the resonances between Cavell’s and 
Derrida’s readings of Shakespeare at  some length, it  joins an already considerable and 
ever-growing number of studies on Cavell and Shakespeare, or Derrida and 
Shakespeare.3 Shakespeare’s importance for Cavell has been addressed by virtually all 
major Cavell scholars. Of particular note are Lawrence Rhu’s  “Competing for the Soul: 
Cavell in Shakespeare,” Anthony  Cascardi’s “‘Disowning Knowledge’: Cavell on 
Shakespeare,” Gerald L. Bruns “Stanley Cavell’s Shakespeare” and “Shakespeare: 
Scepticism and Tragedy” in Stephen Mulhall’s Stanley Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting 
of the Ordinary. At the same time, Cavellian thought has increasingly been influencing 
Shakespearean scholarship. Many  have successfully used Cavellian insights to 
illuminate what Shakespeare’s plays do (to us). Harry  Berger (Making Trifles of Terrors: 
Redistributing Complicities in Shakespeare), David Miller (Dreams of the Burning 
Child: Sacrificial Sons and the Father’s Witness) and David Hillman (“The worst case 
of knowing the other? Stanley Cavell and Troilus and Cressida”) have drawn on Cavell 
in illuminating ways. Amongst others, I shall turn to Janet Adelman’s Suffocating 
Mothers, Sarah Beckwith’s “William Shakespeare and Stanley Cavell: Acknowledging, 
Confessing, and Tragedy” and Naomi Scheman’s “A Storied World: On Meeting and 
Being Met.”
 Commensurate with the lesser prominence of Shakespeare in Derrida’s oeuvre, 
there is less secondary  material exclusively addressing his readings of Shakespeare. 
They  are, nevertheless referred to by many prominent scholars working on Derrida, 
among them Peggy Kamuf (in “The Ear, Who?” and in Book of Addresses), Derek 
Attridge (“Following Derrida”), Nicholas Royle (In Memory of Jacques Derrida) Sarah 
Wood (“A New International, or What You Will”) and of course Hélène Cixous, on 
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3 Of these studies on Derrida and Shakespeare or Cavell and Shakespeare, none focus on the ear, with the 
prominent exception of Peggy Kamuf’s “The Ear, Who?,” Nicholas Royle’s In Memory of Jacques 
Derrida and Sarah Wood’s “A New International, or What You Will” to all of which I shall return in the 
second part. 
whose “Shakespeare Ghosting Derrida” I shall draw extensively. Naturally, Derrida’s 
reading of Marx through and with Hamlet in Specters of Marx has triggered a 
significant number of critical responses, some of which are collected in Ghostly 
Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derrida’s Specters of Marx. As I will show in 
Chapter 8, few of these, however, seriously consider Shakespeare’s role in the text. On 
the other side of the disciplinary divide, scholars including Malcom Evans 
(“Deconstructing Shakespeare’s comedies”), Howard Felperin (“‘Tongue-tied our 
queen?’: the deconstruction of presence in The Winter’s Tale”) and other contributors to 
Shakespeare and Deconstruction (eds. G. Douglas Atkins and David M. Bergeron, 
1988) have considered “deconstruction’s” reverberation in Shakespeare studies. As 
attested by  a conference held on “Shakespeare and Derrida” in 2007 at Cardiff 
University, the forthcoming special edition of Oxford Literary Review entitled 
“Shakespeare and Derrida,” as well as the recent publication of Colin Davies’ Critical 
Excess (2010), Stanley Cavell and Literary Studies (eds. Richard Eldridge and Bernard 
Rhie, 2011) and the forthcoming Stanley Cavell and Literary Criticism (eds. Andrew 
Taylor and James Loxley), the interest  in the interdisciplinary encounter between 
Derrida and Cavell and literature, and in particular Shakespeare, is far from receding. 
 The previous accounts of Derrida’s or Cavell’s readings of Shakespeare mostly 
inhabit the space outlined by Nussbaum’s criteria. They dwell on how either Derrida’s 
or Cavell’s philosophy can clarify what happens in the plays. They show how in their 
readings of Shakespeare these thinkers actually do philosophy. Some of them also offer 
accounts of why at times philosophy must turn to Shakespeare. Although it will in one 
way or another draw on many of the more important critical accounts, this thesis does 
not wish to give a comprehensive record of these preceding studies, simply because it 
would like to understand how Derrida and Cavell exceed these criteria. Echoing the 
apparently  oblique, unorthodox and counterintuitive approaches Cavell and Derrida take 
to literature, the thesis will, from time to time, draw on other selected primary and 
secondary  material on different aspects pertaining either to Cavell or Derrida that have 
so far not yet been analysed in conjunction with their readings of Shakespeare, in order 
to sound out what is unique and singular about their respective acts of readings.
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Whilst there are other paths of enquiry that we could follow in order to illuminate the 
ways these philosophers exceed the current view of interdisciplinarity none is, I believe, 
more eloquent than following how the ear comes into play in their acts of reading. The 
thesis’ proposed project to read Derrida and (against) Cavell on Shakespeare through 
the ear may seem implausible, even portentous. But we must also ask ourselves “how 
far is it possible or interesting to submit [their] work to normal academic standards in 
order to test their coherence or falsehood?” (Davies 24). The guiding argument of my 
thesis is that we will only begin to grasp  their different  but equally  singular and radical 
understanding of the relationship between literature and philosophy once we get to the 
bottom of these auricular preoccupations. It is only if we contextualise their 
philosophical uses of the ear that we will see how they not only meet but  indeed expand 
Nussbaum’s criteria.
 Cavell and Derrida’s acts of reading Shakespeare are marked by an 
extraordinary  aural sensitivity. It is on the one hand expressed by their heightened 
awareness of the nature of sounds and voices in the play: in “The Avoidance of Love” 
Cavell dwells on the nature of Cordelia’s voice and Derrida pays marked attention not 
only to Juliet’s voice in “Aphorism Countertime,” but also to the voice of Hamlet’s 
ghost in Specters of Marx. It is also demonstrated in their attention to how the ear or the 
act of listening is described in the plays. In Disowning Knowledge, Cavell picks up 
Mamillius’ whispering in Hermione’s ear and the curious detail of poisoning through 
the ear in Hamlet, whilst in  Specters and “Aphorism Countertime,” Derrida thinks 
about how the darkness that envelops both Hamlet’s first meeting with his father’s ghost 
and the balcony scene in Romeo and Juliet means that  in both of these scenes the brunt 
of the dramatic tension is transposed to the characters’ ears. Most  crucially, both think 
about the relationship  between text and reader through the ear. As I will suggest  in “A 
Scarred Tympanum” and “Frequencies” respectively, Cavell compares Shakespearean 
drama to Beethoven’s Sonatas while Derrida’s concern with the sounds of Shakespeare 
echoes his discussion of the philosophical ear in “Tympan” and elsewhere. Whilst there 
are some accounts of the role of the ear, related figures and listening in Derrida or 
Cavell (Arnold Davidson, Timothy Gould and Garrett Stewart have all written on 
matters of the ear in Cavell’s work), none connect the way Cavell uses the ear 
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“figurally” to the way  he “actually” listens (to Shakespeare, to opera or to jazz). 
Although there have been studies on figural deconstructive hearing, Stewart notes that 
“any  inclination to sustain and extend the impetus of poststructuralist theory into the 
atrophied field of phonological analysis has a difficult allegiance to win in the ranks of 
deconstruction itself” (Reading Voices 2-3). I would, perhaps, not go as far as to call this 
“phonophobia,” as Stewart does, but I would concur that we are, at times, dealing with a 
certain selective deafness (3). I will argue that most Shakespeare scholars, thinkers of 
deconstruction, or scholars working on Cavell, whether they are using the ear as a 
metaphor or solely auditing it, are affected by a kind of selective deafness: for some this 
is a deafness to the figurative or philosophical uses of the ear, whilst for others this is a 
deafness to what the ear can actually pick up. Neither Cavell nor Derrida are affected by 
this selective deafness: their grasp of Shakespeare’s figurative uses of the ear is matched 
by the acuity with which their ears pick up on rhymes, sounds, rhythms and breaths. It 
is precisely  in how the ear comprises and combines these three aspects that lies its 
import for understanding both Shakespeare’s philosophical purchase and Cavellian and 
Derridean acts of reading. The most meaningful aspect of their “auricular” readings of 
Shakespeare is, however, the fact  that their dual – both figural and actual – 
clairaudience allows us to link their practices of reading as listening to their theoretical 
understanding of what is at stake when reading a text. It will, indeed, allow us to 
suggest that their at times apparently outlandish acts of reading are commensurate with 
the demands of the literary text and the demands of philosophy.
 As on any aspect of Shakespeare, there are numerous critical accounts of the role 
of sound in his work. Wes Folkerth’s relatively  recent  The Sound of Shakespeare in 
particular, is worthy of note. On the one hand revealing how Shakespeare’s writing is 
informed by early  modern attitudes towards listening, and on the other hand connecting 
these with what it means to listen to the plays today, Folkerth has bridged two ways in 
which the ear and Shakespeare have traditionally  been thought about. Since Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, matters of the ear have been used as a metaphor to illustrate the way 
Shakespeare’s texts work on their audiences. Emerson had already suggested that the 
Shakespearean text could change the reader. Shakespeare did not only  write “the airs for 
all our modern music,” but his work also changed the way we think about literature, 
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philosophy and thought itself (Representative Men 163). Interestingly enough, Emerson 
presents the change Shakespeare works in us as a kind of syncopation, a change in 
rhythm, perhaps a change in ear: “Now, literature, philosophy, and thought are 
Shakespearized. His mind is the horizon beyond which at present we do not see. Our 
ears are educated to music by his rhythm” (158). There is another image related to the 
ear of which Emerson was fond, namely  being “in unison,” or  receptivity (145). Ideas 
of receptivity or resonance are repeatedly  used to make a point about Shakespeare’s 
unfaltering and encompassing interest; Folkerth for instance suggests that “his 
bottomless receptivity  takes the form of a radical openness, an indiscriminate 
enthusiasm both taxing and infectious to those around him” (92). Terrence Hawkes’ 
comparison of reading Shakespeare to listening as “impos[ing] a meaning on a sea-
shell’s silence that appears to extend well beyond ourselves” works along the same lines 
(Rag 43). In all of these examples the act of listening figures not in its own right, but as 
a metaphor seeking to trace the strange mechanism by which Shakespeare 
ventriloquises us. 
 There are also scholars such as PA Skantze and Bruce Smith who argue that  the 
physical process of hearing is not only  a suggestive metaphor, but that the actual 
process of listening can help  us understand something about Shakespeare that other 
sensory  processes cannot. In a talk given at the Globe Theatre in London in 2010, PA 
Skantze argued that sound offers us a way to think about the perceived improvised (and 
hence always new, actual, and contemporary) nature of Shakespeare: “the fact that the 
work cannot be separated, recalculated and made to add up  to a tidy sum, pertains to the 
play  of the plays, as if the composition only works in the air because improvisation adds 
the final and necessary catalyst  that both forms and unforms the composition by making 
it vulnerable to change.” What Skantze seems to suggest is that  Shakespeare happens 
somewhere in the distance between the actors’ mouths and the audience’s ears. She is 
thus claiming that we help make Shakespeare by listening.4 The interesting thing about 
these ways of attending to Shakespeare is that figural and actual processes of listening 
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4  In this workshop we were also asked to recite some parts of Hamlet and The Winter’s Tale 
backwards. As Skantze explained in her talk,  this was not a mere “party trick” but rather a “mode of 
undoing our habits of aural reception, or at least disrupting them, in order to ‘hear’  aslant what the 
language does, what it can do, and what our not early modern ears make of the lushness of the sound, 
the persistence of a kind of meaning or more precisely an acoustic forcefield that conveys meaning not 
always word by word.”
are interdependent here, not unlike in Cavell and Derrida. The difference between
Smith’s approach in particular is significant, however. In The Acoustic World of Early 
Modern England: Attending to the O-Factor, Smith locates this effect less in the 
resonant space between us and Shakespeare than in something intrinsic to Shakespeare, 
something he calls the “O-Factor.” What exactly this mythical O-factor is or what it 
consists of remains ultimately unclear. Although Smith protests that the O-factor is 
exactly  what takes metaphysics out of Shakespeare studies, it could be argued that  it is 
precisely what allows it to creep  back in. In the same gesture with which Smith tries to 
trace a phenomenological criticism of Shakespeare centred on the O-factor, he elevates 
this same O-factor to a metaphysical and quasi-mystical presence. Conversely, what 
Cavell and Derrida hear in Shakespeare is not something fixed or intrinsic but the ear 
mirroring the relationship between text and reader; the act of reading. 
In “Adventures of Reading,” Toril Moi asks: “What is the point of reading literature if 
we all manage to see in it is a theory we already know? Why not simply stick to reading 
theory  and philosophy if that’s what we really want to do?” (18). For Moi the question 
of the interdisciplinary encounter between literature and philosophy thus pertains first 
and foremost to finding a reading stance: “How can we read philosophically  without 
reducing the text to a witting or unwitting illustration of a pre-existing theory? How can 
we read literature with philosophy in ways that suggest that the writer may actually 
have something to tell the philosopher?” (19). In this sense the four groups outlined 
above can be further distinguished into two broad attitudes of reading. The first assumes 
that either the author or his philosophy can be distilled from the plays and injected into 
statements when one wishes to give them that je ne sai quoi of undebatable truth. In the 
second attitude of reading, the work becomes a repository for illustrations to be drawn 
on whenever the philosopher wishes to give his philosophical excursus a certain 
panache. In the first act of reading the reader is drowned out by the work’s “aura”; in 
the second, the work vanishes behind the reader’s agenda. Tracing the ways in which 
the ear comes into play, indeed orchestrates, Derrida and Cavell’s acts of reading will 
also disclose how for both the way they think about the interdisciplinary encounter 
between philosophy  and Shakespeare depends on listening out for this resonant space in 
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which text and reader may change each other. An analysis of the auricular aspects of 
their acts of reading Shakespeare will show how far Cavell and Derrida differ from, for 
instance Nuttall’s and Reinhard Lupton’s accounts, in that they do not  omit to describe a 
textual model that accounts for our ability to think with and through Shakespeare. In 
heeding the ways the ear comes into play in their readings of Shakespeare, I will thus 
clarify how their practices of reading correspond to their ideas of the relationship 
between reader and text and, indeed, how this very  act of reading is of philosophical 
value.
 For Cavell and Derrida, each act of reading has philosophical repercussions; for 
both, an act of reading is the philosophical repercussion. As Julian Wolfreys argues in 
“Justifying the Unjustifiable: a Supplementary Introduction, of sorts,” Derrida 
understands reading “as an act which responds to those aspects of a text which cannot 
be defined grammatically (that is, according to a general code or program) ... forcing 
one to face the paradox that reading in the strict sense is called for by  that which is 
unreadable in a text’ (3). I would like to argue that the same is true for Cavell, even if 
he is interested in a different kind of unreadability. As we shall see in parts one and two 
respectively, whilst, as Wolfreys suggests, Derrida “attend[s] patiently  to the contours” 
and “rhythms” of a text, Cavell picks up on a text’s separateness” (3, 12). In this sense 
their acts of reading may be understood, to use Colin Davies’ terms, as acts of 
“overreading” which entail “a willingness to test or to exceed the constraints which 
restrict the possibilities of meaning released by a work” and which at times “depend 
upon what might appear to be bizarre, disorientating interpretive leaps” (ix, xii). In his 
Introduction to Derrida’s Acts of Literature, Derek Attridge draws attention to the 
“polysemy of the term act: as both ‘serious’ performance and ‘staged’ performance, as a 
‘proper’ doing and an improper or temporary one, as an action, a law of governing 
actions, and a record of documenting actions” (2). I contend that both Cavell and 
Derrida have deeply understood that, as Attridge puts it, “literary texts, one might say, 
are acts of writing that call forth acts of reading” (2). Examining the figure of the ear in 
their respective readings of Shakespeare will not only  be conducive to sound out the 
significance of their acts of reading but also to further enhance our grasp of their 
idiosyncratic writing styles.
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 In this thesis I therefore propose to listen to how Derrida and Cavell sound out 
Shakespeare. As Folkerth notes, Shakespeare “uses the word sound ... almost always as 
a verb or adjective, only rarely as a noun” (15). To sound “means not only to produce 
sound, but also to measure the depth of something, to establish its boundaries, to define 
it spatially” (15). Sounding Shakespeare is therefore a statement of intent as well as an 
augury: I hope to listen into the resonant spaces opened by Cavell and Derrida’s 
readings in order to sound out the question of philosophy and Shakespeare further than 
the comfortable place it has hitherto been thought to inhabit. Reading Derrida and 
(against) Cavell reading Shakespeare with my  philosophical and literal ears pricked up, 
I will in the course of this thesis propose three different criteria to be added to 
Nussbaum’s: first, if a philosopher wants his engagement with literature to interest us, 
his account needs to be based on a textual model describing how the very encounter 
between text and reader can become part of the philosophical endeavour. Second, this 
realisation must  be internalised in the very way philosophy is written. Third, this act of 
reading must resonate beyond the conventional boundaries of philosophy and literature.
In Chapter 1, “Literary Investigations,” I seek to radically question the way 
Shakespeare’s role in Cavell’s philosophical writing has been traditionally  understood. 
Although Nussbaum rightly argues that Cavell meets her first two criteria, she finds him 
lacking in the third, in that “he has little to say  about why we would want to turn to 
poetic drama in general, and to Shakespeare in particular, in pursuit  of philosophical 
themes” (2). In her own words: “Cavell brilliantly succeeds at being Cavell, which is to 
say that his readings always illuminate issues of human significance; but one often has 
the sense that the plays are being used as occasions for the pursuit of Cavell’s own 
preoccupations” (6-7). Nussbaum’s view is, unfortunately, representative of much 
existing work on Cavell and Shakespeare. I suggest that this interpretation of Cavell’s 
engagement with Shakespeare is mistaken. It is only through his engagement with 
Shakespearean drama – especially the tragedies, where the potentially tragic 
consequences of a failure to “acknowledge” attain their full poignancy  – that he is able 
to give a name to the cause of the metaphysical illness that J.L. Austin and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein wanted to cure. Cavell’s readings of Shakespeare, therefore, do not “tend 
to confirm the philosophical notions for which he has already  argued independently, in 
19
readings of Wittgenstein, Descartes, and other philosophers,” but are, quite on the 
contrary, crucial to his absorption of the sceptical problem (“Stages” 2). 
 In Chapter 2, “Cavell’s Ear,” a comparison between those moments in Cavell’s 
writings on Shakespeare in which he turns to matters of the ear, and the way  the ear 
features in his other more “philosophical” or autobiographical writings, will confirm 
Shakespeare’s central importance for Cavell’s formulation of “separateness” and 
“acknowledgment.” Through an account  of the way he shifts his attention to the ear in 
crucial moments in his readings of The Winter’s Tale and Hamlet, I argue that in his 
philosophical discourse the existential and traumatic experience of the separation from 
the mother leaves its mark on the ear: whether this be on the scarred tympanum 
addressed in his autobiographical writings, or in the ear-poisoning or ear-whispering 
described in Shakespearean tragedy. The narratives of ear-pain and perfect pitch, at 
precisely those crucial moments when he himself pricks up his ears or listens through 
the ears of Shakespeare’s characters, therefore, become reminders of the fact that we are 
born of woman and that we are separated from her; in other words, that we are mortal 
and that we are alone. However, the ear is not only the figure through which 
separateness is registered: the figure of the ear and the actual process of listening are 
also used to show how our experience of separateness is to be alleviated. Falling back 
on Cavell’s reading of Austin’s Hippolytus and his notion of “passionate utterances,” I 
will maintain that when we pick up on the breath or tone of voice with which things are 
said (or are left unsaid), we are also picking up  on the separateness of our interlocutor, 
and therefore putting ourselves in a position to acknowledge the other. It is precisely 
this aspect of Cavell’s interest in the ear that allows us to make sense of the musical 
metaphors with which he speaks about Shakespearean drama. 
 Chapter 3, “Mending the Heart of Language in a Heartless World,” contends that 
in suggesting that  we can listen to Shakespearean drama in the same way that we can 
listen to other people, Cavell is not only claiming that the plays are subject to 
acknowledgment, but that the experience of reading or seeing them in the theatre can 
prepare us to better acknowledge the people around us. Cavell therefore shifts the 
sceptical focus away from the author of the plays to what the plays can do to their 
audience. In other words, what  matters for Cavell is no longer who wrote the plays or 
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even what exactly  he wrote but what the words give us occasion to do. I contend that 
this idea of Shakespearean drama is on the one hand indebted to Wittgenstein’s idea of 
Shakespeare as a creator of language, and on the other dependent on a textual model of 
reciprocal receptivity  of text and reader, which again displays figurative uses of the ear, 
and which is formulated on the back of Emerson’s reading of Shakespeare and Henry 
Thoreau’s Walden. For Cavell, philosophy must thus turn to Shakespeare or to literature 
not only because it illustrates separateness and acknowledgment, but also because the 
literary  encounter can help us to go beyond knowledge in order to acknowledge the 
other, whether this be a text, a character or a person. 
 To conclude the first part  of the thesis, the fourth chapter, “Perfect Pitch,” argues 
that on both sides of scholarship – looking at Cavell through Shakespeare, and looking 
at Shakespeare through Cavell – the significance of the dramatic Shakespearean form 
for Cavell’s philosophy has hitherto not been realised fully, partly because the many 
ways in which he imagines and practices the interdisciplinary encounter between 
philosophy and literature have not been adequately understood. One important 
repercussion of this encounter is his writing style, for which he has often been criticised 
but which is central to his philosophical method. By offering a series of hypotheses 
regarding the role of parentheses in his writing, I suggest that the notion of “remarriage 
comedies,” in particular The Winter’s Tale, serves as an illustration of what Cavell’s 
writing sets out to do: the dialogue between a “male” and “female” voice aims at the 
remarriage of philosophy and the ordinary, or human, voice.
By examining moments when Derrida talks about Shakespeare as well as instances 
when Shakespeare is grafted into his philosophical writing, the second part  of the thesis 
invites us to listen to “frequencies.” In Chapter 5, “Flèches,” I argue that Derrida’s 
reading of Romeo and Juliet à contretemps radically unsettles the way  a text is thought 
to behave in time, and thus also the relationship between text and reader. In bringing his 
essay “Aphorism Countertime” in conversation with the striking image of Shakespeare 
shooting arrows at us in Specters of Marx and the discussion of the arrow in Politics of 
Friendship, I suggest that for Derrida the trajectory of Shakespeare’s work is indeed 
“teleiopoetic,” to use a term that features heavily in Politics of Friendship. Following 
21
this, I draw from the image in Monolingualism of the Other of the penetrating, loving 
and loved, wounding and wounded arrows of French philosophy and language to 
suggest that the image of Shakespeare’s arrows implies a similarly  violent and loving 
traversal; one in which neither the reader nor the text, including the body of its idiom, 
remains unscathed. What we are therefore dealing with when reading Derrida reading 
Shakespeare is not, as Nussbaum suggests, a “detached” or “bloodless” reading that 
brushes away  the singularity  of the text (Love’s Knowledge 171). On the contrary, as 
Derrida’s image of the poem as a wound suggests, it  is precisely the text’s singularity 
which demands a similarly singular and dated response in the reader. 
 Chapter 6 follows the movements of the porpentine, a poematic and clairaudient 
animal that appears both in Shakespeare’s Hamlet and Derrida’s Specters of Marx, as a 
guide to the singular ways in which Derrida translates and reads Shakespeare. I begin by 
contrasting his parenthetical non-translation of the porpentine with Marx’s translation of 
Hamlet’s mole in The Eighteenth Brumaire, and argue that although Derrida’s use of 
Shakespeare is similarly  performative, it achieves this status by transposing the English 
idiom into his native French. By tracing how the Shakespearean word “relevant,” which 
Derrida speaks about in “What is a ‘Relevant’ Translation,” comes to haunt Derrida’s 
previous translation of Hegel’s Aufhebung, I suggest that the sounds or syllables of 
Shakespeare’s idiom come to bear on the Derridean act of translation. The catachrestic 
porpentine thus helps us understand how for Derrida the Shakespearean idiom, which is 
always plus d’un, not only  watches over English, but also Marx and Hegel’s German, 
and indeed Derrida’s French. 
 Derrida, like Cavell, is a particularly clairaudient reader of Shakespeare and like 
his contemporary, the act of listening has both an actual and philosophical valence. In 
Chapter 7, “Génie qui es tu,” I propose using the term “frequencies,” as it emerges in 
Specters, in order to address how these two modes of listening are intertwined. Whilst 
the ways in which sounds plays into Derrida’s acts of reading will have already been 
examined in the chapters prior to this, here I draw on both the image, in Derrida’s 
Genseses, Genealogies, Genres, & Genius, of the “genius who are you/who is silent 
[génie qui est tu]” and Derrida’s reading of the spectral voice in Hamlet in order to 
show that  it is the caesura, or moment of silence, which allows (Shakespeare’s) literary 
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genius to sound the reader out, and to be sounded out by  him or her. The second part of 
this chapter juxtaposes Persephone’s role in Derrida’s “Tympan” with the persephonic 
model of philosophical writing I propose in Chapter 4 in order to sound out the 
differences between the ways in which Derrida’s and Cavell’s distinct philosophical 
voices seek to shake up or tympanise philosophy. 
 Chapter 8, “Differential Tones,” turns to the political impact of Derrida’s acts of 
reading. I argue that any misreading of Specters of Marx, and what Derrida is doing 
with Marx, is also based on a misunderstanding of the role the Shakespearean 
references play in this text. We cannot understand Derrida’s re-politicisation if we do 
not understand it as an act of re-reading, which in the essay “Marx & Sons” is also 
comprehended in terms of “differential tones” (234). With a reading of how Derrida 
plays on the appearance and disappearance of Hamlet’s ghost  in Specters, and more 
precisely of how he paraphrases one reappearance as “Re-enter the Ghost,” I argue that 
it is precisely in this “re-” that we can hear the differential tones of Derrida’s 
performative reading resonate. 
In arguing that Cavell and Derrida provide positive examples of what philosophy can 
learn from literature and that, moreover, they do so – among other ways – via an 
extraordinary  aural sensitivity, one is faced with a number of caveats and problems, not 
least their different philosophical backgrounds and traditions. The complex ways in 
which Derrida’s and Cavell’s work seem both to clash and harmonise with each other 
has been written about by  a handful of scholars; Gordon Bearn’s “Sounding Serious: 
Cavell and Derrida,” Roger Bell’s Sounding the Abyss: Readings between Cavell and 
Derrida, Hent de Vries’ “Must We (Not) Mean What We Say? Seriousness and Sincerity 
in the Work of J.L. Austin and Stanley Cavell,” Toril Moi’s “‘They practice their trades 
in different worlds’: Concepts in Poststructuralism and Ordinary Language Philosophy,” 
Michael Fischer’s Stanley Cavell and Literary Skepticism, Chapter 3 of Asja 
Szafraniec’s Beckett, Derrida, and the Event of Literature and, among other works 
from his oeuvre, Cavell’s Philosophical Passages all venture descriptions of what unites 
and separates these philosophers. I will address the relationship between their acts of 
reading in two interludes: the first between Part One and Part Two, and the second 
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between Chapters 7 and 8. As I will argue, most of these studies are too skewed to give 
a fair portrait of what these philosophers, and most importantly their acts of reading, 
have in common, and where their fundamental philosophical assumptions become 
irreconcilable. It is not my intention to offer a comprehensive comparison between 
Cavell and Derrida, although scholarship is in need of one, or to claim that one 
philosopher is better at thinking through Shakespeare than the other. Neither is it this 
project’s aim to propose that one listens better to Shakespeare than the other, or indeed 
that Shakespeare’s plays justify one act of listening over and above the other. Instead, its 
object is to understand each act of reading in its own terms in order to show that they 
both, in their way, give us occasion to radically rethink the relationship between 
philosophy and literature.
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Part I – A Scarred Tympanum
1. Literary Investigations
“But can philosophy become literature and still know itself?” (Claim 496). Despite its 
being situated at the end of The Claim of Reason, this question regarding the 
interrelation between the two disciplines hovers over what is perhaps Cavell’s most 
uncontroversially philosophical work from the very beginning. Similarly, the reading of 
King Lear in “The Avoidance of Love” hovers over the largely philosophical 
investigations of Must We Mean What We Say? I begin my exploration of the role of 
Shakespeare for Cavell’s philosophy with the very  end of The Claim of Reason because, 
with its palintropic bearing, this question sets the tone for both the indirect paths of his 
philosophical writing as a whole, and the palintropic narratives with which it 
obsessively returns to Shakespeare.
 Cavell’s readings of Shakespeare deviate. There is what Rhu calls the “proleptic 
claim” that frames his readings of Shakespeare, namely the contention that  the 
scepticism portrayed in Shakespeare’s plays is more similar to Descartes’ than 
Montaigne’s (“Competing” 145). This prolepsis is echoed in Cavell’s narrative of that 
first philosophical spark, which seems both to have preceded and succeeded his interest 
in Shakespearean drama. In Cavell’s work, Shakespeare refuses to be pinpointed or 
confined to one single place or role. Staying in the company of this idiosyncratic thinker 
we will soon realise that his references to Shakespeare are, though singular, never 
confined to a single, isolated place in his oeuvre. To complicate matters further, his 
philosophical interests mark out a path of reading that is anything but linear: from 
Austin to Wittgenstein, Thoreau to Emerson, it does not progress from one to the next; 
just like notes in a chord, they do not succeed so much as augment each other. 
 The idiosyncratic lack of linearity in Cavell’s investigations should neither be 
ignored nor berated if one wishes to grasp his philosophical acts of reading. In Little 
Did I Know he writes: 
 I am familiar with the thought that there ought to be an orderly course of 
 preparation for what is commonly thought of as a path. I am I think more 
 impressed with the counterthought that there cannot be such a course, for the 
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 reason that there is no predicting what text, or conversation, will produce in this 
 or that mind, a conviction, I might say, in the reality  or presence of philosophy, 
 without which such a course cannot seriously begin to take effect. (253-4) 
The obliqueness of his philosophical-literary approach is indicative not of a lack of 
rigour, but rather is the expression of a different philosophical diligence more in line 
with what he wants philosophy to be, indeed what he believes philosophy  already is. 
The non-linearity of Cavell’s philosophical-literary itinerary is dictated by his 
conviction that literature and philosophy are part of the same endeavour; that, in other 
words, they  are – or should be – aiming at a conversion. In Contesting Tears Cavell 
declares: “for me there is no itinerary, say  no approach, to philosophy; rather philosophy 
comes upon me, approaches me, like a conversion” (64). If we wish to make sense of 
how his readings of Shakespeare bear on his philosophy, we cannot confine either 
discipline to what are traditionally thought to be their precincts; nor will it will be 
sufficient to merely speak of an affinity  between the disciplines. We must take a quite 
different approach. 
My approach to the question of how philosophy  and literature intersect in Cavell’s acts 
of reading Shakespeare is quite different to the one taken by Nussbaum. Her diagnosis 
of Cavell’s readings of Shakespeare is correct in most points: Cavell illuminates the 
plays, and his readings of Shakespeare also lend insights to philosophy  (“Stages” 2). 
Although these acts of reading may be literary in nature, they  are philosophical in 
outlook. They are, in this sense, not only concerned with opening new perspectives on 
the plays but also on scepticism. What is, however, troublesome in Nussbaum’s picture 
is that she presents two distinct, albeit at times intimately linked, disciplines. In this 
picture, although literature and philosophy become more affine, disciplinary boundaries 
remain ultimately  unchallenged. This view of two related yet distinct disciplines seems 
also to be held by Beckwith, who proffers an image of two chiasmatically  related 
disciplines: “employing this novel interpretation of skepticism, Cavell develops 
stunning readings of Shakespearean tragedy, but his reading of Shakespearean tragedy 
also inform his definition and brilliant redefinition, of skepticism” (125). Whilst 
Eldridge and Rhie – the editors of the first collection of essays on Cavell’s relationship 
to literary studies Stanley Cavell and Literary Studies – are right  in claiming that 
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“arguably no other living philosopher has done as much as Cavell to show the common 
cause shared by literature and philosophy, where both stand to lose by  failing to 
acknowledge and embrace the claims of the other,” simply positing this common cause 
is not doing the intricacies of Cavell’s philosophical-literary investigations any justice 
(2). Although I commend Nussbaum, Beckwith, and Eldridge and Rhie for their 
recognition of the double character of Cavell’s readings of Shakespeare, I am suspicious 
of the idea of interdisciplinarity  that  they imply. As Rhu observes in Stanley Cavell and 
Literary Studies often “pious fantasies of inter-disciplinarity abound, but the challenges 
of frank exchange and mutual intelligibility abide” (“Competing” 143). It  is certainly 
true that the way  in which literature and philosophy mingle in Cavell’s work is not 
always comfortable, but it is in just this difficulty that the value of what he is trying to 
do rests: “I know the company  [between literature and philosophy] is sometimes restive, 
difficult, occasionally quite impossible. If you do not find it so it  may  be that you are 
too much conceiving of philosophy as a well-behaved and well-explored function of 
literature, or of literature as treating independently  well-known philosophical 
ideas” (Disowning 2). The texts collected in Disowning Knowledge are negotiating this 
difficult relation, treating Shakespeare’s plays neither as a mere illustration of well-
known philosophical ideas, nor philosophy as a mere function of them. Instead, 
literature is seen as “partak[ing] of a mode of existence which is philosophical, and 
from which the philosopher might find instruction” (Davies 137).
 I would like to challenge a too-comfortable view of the interdisciplinary nature 
of Cavell’s work, which sees literature and philosophy  as attuned yet  separate 
disciplines, because it  gives rise to the belief, expressed also by  Nussbaum, that “the 
plays are being used as occasions for the pursuit of Cavell’s own 
preoccupations” (“Stages” 7). This image is in turn related to the notion that Cavell’s 
work on Shakespeare is secondary  to his purely philosophical discussion of scepticism, 
for instance through his engagement with Austin and Wittgenstein. In this first  chapter, I 
will address these misconceptions and argue that we will not be able to fully understand 
how Cavell’s readings of Shakespeare do philosophy as long as we think of philosophy 
and literature as two distinct  precincts of his thought. I am here arguing along those 
lines traced by Katrin Trüstedt when she writes that “seine detaillierten Text-Lektüren 
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haben es sich zur Aufgabe gemacht, diese Texte in ihrem spezifisch literarischen So-
Sein ernst  zu nehmen und eben darin ihre philosophische Bedeutung 
aufzufinden” (107).5 Whilst the question concluding The Claim of Reason is, according 
to Moi, natural for “someone who believes that a work of art can have philosophical 
insights,” it can also be posed the other way around (“Adventures” 19). Like this 
question, Cavell’s work raises doubts about our traditional image of philosophy, just as 
it does about what we think literature is. Far from drawing on the question of literature 
and philosophy, it aspires toward a new comprehension of philosophy and literature, as 
well as philosophy and literature, that radically shifts our understanding of what 
characterises these disciplines individually and what they can achieve together. 
1.1 Shakespeare’s Sceptics
Cavell’s readings of Shakespeare blur disciplinary distinctions by showing us that his 
tragic heroes are also sceptics. His readings of Shakespearean tragedy and late romance 
propose that the sceptic is not only someone who wonders about the existence of a 
goldfinch at the end of the garden. The sceptic is someone who, like Lear, banishes his 
daughter; who, like Leontes, wonders whether his children are truly his; and who, like 
Othello, thinks that he has reason to doubt his wife’s faithfulness. The sceptic is, in 
other words, just like us – indeed he is us. As Leontes, Othello, Lear, Hamlet, 
Coriolanus and Macbeth become Shakespearean embodiments of the sceptic, so 
Cavell’s readings of tragedy diagnose the tragic streak of philosophy.6 
 Cavell’s twin concerns of philosophy and literature – as expressed in his 
readings of Shakespeare, and others besides – surface most clearly in his discussion of 
language. Language, the medium through which philosophical and literary endeavours 
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5 “His detailed acts of reading have proposed to take these texts seriously in their specific literary nature, 
and it is precisely in their literary nature that they find their philosophical significance” (my translation). 
6 Unfortunately the scope of this thesis does not allow me to give full accounts of all of Cavell’s acts of 
reading Shakespeare. Out of the total of seven collected in Disowning Knowledge the choice fell on “The 
Avoidance of Love,” “Hamlet’s Burden of Proof,” “Othello and the Stage of the Other” and “Recounting 
Gains, Showing Losses: Reading The Winter’s Tale” because they provide the best insight into the role of 
Shakespeare in Cavell’s philosophy. His readings of Macbeth and Coriolanus, as well as a short reading 
of The Merchant of Venice in The Claim of Reason must remain for another time. 
alike are channelled, communicated and considered, therefore comes to bridge his 
readings of the tragedies and his work on the philosophical problem of scepticism. 
“Recounting Gains, Showing Losses: Reading The Winter’s Tale” is illuminating to read 
alongside Cavell’s work on Austin and Wittgenstein because it illustrates, perhaps more 
than the other plays Cavell scrutinises for the cause and cure of the sceptic’s malaise, 
the imbrications of scepticism, tragedy and language. It is no coincidence that Leontes 
is taken over by sceptical doubt shortly  after he has heard Hermione deftly convince 
Polixenes to stay with them a little while longer. Hermione is, indeed, all but “tongue-
tied” (1.2.27). Half-mockingly repeating the very same word with which Polixenes 
feebly protests against staying – “verily” (1.2.46) – she insists that “a lady’s Verily’s / 
As potent as a lord’s” (1.2.50-1). Although Leontes is evidently  pleased that Polixenes 
is staying – “Hermione, my dearest, thou never spok’st / To better purpose” (1.2.88-9) – 
he is somewhat taken aback at  how quickly she succeeds. Indeed, he compares the 
speed of her convincing Polixenes with the “three crabbed months” that “had sour’d 
themselves to death” (1.2.102) before she accepted his proposal. Leontes’ sceptical 
doubt is here stirred by the fact  that it took Hermione less to convince Polixenes than it 
took Leontes himself to convince her.7  Even more so, that  her language succeeded in 
doing something that  his did not. It  would therefore seem that  the onset of Leontes’ 
erosive sceptical doubt has more to do with the realisation of the strange double face of 
language – its power and its impotence – than in his wife’s behaviour towards Polixenes 
per se. The sceptic’s anxiety is noted in the realisation that, as Ludger Viefhues-Bailey 
asserts, our agreement in what we mean when we say something is “not secured by 
transcendental structures of language” (8). Consequently the sceptic’s “misuse” of 
language is much more than a collateral symptom of his scepticism. 
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7 In this thesis I consciously choose to go against the convention of referring to the reader as “she” 
rather than “he.” I do so for a variety of reasons.  I have always felt that this convention is, albeit well-
meaning, still a rather vacuous gesture. What does the use of a female rather than a male pronoun 
achieve? Does it actually shake up the way we think about sexual difference? Does it actually level the 
playing field for female academics? I doubt it.  I have also chosen to use the male pronoun throughout 
for reasons of clarity,  since Cavell identifies scepticism as a “male” position and acknowledgment as a 
“female” position.  The question of how gender comes into Cavell’s understanding of scepticism and 
acknowledgment is,  to say the least, contentious and I briefly turn to it in Chapter 4. Derrida’s similar, 
if less pronounced, tendency to privilege a “female” mode addressed in Chapter 7 is no less 
problematic. In any case, the substitution of a pronoun would in this context,  I feel, not work towards 
a resolution of these tensions but merely gloss them over. 
 Leontes not  only  speaks a language that Hermione and the audience cannot 
understand, he also hears in language something only he can detect (3.2.80). Making 
words his own, Leontes charts a parallel world in which words have a weight and 
significance only he is able to appreciate. Let us listen to his conversation with Camillo, 
shortly after he has decided that Hermione and Polixenes have cuckolded him. When 
asked why Polixenes is staying, Camillo answers:
 CAMILLUS  At the good queen’s entreaty.
 LEONTES  At the queen’s be’t; ‘good’ should be pertinent,
    But so it is, it is not.
         (1.2.220-2)
Leontes is no longer taking the meaning of “good” for granted, and rather measures, 
weighs and scrutinises it for its meaning, as if he has just heard it for the first  time. In 
his ear the meaning slips from the apostrophic use to an adjective denoting the queen’s 
virtue. Similarly, after hearing Camillo’s reason for why Polixenes is staying longer – 
“To satisfy your highness, and the entreaties / Of our most gracious 
mistress” (1.2.231-2) – Leontes again inflects what he hears to feed his suspicions. 
“Satisfy? / Th’ entreaties of your mistress? satisfy?” (1.2.233-4). No longer merely 
inflecting what he hears, he repeats it  as if to savour the resonances he cannot help but 
hear. Here, Leontes is slipping poison into his own ear. We might concur with Beckwith 
that “Shakespeare’s tragic heroes, such as Othello and Leontes, are would-be private 
linguists, imagining that they can define a world from their viewpoint only” (135). As 
the play’s winter segment draws to an end, Leontes’ language becomes increasingly 
inventive and incomprehensible – the composites of “inch-thick, knee-deep; o’er head 
and ears a fork’d one” only being one example (1.2.186). Here language is no longer 
shared; rather, it has become a coagulant separating those who hear, those who do not 
want to hear and those that hear something in language that is not there, indeed perhaps 
unheard of. 
Cavell is not only interested in thinking about how a particular philosophical 
problematic is played out and illuminated by literature; he is also inquisitive about how 
this affects philosophy. When Cavell tends his ear to how the sceptic plight reverberates 
in the language of Shakespeare’s tragic heroes, he is with his other ear listening to how, 
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for instance, Leontes’ plight may be transposed to the philosophical realm. When 
reading Shakespeare he is, in other words, always attentive to the lessons tragedy holds 
for philosophy. When Leontes misuses language, when he is “wanting to tell more than 
words can say and evade telling altogether” he is therefore falling into philosophy’s 
original sin (Disowning 201). In “Knowing and Acknowledging” Cavell notes that “the 
skeptic uses a form of words that makes perfect sense in certain contexts and then 
applies it to a case in which it makes no sense” (250). Philosophy’s progress is of course 
dependant on using words “outside its language game(s), apart from its ordinary 
criteria” (Disowning 7). Whilst it  is naturally  “essential to language that words can so 
be turned,” that we can stretch their use, an over-stretching of language, such as 
happens in vast areas of professional philosophy, has potentially tragic consequences 
(7). In Beckwith’s words, the tragedies “diagnose the relentless cost of imagining that 
language can be private property of the mind – the protagonists of those plays define the 
world from their single perspective and lose it along with everyone they love” (135). 
Yet somewhat paradoxically, a certain part of philosophy interprets this loss of common 
ground with its interlocutors as a state of enlightenment (perhaps the obtainment of a 
particularly sophisticated and scholarly rigour). Leontes’ sentence “I have drunk, and 
seen the spider” (2.1.45) – the spider in the cup being the certainty that Hermione has 
been unfaithful to him and that the child she is carrying is not his – perhaps best denotes 
the sceptic’s idea “of being cursed, or sickened, in knowing more than his fellows about 
the fact of knowing itself, in having somehow peeked behind the scenes, or, say, 
conditions, of knowing” (Disowning 197).8
 In Cavell’s act of reading, Leontes, who explodes the ordinary  use of language 
in order to satisfy his own fantasies of knowledge, grows into the epitome of another 
tragic figure: the philosopher. The tragic hero has something of the sceptic when he 
removes himself from ordinary language, just as there is something tragic in the way the 
philosopher frequently raises radically sceptical demands, “in which the best case of 
knowledge shows itself vulnerable to suspicion” (7). The philosopher’s sceptical stance 
is tragic because, in raising sceptical demands, the philosopher implies that “true 
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8  I italicise knowing or knowledge every time I wish to indicate knowing as opposed to 
acknowledging, as contrasted by Cavell in his early essay “Knowing and Acknowledging.” When I 
wish to speak of knowing as acknowledging, it will not be italicised.
knowledge is beyond the human self, that  what we hold in our minds to be true of the 
world can have at best the status of opinion, education, guesswork, hypothesis, 
construction, belief” (7). When the philosopher “turn[s to] the concept of belief” to 
name our “absolute intimacy” with the world, he describes this relation in a way  that 
“no human other could either confirm or compromise,” simply because our “intimacy” 
with the world is not a question of belief (7-8). The sceptic thus puts the world into the 
position of a speaker, whose claims the philosopher cannot “listen” to (7-8). The 
philosopher’s claim to knowledge therefore substitutes a more immediate, and Cavell 
seems to suggest more human, relationship to the world and those who live in it.
 In “Recounting Gains, Showing Losses: Reading The Winter’s Tale” literary and 
philosophical interests are not merely  affine to each other; they become one another. 
Despite his literary insight, the discipline of literary studies has been, write Eldridge and 
Rhie, slow to welcome Cavell as one of its own: “obviously held in high esteem, he is 
rarely cited, and more rarely  do his insights and ideas establish the terms of professional 
debate within literary studies about a given intellectual issue, whether theoretical or 
interpretative” (2). This resistance is particularly conspicuous when compared to the 
impact Derrida has had on literary studies. For Eldridge and Rhie, literary studies has 
been reluctant to accept Cavellian acts of reading for a variety of reasons, ranging from 
the all too pedestrian-sounding approach of ordinary  language philosophy to his 
seemingly out-dated humanism (3-5). Another reason why Cavell’s acts of readings 
have so far failed to take hold on the imaginations of literary scholars is that they  have 
failed to appreciate both the intricacies of Cavell’s literary-philosophical investigations, 
as well as what they  are ultimately aiming at. They have, in other words, not yet come 
to appreciate fully  that his philosophical and literary ambitions are both secondary to a 
wider concern which we may, with Eldridge and Rhie, call “humanist,” but which for 
the time being I would like to call “human.” And the end of “Recounting Gains,” for 
instance, when Cavell, with an ear to Hamlet, speaks about the mirror held up to nature, 
the distinction between philosophy and literature becomes less important to the point of 
vanishing. For Cavell “Hamlet’s picture of the mirror held up to nature asks us to see if 
the mirror as it  were clouds, to determine whether nature is breathing (still, again) – 
asks us to be things affected by the question” (Disowning 221). The tone of Cavell’s 
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disciplinary  irreverence is set by his attention to how this drama affects us. It is 
precisely this drama’s capacity to arouse in its readers certain emotions, or questions 
that are not traditionally thought to pertain to the philosophical realm that, as I will go 
on to argue in the next section, paradoxically contributes to the laying of Cavell’s 
philosophical foundations.
1.2 Separateness: Towards Philosophical Foundations 
There exists a widespread view that a writer’s philosophical and literary interests must 
succeed each other, either temporally or in importance, that, in other words, they  cannot 
be on equal footing. Accordingly, the overwhelming scholarly consensus is that Cavell’s 
readings of Shakespearean tragedy are secondary to his own philosophical concerns. 
According to this view, his literary investigations are thus built  on philosophical 
foundations, which in turn are constituted by a move from Austin to Wittgenstein. Such 
a view can, for instance, be found on the very first page of Eldridge’s and Rhie’s 
“Introduction” to Stanley Cavell and Literary Studies: “By synthesising lessons about 
ordinary  language he first learned from J. L. Austin with the teachings of the later 
Wittgenstein, Cavell early on developed a radically original interpretation of skepticism 
that would go on to inform all his subsequent philosophical investigations” (1). Along 
similar lines, Espen Hammer asserts that the development of the notion of 
acknowledgment is ascribable to the fact  that in his later work Cavell moves away from 
an Austinian vision of language, where speakers are guided by impersonal rules (still at 
times held in Must We Mean What We Say), towards a view of language more akin to 
Wittgenstein’s notion of forms of life (43-8). Likewise, for Mulhall, Cavell’s view of 
language is a blend of Austin’s ordinary  language philosophy and Wittgenstein’s 
understanding of criteria and grammar: “beginning from a classically Austinian 
emphasis upon ‘what we say  when’, he ends up  placing great weight upon the 
essentially  Wittgensteinian notions of grammar and criteria” (19). Whilst these pictures 
of Cavell’s philosophical endeavours are accurate enough, something essential, namely 
what triggered Cavell’s turn to philosophy, escapes them.
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 When Cavell collected the pieces he had written on Shakespeare in Disowning 
Knowledge he “began to wish to assess what happens to the essays in the face of one 
another, or backed against one another, and to let them find their weight with just the 
philosophy that clings to them in their individual emergencies.” He continues:
 The misunderstanding of my attitude that most concerned me was to take my 
 project as the application of some philosophically independent problematic of 
 skepticism to a fragmentary parade of Shakespearean texts, impressing those 
 texts into the service of illustrating philosophical conclusions known in advance. 
 Sympathy  with my project depends, on the contrary, on unsettling the matter of 
 priority (as between philosophy and literature, say) implied in the concepts of 
 illustration and application. (1)
In Cavell’s readings of Shakespeare, the relationship between philosophy and literature 
goes deeper than the concepts of priority, illustration and application can fathom. 
Amongst the critics writing about Cavell and Shakespeare, Mulhall is, to my 
knowledge, the only one to highlight the fact that  “Cavell is convinced not only that 
scepticism is a topic within these plays, but also that the Shakespearean corpus of which 
they  are members – this particular mode of poetic drama, this particular body of 
expressions – itself constitutes an effort to overcome the sceptical impulse in our 
culture” (196). I want to go a step further and proffer the hypothesis that 
acknowledgment and separateness are not only something that the plays trace, but that 
Cavell’s engagement with Shakespearean drama plays a crucial role in the formulation 
of his philosophical contribution.
 It is remarkable, though hardly surprising, that the Shakespearean influence is 
not taken into account in most narrations of Cavell’s philosophical evolution. There is 
another way  of tracing the arch of Cavell’s career. Rhu, for instance, describes Cavell’s 
career as arcing from “skepticism to perfectionism” before claiming that  “the defining 
arc of Cavell’s career could also be described as a development from Shakespeare to 
Emerson, with particular attention appositely paid to how Emerson begins to enter 
Cavell’s interpretation of Shakespeare” (“Competing” 141).9 The parallel arches drawn 
up by Rhu come, to my mind, closer to sketching his career because they  move away 
from a discipline-based approach to one focusing on trans-disciplinary preoccupations. 
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9 For more on this arc from scepticism to perfectionism, see also Rhu’s Stanley Cavell’s American Dream, 
in particular Chapter 3.
If we had to draw an arc it would have to curve from “skepticism to perfectionism,” or 
put in Shakespearean terms, “from tragedy to romance,” rather than from philosophy to 
literature (141). In contrast  to Rhu and others, I maintain that this arc is not merely 
echoed in his readings of Shakespeare but that  it  was, in all its urgency, first discovered 
by Cavell through an encounter with Shakespearean drama.
Although Cavell’s contribution to the philosophical problem of scepticism is certainly 
indebted to a cross-fertilisation of Austin and Wittgenstein, its genesis, so to speak, is 
more complicated than generally assumed. In the first part of The Claim of Reason, 
Cavell outlines the differences between Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s understanding of 
criteria. In “Austin and Examples,” Cavell reads Austin’s “Other Minds” as discussing 
“the relation between knowing what a thing is (by  means of criteria) and knowing that it 
is” (Claim 49). Criteria in the Austinian sense will therefore allow us to claim that 
something is a goldfinch no matter whether it is a real one or a stuffed one, because “the 
criteria (marks, features) are the same for something’s being a goldfinch whether it is 
real, imagined, hallucinatory, stuffed, painted, or in any way phoney” (51). For 
Wittgenstein, by contrast, criteria unveil (our) use as (our) meaning. As The Claim of 
Reason states, “criteria do not  relate a name to an object, but, we might say, various 
concepts to the concept of that object” (73). Put differently, “the test of your possession 
of a concept (e.g., of a chair; or a bird; of the meaning of a word; of what it is to know 
something) would be your ability to use the concept in conjunction with other concepts, 
your knowledge of which concepts are relevant to the one in question and which are 
not” (73). What criteria, therefore, reveal for Wittgenstein is an underlying grammar of 
understanding, only subsequently  filled by the world. In asking myself, for instance, 
what I mean when I say “I have a toothache,” I am, in a Wittgensteinian vein, not asking 
myself about the nature (or existence) of a pain or feeling that would elicit such an 
utterance, but rather about the context and consequences under which I might be saying 
(or indeed not be saying) “I have a toothache”. Simply put, the question for 
Wittgensteinian criteria does not lead to the answer about what  something is but what it 
is for us.
 For Wittgenstein criteria have a greater affinity with judgments than with 
statements; and our ability to establish criteria indeed depends upon a prior agreement 
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in judgments (30). Wittgensteinian criteria do not  discover a factual or knowledge-based 
root of our criteria, but our attunement in them. In § 241 of the Philosophical 
Investigations Wittgenstein writes: “So you are saying that human agreement decides 
what is true and what is false?” – It is what human beings say that is true and false; and 
they  agree in the language they use. [Richtig und falsch ist, was Menschen sagen; und 
in der Sprache stimmen die Menschen überein]. That is not agreement 
[Übereinstimmung] in opinions but in forms of life.”10 As Sandra Laugier points out, “it 
is of the first importance for Cavell that Wittgenstein says that we agree in and not on 
language. That means that we are not makers of the agreement, that language precedes 
agreement just  as much as agreement makes language possible, and that this circularity 
amounts to an irreducible element of skepticism” (24). For Ewa Plonowska Ziarek, 
Wittgestein’s hypothesis that criteria unveil our attunement (or lack thereof) 
demonstrates that “the stability  of meaning in ordinary language cannot be confused 
with conceptual necessity  because it rests on a common linguistic practice – on the 
agreements in judgements reached among the speakers rather than on the rules of 
reason” (27). Therefore, “if our relation to the world and to others in general 
presupposes a background of attunement in criteria, then it cannot be one of knowing, 
where knowing is construed as certainty” (Mulhall, 84, my italics). We are attuned or in 
attunement with each other. This attunement is surprisingly  robust, yet  fragile. The very 
possibility of attunement in judgments harbours the possibility that at some point we 
will cease to agree and that our attunement will disintegrate top to bottom. In Mulhall’s 
words: “we cannot ‘refute’ the possibility  that someone will decide (or find, or be driven 
to the conclusion) that he no longer agrees with others, that his attunement with them 
has limits; we cannot ‘refute’ the possibility of repudiating an agreement, however 
fundamental that agreement may be” (104). 
 Although Wittgenstein’s criteria go beyond knowledge, they do not offer an 
antidote to the sceptical threat. Let us, for instance, take the example of pain. As 
Mulhall explains, Wittgensteinian “criteria of pain are satisfied by the presence of pain-
behaviour, and so cannot guarantee the presence of pain” (83). Similarly, the very 
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10  The term “attunement” is better than “agreement” here, not only because it echoes Wittgenstein’s 
idea of agreement as a kind of tuning into one another, but also because it has significant 
psychoanalytic reverberations that,  as we will see in the next chapter,  are a crucial framing element of 
what Cavell does with Wittgenstein. 
words, utterances, or gestures that express pain cannot be fully trusted. Though pain 
manifests itself “right at the surface, like shivering,” the “idea of someone’s pain” seems 
“so far from what manifests it” (80). In short, whilst the reality  of pain is “wholly 
inner,” its criteria are “wholly outer” (80). Criteria, the very thing meant to get us closer 
to the thing in question, is thus the very thing that blocks our access to it. Criteria are 
therefore “disappointing,” because they  “do not assure that my words reach all the way 
to the pain of others” (79). In introducing the thought that there is no way in which we 
can actually  know what the other means when he says that she is in pain, thus proposing 
that there are moments when we are simply not attuned, Wittgensteinian criteria 
paradoxically show that the limitations of criteria do not limit our abilities to respond to 
the other even if we do not know her pain. Wittgenstein’s idea of Übereinstimmung (like 
Cavell’s acknowledgment) does not so much oppose knowledge as pull the rug out from 
under the necessity to know, and redirect our enquiry to different ground. Again Laugier 
offers a lucid formulation: 
 There is not, then, an “answer” to the skepticism that emerges from the fragility 
 of our agreements. That our ordinary  language is founded on nothing but itself is 
 not only a source of anxiety as to the validity of what we do and say: it  is the 
 revelation of a truth about ourselves that we do not want to recognize – that “I” 
 am the sole possible source of their validity. To refute this, to attempt to surpass 
 skepticism, ends up reinforcing skepticism. (22)
This shift away from knowledge is momentous for Cavell’s understanding of language 
and is indeed indicative of what the sceptic’s misuse of language, as for example 
illustrated by his diagnosis of Leontes, is a symptom of. 
Cavell’s groundbreaking contribution to the philosophical problem of scepticism turns 
on the simple realisation that we cannot help  not knowing some things for certain but 
that this does not mean that we cannot know. There is something – a lack but also a 
possibility – that  eludes epistemology and that underlies Cavell’s reliance on a 
Wittgesteinian notion of attunement. We may perceive traces of this “lack” in his 
discussion of Wittgenstein’s criteria:
 What is disappointing about criteria? In a philosophical mood, we wanted the 
 wince to take us all the way to the other’s pain itself, but it  seems to stop at the 
 body. The feeling is: The wince itself is one thing, the pain itself something else; 
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 the one can’t be the other. But what happened to the pain that was in (what we 
 called) the wince? That – the pain he’s wincing in – is what I called his being in 
 pain, and pitied. (That is…what I called? What is? Why the past tense with a 
 present demonstrative? Do I not call it that now? Or has it vanished?) He was 
 wincing in pain. It wouldn’t have been a wince otherwise. – And was it? Surely 
 he could have come out with that (what we call – called – a wince) with nothing 
 behind it. Or maybe the “wince” meant something else. It’s the same old circle. 
              (Claim 81)
In Cavell’s meditation the idea surfaces that something, a moment or a pain, or 
someone, me or you, can be completely and wholly separate, complete and wholly 
beyond the grasp of our knowledge. There is no way  of one knowing another person’s 
state of mind, feelings, what they mean exactly: the wince, although an expression of it, 
is not the pain, and even if it were, as soon as these questions are posed, the present 
tense in which it could be apprehended slips into the past. The pain dodges our grasp 
and vanishes. Whilst the feeling of separateness guides Cavell’s shift from an Austinian 
to a Wittgensteinian understanding of criteria, leaving the matter at merely accepting or 
recognising it would be meaningless, since it is clear that human beings are mostly 
attuned: they are able day in, day out to judge each other’s state of mind, feelings, and 
what they meant when they said “I have a headache” correctly. 
 The point here seems to be that although we do not know precisely, we know 
enough to live and most importantly live with others. In other words, even if we do not 
know some things, we still know them well enough to get  by. In drawing “Knowing and 
Acknowledging” to a conclusion Cavell writes: 
 I take the philosophical problem of privacy, therefore, not to be one of finding 
 (or denying) a “sense” of “same” in which two persons can (or cannot) have the 
 same experience, but one of learning why it is that something which from one 
 point of view looks like a common occurrence (that we frequently  have the same 
 experiences – say looking together at a view of mountains, or diving into the 
 same cold lake, or hearing a car horn stuck; and that we frequently do not have 
 the same experiences – say at a movie, or leaning the results of an election, or 
 hearing your child cry) from another point of view looks impossible, almost 
 inexpressible (that I have your experiences, that I be you). (262)
The question is therefore not why at times we cannot know, but why at times we choose 
not to know. The point is that although the sceptic’s conclusions – “that we can’t know 
what another person is feeling because we can’t have the same feeling, feel his pain, the 
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way he feels it” – leaves us “shocked,” we still at times behave as if we believed him 
(246-7). We cannot, it seems, shake this feeling of separateness: “But I am filled with 
this feeling – of our separateness, let  us say – and I want you to have it too. So I give 
voice to it. And then my powerlessness presents itself as ignorance – a metaphysical 
finitude as an intellectual lack. (Reverse Faust, I take the bargain of supernatural 
ignorance.)” (263). The problem is not that we are separate, in other words, that  my 
experience of hearing a child cry may stir different emotions in me than it does in you; 
it is rather but how I react to these cries and why sometimes I pretend to hear and know 
less than I actually do. 
I have tried to show that Cavell’s philosophical readings are based on the experience of 
separateness, the source of which is, although not extraneous to Austin’s and 
Wittgenstein’s oeuvres, external to both. His reading of both Wittgenstein and Austin is 
indebted to a third influence – the experience of separateness – which, together with its 
potentially tragic or redemptory consequences, is, I will go on to argue in the next 
section, first grasped and formulated in his encounter with Shakespeare. We must also 
turn to King Lear to understand why  for the sceptic taking this dehumanising bargain is 
easier to bear than acknowledging our common separateness.
1.3 Lear’s Avoidance, Cordelia’s Acknowledgment
What “The Avoidance of Love” and other Shakespearean readings urge is that the 
sceptic chooses his actions: that though tragic in their consequences, they seem less 
awful than running the risk of discovering and indeed facing his separateness. Cavell 
repeatedly argues that the sceptic’s claim on knowledge is not a positive but a negative 
one, motivated by wanting to avoid the metaphysical consequences of our common 
separateness and our finitude. The sceptic therefore chooses to “interpret[s] a 
metaphysical finitude as an intellectual lack” (Disowning 11). In Gould’s phrasing, 
scepticism thus “refers less to an intellectual position concerning the impossibility of 
knowledge,” but “disguises a deeper anxiety,” for instance about “our place in the 
world” and “the fateful precariousness of our knowledge, which the epistemic 
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constructions of skepticism can never catch up with or domesticate” (208, my italics).11 
This misguided faith in epistemology is mirrored in the sceptic’s misunderstanding of 
what criteria can actually  do. One example of this is Leontes’ perversion of the function 
of criteria when trying to ascertain whether Mamillius is truly his son. When, as Cavell 
writes, “Leontes cannot convince himself that Mamillius is his son on the basis of 
criteria such as their having similar noses and heads,” he does not conclude that these 
criteria are insufficient, or that that knowledge in general is insufficient for ascertaining 
whether he is truly  Mamillius’ father. Instead, he “concludes that he may disown his 
child, not count him as his own” and tragedy ensues (Disowning 206). Leontes the 
philosopher-sceptic is here perverting Wittgenstein’s understanding of family 
resemblances. Let us briefly turn to § 67 of the Philosophical Investigations: “I can 
think of no better expression to characterise these similarities than ‘family 
resemblances’; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, 
features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same 
way. - And I shall say: ‘games’ form a family.” What his scrutiny of Mamillius’ face 
does not account for is that in order to establish a “relation” between them, two things, 
games or people do not need to be connected by one essential common feature (for 
example a nose), but that  a “resemblance” may be traced by connecting a series of 
overlapping similarities, where no feature is common to all. In short, the sceptic Leontes 
entrusts the solution of a problem to knowledge even if this problem does not fall into 
its realm.
 Why does the sceptic turn to knowledge if knowledge cannot bring the relief he 
is after? We could look to any  of the tragedies analysed in Disowning Knowledge for the 
existential drama that  the sceptic’s epistemological crisis hides, but it  is perhaps 
nowhere more poignantly described than in “The Avoidance of Love,” his reading of 
King Lear. The play, we recall, begins with a father’s ploy  to obtain his daughters’ 
public demonstration of their love in exchange for a portion of his kingdom, 
corresponding to the expanse of their professed love. Goneril and Regan comply, 
Cordelia does not. Lear is not satisfied and tragedy unfolds. To be sure, Cordelia’s 
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11 Another useful formulation can be found in Eldridge and Rhie: “For Cavell, skeptical doubt about the 
external world or other minds is neither an intellectual error in need of logical refutation (as philosophy 
has traditionally assumed), nor an ill-formed worry that we might readily put behind us, but a reflection 
of the inescapable finitude that characterizes every human life” (1). 
answer “Nothing, my lord” (1.1.87) and concession that she loves Lear “according to 
[her] bond, no more nor less” (1.1.93) seems rather tight-lipped. This lack of emotional 
expressiveness, however, does not  explain Lear’s reaction, nor does it make it  any less 
puzzling. The question is whether we are ready to believe that Lear does not know his 
daughters well enough to be aware that Cordelia’s “love’s / More ponderous than [her] 
tongue” (1.1.77-8), and that Goneril and Regan’s words are a mere rhetoric.12  For 
Cavell, this seems unlikely. How then does Cavell explain Lear’s bizarre behaviour?
  In “The Avoidance of Love” Cavell suggests that Lear turns to knowledge by 
asking his daughters to quantify their love for him, because he cannot bear to be 
separate. As Davide Sparti has argued, “in avoiding Cordelia’s sign of authentic love, 
Lear is avoiding what every love implies, that is, one’s need of and hence dependency 
on the other, thus, one’s incompleteness and potential vulnerability” (92). What does 
Cordelia do in the face of her father’s avoidance? “Love, and be silent” (1.1.62). 
Cordelia’s answer is outrageous to Lear, precisely  because it answers his demand too 
well. When Cordelia says “nothing” she cuts right through his spiel, and threatens to 
reveal his dependence, because she is voicing their common separateness (1.1.87). 
When Cordelia confirms that she loves him “according to [her] bond,” she is in truth 
declaring that her love will not bow its head to tyranny, i.e. that it cannot be swayed by 
monetary or emotional blackmail; that there is nothing her father can do to make her 
love him more or less (1.1.93). Cordelia’s refusal to gush forth hyperboles, regardless of 
the consequences for her, makes her expression of love, if sober, truthfully and freely 
given. Her refusal to be paid off, Cavell suggests, both reveals the depth of her affection 
and shows that there is nothing that Lear can do to deserve, or buy, this love (Disowning 
62). As Bruns notes, “Lear turns on Cordelia because he knows, or fears, from her 
directness, possibly from her look, anyhow from her refusal to play the game, that she 
can’t feign feigning but  genuinely loves him” (“Cavell’s Shakespeare” 619). For Lear, 
recognising Cordelia’s true expression of love would amount to admitting that  such a 
thing as unconditional love exists and that he could be wondrously  worthy of it. It 
would mean that he would have to accept that  love explodes the realm of what is 
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12  In some editions, Cordelia’s words are not “more ponderous” but “richer” than her tongue. 
Ponderous is more suitable to Cavell’s reading, since it reverberates with Cavell’s interest in the 
weight of words, but also with his image of Cordelia choking with her heart in her throat, that I will 
turn to in Chapters 2 and 3.
knowable and that the reasons he himself could be considered loveable are not 
recountable. Put differently, if Cordelia’s love can only be given freely and received 
freely, then there is nothing in the realm of Lear’s knowledge that explains this love. 
When he holds her to ransom, he is therefore doing nothing other than trying to pull 
love back into the realm of what is graspable, even countable in monetary terms. There 
is, however, a further twist to Lear’s behaviour. As is asserted in “Knowing and 
Acknowledging,” “the skeptic’s knowledge, should we feel its power, is devastating: he 
is not challenging a particular belief or set of beliefs about, say, other minds; he is 
challenging the ground of our beliefs altogether, our power to believe at all” (240). In 
not accepting Cordelia’s response, he effectively  shuts his ears to her and her cry of 
acknowledgment. Shakespeare’s tragedies thus show “the annihilation inherent in the 
skeptical problematic, that scepticism’s ‘doubt’ is motivated not by (not even where it is 
expressed as) a (misguided) intellectual scrupulousness but by a (displaced) denial, by a 
self-consuming disappointment that seeks world-consuming revenge” (Disowning 5-6). 
What Cordelia’s death illustrates is that the truly tragic consequences of the sceptic’s 
choice are played out on the skin of others, to whom he refuses to relate and whom he 
hinders from relating to him.
 If Lear is the epitome of the sceptic, then Cordelia is the embodiment of 
acknowledgment, understood as the revelation of our common separateness. The way to 
overcome scepticism is neither denying the grounds for scepticism (because they cannot 
be shifted), nor tackling them on the basis of knowledge, but by shifting the ground of 
inquiry  away from knowledge and towards acknowledgment. Knowing and 
acknowledging do not  represent polar opposites; rather, they are both different modes of 
knowledge. In Cavell’s words: “One could say: Acknowledgment goes beyond 
knowledge. (Going beyond not, so to speak, in the order of knowledge, but in its 
requirement that I do something or reveal something on the basis of that 
knowledge)” (“Knowing” 257). In saying that  the question of other minds is not a 
matter of knowledge, but of acknowledgment, he is not only saying that we must forgo 
knowledge but that we must work within our limitations. When, in The Claim of 
Reason, Cavell therefore suggests that “we have faith that the things of our world exist,” 
here faith is not divinely given, but must be worked for and towards on the basis of our 
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knowledge: “But how is that faith achieved, how expressed, how maintained, how 
deepened, how lost?” (243). What counts for Cavell is not whether we know for certain 
but what we choose to do, or more precisely to reveal. It is only when I admit to myself 
and others that I am separate from them, just as they are from me, that we can start 
taking steps towards each other. Similarly to attunement, faith is not  simply  given but 
must be achieved and maintained; indeed, it is our responsibility not to lose it. 
“The Avoidance of Love” is not merely  the literary  illustration of an independently 
formed philosophical investigation. On the contrary, the way Shakespearean drama 
illuminates a pivotal “human” problematic (how do we deal with our common 
separateness?) and the way it repositions this at the centre of what philosophy  should 
consider, underlines the necessity of pursuing literary-philosophical investigations. In 
Little Did I Know, Cavell repeatedly  returns to a fateful encounter with Austin – more 
precisely with his Hippolytus and with what he had to say about promises in “Other 
Minds” – as the crossroads where he finally  began to find his perfect pitch of 
philosophy. After this crucial encounter with Austin, Cavell, however, still had “little 
idea how to clarify [his] intuition” of “Austin’s idea of the claim of knowledge as ‘going 
beyond’” (321). It was only, Cavell continues, “some ten years later” that he was “able 
to begin articulating this region “beyond” knowledge by taking into account the concept 
of acknowledgment” (321). He goes on to suggest that this philosophical “small 
advance” was also taken in response to Shakespeare: “what the advance required in my 
case was coming upon a way to make sense of the mysterious and grave events of King 
Lear” (322). In other words, his response to scepticism was also motivated by his urge 
to make sense, perhaps to alleviate, Lear’s loss. In the “Introduction” to Disowning 
Knowledge Cavell indeed observes that “tragedy is an interpretation of what scepticism 
is itself an interpretation of” (5-6). In other words, both scepticism and tragedy, both 
philosophy and literature, are an interpretation of an underlying experience. For James 
Conant, “Cavell takes himself to have uncovered in Shakespearean tragedy  an 
exploration of the problem of skepticism that is able to both complement and 
supplement the discussion advanced in the work of the later Wittgenstein and 
Austin” (620). Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s influences therefore mingle with a different 
kind of experience: not a philosophical one, not even a literary  one, but a “human” one 
43
enshrined in Shakespeare’s play. Whilst  Cavell’s formulation of acknowledgment and 
separateness seems to follow from readings of Austin and Wittgenstein, it answers a 
more existential problematic illuminated by a Shakespearean tragedy. I would, 
therefore, go further than Conant and contend that the literary experience of 
separateness is not  a mere complement or supplement to his philosophical 
investigations. Instead, I argue with Davies that here “philosophy comes after 
literature’s great achievement” (139). Returning to the question of the relationship 
between literature and philosophy in Cavell’s work, this means that  he “does not use 
Shakespeare to illustrate, to exemplify or to explain pre-existing ideas, because those 
ideas did not exist, or they had not been lucidly articulated, before Shakespeare gave 
them dramatic form” (139).
 Whilst an increasing number of scholars highlight the double – literary and 
philosophical – nature of Cavell’s readings of Shakespeare, we will not be able to fully 
appreciate the intricacies of Cavell’s “interdisciplinary” approach unless we 
acknowledge that Shakespeare is not secondary, but fundamental to Cavell’s 
philosophical investigations. His readings of the tragedies not only give us an insight 
into the philosopher-sceptic’s tragic predicament, but also show that, contrary to popular 
belief, his work on Shakespeare plays a fundamental part in his formulation of 
separateness and acknowledgment. Shakespeare is not a marginal region of Cavell’s 
thought; rather, something that he experiences in the tragedies makes him recast the 
manner of his philosophical questioning. In “A Conversation with Cavell” in The Senses 
of Stanley Cavell, he admits that the final sentence of The Claim of Reason was partly 
motivated by the lingering doubt that he had succeeded in doing philosophy by  asking 
something that would usually fall into the literary realm. He was wondering whether he 
might “be asking something of the literary that the philosophical should scrupulously 
deny itself, something that plays with truth” (313). Cavell is not choosing literature over 
philosophy. What his diagnosis of scepticism in Shakespeare’s tragedies show is that 
philosophy and literature do not supersede or trump one another; instead, they are two 
related modes with which Cavell seeks to alleviate the problem of scepticism, which in 
turn is not understood as exclusively  belonging to the philosophical realm, but rather as 
a symptom of the human predicament. Only when we bring his writings on Shakespeare 
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in direct relation to those focusing on matters of the ear, will we be able to identify  the 
root of the experience of separateness and what his literary-philosophical investigations 
are trying to alleviate. 
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2. Cavell’s Ear 
Cavell has a fine ear. His philosophical writing is interspersed with moments when he 
shifts the reader’s attention to a sound, the tone of a voice, or the act of listening itself. 
One such example is a rather peculiar passage in the discussion of the differences 
between Austinian and Wittgensteinian criteria. In The Claim of Reason, Cavell is 
thinking about Austin’s goldfinch and wondering what exactly he was claiming when he 
claimed to know that there was a goldfinch in the garden: 
 Whether or not there are Austinian criteria for something’s being real, or for 
 being a real something of a particular kind, Austin must imagine, validly, that  we 
 know how to make sure, know what to do to make sure and certain, of such 
 things. For example, to make sure that the bird is not stuffed I could puncture it  
 and see whether stuffing falls out. I have no idea whether this bit of academic 
 sadism would be making sure it’s real “in the same way” as I might  have made 
 sure it’s a goldfinch (unless someone wishes to insist that this is making sure it  
 is a goldfinch, while another might wish to insist that only God could really do 
 that (as only  a composer can make sure that the tonic is well established (though 
 who is it who makes sure that the singing is on pitch, the singer or the sung 
 to?))). (58)
In this wonderful sequence of parentheses within parentheses – to which I shall return in 
Chapter 4 – the question of whether an other (I or God) can know that the goldfinch 
exists (or perhaps even that the goldfinch is in pain) is presented as similar or identical 
in philosophical force and significance as the question of whether the singer knows her 
own pitch better than the listener wincing at its flatness or sharpness (if this were the 
case there would be no more singing out  of tune, I suppose; ears can lie). An aural 
image similarly  slips into the scrutiny of his own sceptical doubt, undermining his 
ability to confirm that there is a goldfinch in the garden: 
 There is this humming in the air; or a noise at midnight in the basement – there it 
 is again. Shall I say: “I don’t by any means always know…”, and let it go at  
 that? But there aren’t just hummings in the air; it is imperative that I find out 
 whether there happens to be one in the air now or whether it  is only in my ears. 
 Certainly  I may not be able to learn the answer in this case, to convince myself 
 one way or the other. But it won’t help my condition to say  that sometimes I just 
 don’t know. I am left with the question; it stays in me, until it decays in my 
 memory or I overlay it, perhaps symbolize it, with something else. (60)
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In both these instances Cavell is thinking about the question of scepticism through our 
convoluted aural passageways. These instances when Cavell transposes the question of 
scepticism to the ear should not be disregarded for their supposed lack of philosophical 
rigour. Is the pitch in the singer’s ear? Is the humming in the air? Is the act of listening 
located closer to the object or the subject  of sound? The answers to these questions will 
be momentous for Cavell’s philosophy. Here, we might project what Cavell observes 
about Shoshana Felman’s supposed lack of philosophical rigour: if this “invocation” of 
ears “lacks philosophical decorum, so much the worse for philosophical 
decorum” (“Foreword Body” xx). Cavell’s reference to all things aural does not explode 
philosophical decorum so much as seek to reinvent it, that is, propose a new rigour more 
in keeping with what he wants philosophy to do. 
 Passages discussing the relationship between philosophy  and matters relating to 
the ear, such as tonal music, the (“female” (operatic)) voice, rhythm and breath have not 
received the attention they demand and deserve. As far as I am aware, only three critics 
focus on matters of the ear in Cavell. Stewart, whose Reading Voices listens to the 
phonotext of literature (interestingly  also to Shakespeare), has in more recent work 
endeavoured to audit Cavell’s reading of literature and style. Yet, apart from a short 
analysis of the “imp” sound in his reading of Poe’s “The Imp of the Perverse” in 
Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes, he does not often turn his attention to the sound of 
writing (“World Viewed” 79-81). In a paper given at a recent conference, Arnold 
Davidson presented very  interesting work on the intersection between jazz and 
philosophy, or rather how Cavell’s view on jazz may be understood to bear on his 
philosophical mission. Focusing on an anecdote related in Little Did I Know, where 
Cavell notes that Ben Webster could not keep  on playing because he had forgotten the 
words to the song, Davidson reads Webster’s breath as his own idiosyncratic signature 
and therefore as the ethical act par excellence. Davidson is here gesturing towards 
Cavell’s understanding of passionate utterances – to which I will turn in the next chapter 
– taking the idea about the fundamentally  ethical nature of language a step further to 
include all those things we say  without words, or despite words. In an inspiring and 
inspired response at the same conference, Cornell West called Cavell the jazzman of 
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philosophy: a charming idea, which however would need more fleshing out.13 Gould’s 
Hearing Things also centres on the ear in Cavell, but whilst Stewart audits it, Gould 
philosophises it. The ear and hearing for Gould become descriptive of a certain textual 
model that distinguishes Cavell’s style.14 
 Although Stewart’s attention to the phonotext, Davidson’s attentiveness to 
breath, West’s musicological and historical contextualisation and Gould’s philosophical-
textual reading are valuable, these approaches fall short of unravelling the role of the ear 
in Cavell’s philosophy. They fail to do so for three reasons: firstly, they do not link 
Cavell’s more properly aural and musical concerns with his figural uses of the ear. 
Secondly, they  do not contextualise the moments in which he refers to the ear both 
actually and figuratively in his autobiographical writings. Finally, they fail to see how 
these aural references function as a sort of hinge between his philosophical and literary, 
more precisely, Shakespearean, investigations. For Cavell turns with considerable 
interest to moments in the tragedies and romances that pivot on the ear: whether this be 
the strange detail of the ear-poisoning in Hamlet, or Mamillius’ whispering into 
Hermione’s ear. And then there is, of course, Cavell’s unexpected and idiosyncratic 
notation of the nature of Cordelia’s voice in “The Avoidance of Love.” Fathoming these 
aural narratives and how they echo each other and how each of them reverberates with a 
deeper concern, is therefore crucial in sounding out the philosophical import of his 
readings of Shakespeare, as well as the impetus of his philosophy in general.
48
13  Davidson’s paper was, like Stewart’s, given at a conference in Harvard in October 2010, but only 
the latter was published in Stanley Cavell and Literary Studies: Consequences of Skpeticism (Eds. 
Rhie and Eldridge). Cornell West made his remark I believe also in response to Davidson’s 
presentation. One possible avenue to begin to understanding what West meant would be to start with a 
recent interview with Anna Fifield in the Financial Times where, speaking about his political and 
democratic commitments, he describes himself as “a jazzman in the life of the mind,” and goes on to 
say: “I’m going to blow my horn and sing my song in such a distinctive way that people will have to 
take notice. Not notice of me but of the point.” The term “jazzman of philosophy” would therefore not 
only point to Cavell’s idiosyncratic philosophical voice, to which I shall turn in Chapter 4, but also to 
how this is linked to an idea of quasi-religious as well as political witnessing.
14 Gould’s is one of the more significant contributions to the illumination of Cavell’s work in recent years 
and I will return to it when I analyse Cavellian acts of reading (and writing) in Chapter 3.
2.1 A Damaged Left Ear
The experience of separateness is not something that Cavell inherits from either Austin 
or Wittgenstein; rather, it  is an experience that he brings to his philosophical readings. 
Although the previous chapter has examined what separateness is and how it chimes 
with Cavell’s readings of Austin and Wittgenstein, we have so far failed to determine 
what causes separateness. We are still to ascertain what existential experience creates a 
metaphysical lack for which the sceptic mistakenly seeks to compensate with 
impossible demands upon our knowledge. Yet, “true recovery” from scepticism “lies 
in ... finding skepticism’s source (its origin, say, if you can say it without supposing its 
origin past)” (Disowning 198). One way of getting closer to what Cavell means by 
separateness, and thus of finding scepticism’s source and remedy, is to further 
investigate the language or imagery with which Cavell frames the experience of 
separateness in his autobiographical writings. 
 Cavell’s autobiographical experience of separateness, although encrypted in all 
of his philosophical writings, is first  overtly  voiced in the narration of his childhood in 
A Pitch of Philosophy. His childhood account is pervaded by a deep sense of gratitude 
towards his parents, as well as by an acute experience of separateness. Immediately  the 
child’s separateness is understood as an extension of the parents’ lack of attunement, 
what he also calls “their despair of harmony” (Pitch 21). The main reason for the 
difference between his immigrant father and his musician mother – marking out what to 
him seemed then an insurmountable separateness – was, on the one hand, “the glad 
unsayability  of her knowledge of the utter expressiveness of music,” and, on the other, 
“his wild love of the eloquence he would never have” (21). It is striking that  Cavell 
comments on his parent’s avoidance of each other, or rather lack of acknowledgment of 
each other, in terms of a melancholy silence, which in the case of his mother is often 
translated into impassioned and solitary  piano playing (Little 111). This equation of 
separateness and acknowledgment with silence and music is not accidental. Throughout 
his autobiographical writings, memories of a painful aural injury  and subsequent 
treatments colour the experience of his self-alienation, or the “distance from one’s 
body,” at the heart of the sceptical problem.
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 In A Pitch of Philosophy and Little Did I Know, the existential crisis of the 
separateness between mother and child is persistently  registered by  the ear. One 
example for this is Cavell’s account of his ear pain. As a child, Cavell was “hit by a car 
as [he] ran headlong into [his] most  uneventful street to retrieve a ball” and was “left 
with a damaged left ear” (Pitch 25). This damage was frequently  the cause of the 
painful ear infections that punctuated his childhood. Significantly, in The Claim of 
Reason Cavell uses ear pain as an example of the sceptical problem of pain: 
A ringing in the ears is nicely  describable as such, and typical manifestations are 
to frown or open the mouth very wide so as to move the ears around, or to press 
your palms against them for a moment, or to shake the head vigorously  once or 
twice and then listen – people who haven’t had the experience probably won’t 
understand what you’re doing. (80)
Cavell, of course, does not only use examples of ear pain, but also refers to headaches 
or toothaches, amongst other sources of pain. This particular passage is, however, 
crucial, as a typical parenthetical comment in “Philosophy and the Arrogation of Voice” 
maintains:
But while the story of my ear as an organ of my body is less articulated here (for 
example, details of the primitiveness and painfulness of the early medical 
treatments of my ear, in the days still preceding the discovery of sulfa drugs, 
treatments which determined a general attempt to learn a distance from my body 
and so attempts to undo that learning, and which will mould the common male 
doubt, at certain stages, that one specifically  will bear up under torture), it  colors 
the others, in ways I know I have not fathomed. (Pitch 30) 
We can detect a slight  hesitation on Cavell’s part. In one and the same gesture, he offers 
and withdraws the figure of the ear as something central to his philosophy. It is as if he 
were trying to say that  the question of the ear is philosophically  pervasive and pertinent, 
but in ways that he has not fathomed, in ways that are perhaps not fathomable, at least 
not by “traditional” philosophy. In order to unravel what is registered here by  the ear – 
the experience of separateness – the philosopher must therefore turn to the rigours of 
other disciplines more suited to this task than philosophy. 
Whilst the passage from A Pitch of Philosophy is, as far as I know, the only  place in 
which the autobiographical narration explicitly links the problem of his ear to this sense 
of separateness, and thus the question of scepticism, the connection is made more often 
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in his readings of Shakespearean tragedy. It is striking how often Cavell turns to a scene 
revolving around the ear in an attempt to locate the trigger for the tragic mechanism. At 
the end of “Hamlet’s Burden of Truth,” Cavell adds a short comment on the peculiar 
detail of Old Hamlet’s poisoning through the ear. It could be argued that the sheer 
obtrusiveness of killing somebody by pouring poison into their ear merely underlines 
the shifty  ground on which Hamlet’s sceptical claim to knowledge stands. Considering, 
however, the importance the of the ear in other plays – for example Iago pouring 
pestilence into Othello’s ear – and indeed in Cavell’s narration of his own childhood, 
this scene takes on an additional significance. 
 When Cavell introduces the question of the ear in his reading of Hamlet he 
introduces it in explicitly  Freudian terms. Freud speculates that the primal scene, a 
“phylogenetic inheritance,” is transmitted from parent to child by way of the ear: “the 
family sounds or sayings, the spoken or secret discourses, going on prior to the subject’s 
arrival, within which he must take his way” (Disowning 189). Cavell continues: “I hope 
you will be struck by the fit of this account with the fact that Hamlet’s fantasy of the 
dumb show takes up  something he heard from his ancestor’s ghost and that features the 
mortal vulnerability of the ear” (189). The ear is the place where, on the one hand, the 
parental ghost’s injunction is heard, and on the other hand, the place where this 
injunction must be shut out, whether the child wants to or not. Through his reading of 
Hamlet, Cavell therefore re-imagines the ear as the place where the battle of 
individuation takes place, where the individual must learn how to make his way with 
and against his parents’ anxieties and fantasies. The ear is also the place where the child 
must learn to accept his separateness. In the “Introduction” to Disowning Knowledge, 
Cavell further locates the root of separateness not merely in the primal scene, but in the 
child’s relation to its mother: “what philosophy registers as uncertainty in our 
knowledge of the existence of the world is a function of, say  intellectualization of, the 
child’s sense of loss in separating from the mother’s body” (13). This proximity  of the 
“motherly” or the “female” to the struggle of individuation is no doubt linked to his 
equating of acknowledgment with the “female voice,” and I will return to this issue in 
Chapter 4. For the purposes of our present enquiry, however, namely the valence of 
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matters of the ear in his writings, we must stay with Cavell’s (and indeed Shakespeare’s) 
association of the female body with the struggle to come to terms with one’s mortality.
Perhaps the most  eloquent example of how closely the “female” is associated with the 
individual’s experience of separateness in Cavell’s imagination is his treatment of 
breath. Breath is something that Cavell returns to in all of his writing, be it his reading 
of Shakespearean tragedy, his anecdotal tales about jazz, his writings on film, or his 
study of Emerson. In “Henry James Reading Emerson Reading Shakespeare,” for 
instance, he briefly turns to Lear’s “No, rather I abjure all roofs, and choose / to wage 
against the enmity o’ th’ air” (Transcendental Etudes 246). Earlier in that scene Lear 
“had recorded his sense of suffocation (‘Hysterica passio, down thy rising sorrow,’ well 
studied by Janet Adelman in her Suffocating Mothers)” and Cavell thus takes “the 
enmity of the air as encompassing not only a disturbed sky, but the mortal’s condition of 
living in the medium of air, subject to the necessity  of breathing” (246). Adelman’s 
reading of Lear’s sense of suffocation is part of a longer chapter in which she argues 
that the sceptic fantasy of maternal contamination and its flip  side, the longing for 
maternal presence, are expressed through Lear’s relationship  to Cordelia (116). Here 
Lear’s welling up (“O, how this mother swells up  toward my heart! / Hysterica passio, 
Down, thou climbing sorrow, / Thy  element’s below. Where is this daughter? 
[2.2.246-8]) is read as a rejection of his mortality, which is linked to the female (114). In 
line with Cavell’s assertion that what philosophy deems to be an intellectual lack is 
instead “the child’s sense of loss in separating from the mother’s body,” Suffocating 
Mothers argues that Shakespeare’s tragic heroes persistently project the fear of their 
own mortality onto the mother’s body (Disowning 13; Adelman 6)
 What is rising in Lear’s throat, and in ours, what is shortening breath is the 
realisation of our mortality. Lear’s fantasy of hysterica passio can therefore be 
understood as an expression of anxiety about his own existence similar to the one 
voiced in Descartes’ Cogito, but transposed onto the maternal body. As Cavell writes in 
relation to Hamlet, the burden of human life is to come to terms with our own mortality: 
“the burden of proving that  he or she exists, and that this burden is discharged in 
thinking your existence, which comes in Descartes (though this is controversial) to 
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finding how to say, ‘I am, I exist’; not of course to say  it just once, but  at every instant 
of your existence; to preserve your existence, originate it” (Disowning 187). As Cavell 
so pithily  puts it in The Claim of Reason, the sceptic’s problem is neither with 
knowledge nor with his mother, but with himself: “I am the philosophical problem. I 
am” (83). The use of the utterly Emersonian image of a joining and disjoining breath – 
“as if his every breath and gesture disjoin and join him, from and with mankind” – to 
describe Hamlet’s separateness, must in this sense be viewed in terms of Lear’s 
hysterica passio and the struggle to preserve and acknowledge our existence as separate 
and therefore mortal (Disowning 188).
 Cavell’s discussion of breath is also salient because it bridges his treatment of 
the existential struggles underlying the experience of separateness and his discussion of 
the sceptic’s “misuse” of language discussed in the previous chapter. Emerson’s 
Transcendental Etudes links Lear’s claim that he would rather “abjure all roofs, and 
choose / To wage against the enmity o’th’ air” (2.2.297-8) to the sceptic’s “sense of 
suffocation,” and hence to Emerson’s “idea of the fear of breath as a fear of 
speech” (246). The link between the image of breath and the fact that words remain 
beyond our control originates in Emerson, especially in his idea that “character teaches 
above our wills. Men imagine that they  communicate their virtue or vice only by  overt 
actions, and do not see that virtue or vice emit a breath every moment” (“Self-Reliance” 
92). Emerson’s image of emitting breath is here married to Cavell’s reading of 
Wittgenstein’s notion of private language as an effect of the sceptic’s “wish to deny the 
publicness of language” (Claim 351). This conjunction of two philosophical acts of 
reading may be further sounded out by  Cavell’s incisive discussion of Lear’s fear that 
his words (gestures, breaths, intonations, silences) could betray his vulnerability  and 
separateness. “Wittgenstein’s idea” thus receives “amplification” from the role of breath 
in Shakespeare and Emerson “so that the fear of breathing is seen as a projection onto 
language of a fear of its insufficiency, as if it is language itself that has shrunk from its 
responsibilities of reference and expression” (Transcendental Etudes 246). In The Claim 
of Reason, the image of breathlessness, our inability to express ourselves, grows more 
acute:
 My problem is no longer that my words can’t get past his body  to him. There is 
 nothing for them to get to; they can’t even reach as far as my body; they  are 
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 stuck behind the tongue, or at the back of my mind. The signs are dead; merely 
 working them out loud doesn’t breathe life into them; even dogs can speak more 
 effectively. Words have no carry. It is like trying to throw a feather; for some 
 things, breath is better than strength, stronger. This is also something I meant by 
 saying that voicing my criteria has to have the force of “call.” (84) 
This passage echoes Lear’s final speech in Act 5, Scene 3. Here, as in the passage 
above, dogs make an uncanny appearance. Whilst Cavell laments the fact that our words 
have no breath left in them and that even dogs can speak more effectively, Lear cannot 
understand why life and breath should be in a dog, a horse or even a rat, and not in his 
poor Cordelia. It  is almost as if, to paraphrase Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes, “the 
world and [his] desires in it  are too monstrous for telling, and the burden of language, of 
bearing meaning, of making myself intelligible, crushes [him]” (247). Lear’s and 
Hamlet’s breath are thus a “reasonable portrait of something ... that philosophical 
skepticism dreams of explaining as an intellectual lack in human knowledge rather than 
a perpetual contending with the fate or condition of finitude” (247). 
 The Winter’s Tale also draws a link between the precariousness of language, the 
mother, our sense of separateness and the ear. Just before Leontes has his sceptical 
outburst, Mamillius, whose infant state is forever etched into his name, is seen 
whispering into Hermione’s ear:
 HERMIONE  Come, sir, now
    I am for you again: ‘pray you, sit by us,
    And tell’s a tale.
 MAMILLIUS  Merry, or sad, shall’t be?
HERMIONE  As merry as you will.
MAMILLIUS  A sad tale’s best for winter: I have one 
   Of sprites and goblins.
 HERMIONE  Let’s have that, good sir.
    Come on, sit down, come on, and do your best
    To fright me with your sprites: you’re powerful at it.
 MAMILLIUS  There was a man – 
 HERMIONE  Nay, come sit down: then on.
 MAMILLIUS  Dwelt by a churchyard: I will tell it softly, 
    Yond crickets shall not hear it.
 HERMIONE  Come on then, 
    And giv’t me in mine ear. 
          (2.1.21-32)
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It is a lovely, intimate scene: a child whispering a story into his mother’s ear. Here the 
original union with the mother is presented as a union of common language, a story  that 
only Hermione and Mamillius know. We shall not hear it. Hermione and Mamillius are 
completely attuned to each other, they are in what the renowned psychoanalyst Susie 
Orbach calls “attunement,” or “a circle of positive engagement,” which occurs when the 
mother is “on the baby’s emotional wavelength” (59). When Cavell suggests that 
Leontes’ sceptical outburst is in fact not only triggered by his realisation of the double-
face – the power and impotence of language – but also by  Hermione’s pregnant state, 
reminding him of his own original union with his mother, he is not presenting two 
alternative explanations for Leontes’ behaviour, but instead gesturing at how they  might 
inform each other (Disowning 196). For the sceptic who has forgotten how to 
communicate beyond language’s short-comings, Mamillius’ whispering into Hermione’s 
ear comes to stand for the intimacy and trust in language that he, like Leontes, has lost. 
What the conjunction of these acts of reading suggests is that the sceptic’s misuse of 
language, as illustrated in the first chapter by Leontes, is linked to his inability to 
overcome the traumatic separation from his mother. The metaphysical finitude that the 
sceptic wrongly  and wilfully interprets “as an intellectual lack” is thus tightly wound up 
with the child’s experience of the separation from his mother, the realisation that he is 
separate and thus mortal (Disowning 11).
A comparison of how the figure of the ear and the related figure of breath come into 
play  in his readings of Shakespeare, as well as his philosophical and autobiographical 
writings has unveiled the psychoanalytic impetus of Cavell’s work. By linking an 
apparently  purely, even supremely, intellectual problematic with the primal experience 
of the child’s separation from the mother, he is not only introducing an element that is 
thought to belong to the psychoanalytic realm, but also boldly redrafting the goals and 
parameters of philosophy. Indeed, for Plonowska Ziarek he supplants “the 
epistemological quest for the legitimation of knowledge” with “a project of therapy, 
what might be called a psychoanalysis of philosophy” (27). In Cavell’s work 
psychoanalysis, like literature, does therefore not supplant or supplement philosophy. In 
chapter 2 of Contesting Tears, “Psychoanalysis and Cinema: Moment of Letter from an 
Unknown Woman” Cavell in this sense speaks of psychoanalysis’ “reassociation with 
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philosophy on its appearance on the stage of skepticism” (97). To borrow an image used 
in Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes, the psychoanalytic problem Cavell locates behind 
scepticism “amplifies” philosophy  (246-7). This, however, is an “amplification” that not 
only influences how Cavell uses figures of the ear, but  also how he actually  listens to 
Shakespearean drama. 
2.2 Passionate Utterances – Heaving Hearts into Mouths
In Cavell’s work, matters of the ear are never merely  figural, but also describe the actual 
process of listening. In his readings of Shakespeare’s plays he often pays particular 
attention to breath, rhythm, trembling and even the quality of the character’s voices. In 
“The Avoidance of Love” Cavell remarks that  Shakespeare’s notation of Cordelia’s 
“stature and of the quality of her voice is unique in the play” (Disowning 63). Yet since 
“the idea of a defiant  small girl seems grotesque, as an idea of Cordelia,” its 
significance must lie somewhere else (63). Here is how Cavell pictures that first  crucial 
exchange between father and daughter in King Lear: 
 I imagine the scene this way: The older daughters’ speeches are public, set; they 
 should not be said to Lear, but to the court, sparing themselves his eyes and him 
 theirs. They  are not monsters first, but ladies. He is content. Then Cordelia says 
 to him, away from the court, in confused appeal to their accustomed intimacy, 
 “Nothing” – don’t force me, I don’t know what you want, there is nothing I can 
 say, to speak what you want I must not speak. But he is alarmed at the appeal 
 and tries to cover it up, keeping up the front, and says, speaking to her and to the 
 court, as if the ceremony is still in full effect: “Nothing will come of nothing; 
 speak again.” (Hysterica passio, is already stirring.) Again she says to him: 
 “Unhappy that I am, I cannot heave my heart into my mouth” – not the heart  
 which loves him, that always has been present in her voice; but the heart which 
 is shuddering with confusion, with wanting to do the impossible, the heart which 
 is now in her throat. But to no avail. (64)
For Adelman, as for Cavell, “Cordelia embodies the rising, choking heart (cor) that we 
half-hear in her name”: not only in her “first appearance, when she cannot heave her 
heart into her mouth” but also on her return, when she “pantingly heav[es] forth the 
name of father” (127). When Cordelia claims that she cannot heave her heart into her 
mouth, she seems to be saying that, in contrast to her sisters, she cannot boast  of her 
56
feelings. But Regan and Goneril are not heaving their hearts into their mouths, quite the 
contrary. For Cavell, Cordelia is not speaking here of the heart that loves Lear, which 
has been present in her voice (and we will soon see how a heart  can be present in a 
voice), but of the heart that is “shuddering” and that is “stuck in her throat.” 
 Questions of breath and swallowing, voice and trembling are also addressed in 
The Claim of Reason in the guise of the “half-swallowed apple of knowledge”:
 Is being human exactly  to be incapable either of swallowing it or spitting it  out? 
 Is the gasping of the human voice, say  sobbing or laughing, the best proof of the 
 human? or best picture, i.e., mask? To swallow once and for all would be to live 
 always within ordinary language-games, within the everyday; to spit once and 
 for all would be to exist  apart from just that  life, to live without. In particular, to 
 live without the human voice (e.g., without appeal, without protest). (477)
As with Hamlet’s joining and disjoining breath, this moment, when the “apple of 
knowledge” is neither swallowed nor spat out, marks our struggle to overcome 
separateness. The apple of knowledge is, of course, reminiscent of the forbidden fruit in 
Genesis, standing for man’s shame, his awareness of his nakedness. Here this image of 
the apple represents man’s awareness of his separateness: spitting it out would mean 
pretending that there is no separateness, would mean aspiring, like the sceptic-
philosopher, to transcend our human condition. It would also mean living without what 
Cavell calls the “human voice.” To swallow it would mean suffocating under the burden 
of separateness. Living with the human voice would mean neither clearing one’s throat 
completely, nor swallowing the apple of knowledge. As the parenthesis suggests, living 
with the human voice entails living with appeal and protest, means living with gasping, 
sobbing and laughing. What these passages suggest is that, for Cavell, this struggle 
leaves traces on the body, and that these traces are, furthermore, audible. Cavell’s focus 
on the quality of Cordelia’s voice suggests that these sounds are nothing other than 
voiced betrayals of the body’s separateness, sounds that we need to heed in order to 
acknowledge the other. Similarly, when Cordelia cannot heave her heart into her mouth, 
when her heart is stuck in her throat, she is voicing the existential conflict inherent in 
the human condition, that is to say, her separateness.
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Cavell’s notations of voice and breath and their tremors, rhythms and sounds must be 
taken in conjunction with his reading of Austin, in particular his expansion of 
perlocutionary speech acts to passionate utterances. Cavell’s awareness of the body’s 
sounds is founded on his reading of Austin’s take on Hippolytus’ famous quote: “my 
tongue swore to but my  heart did not,” in How to Do Things with Words (9-10). Cavell 
argues that Austin uses Hippolytus’ citation to enact a claim that “the metaphysician in 
each of us – will use metaphysics to get out of the moral of the ordinary, out  of our 
ordinary  moral obligations” (Passages 75). Austin’s reading of Hippolytus’ excuse is 
aimed at banishing intention from the weight of our responsibility, meaning that  we will 
still be bound by our word, even if we did not mean to say  it. In contrast to Austin, 
Cavell argues that intention, at least  a conscious one, is always impossible because we 
will never really be able to know what others, including ourselves, mean, what the 
intonation we give to our words exposes. Whilst  Austin’s clinging on to intention is 
expressive of a (sceptical) fear of the metaphysical dodge, Cavell embraces it  precisely 
because of its inevitability. Cavell goes beyond Austin in believing that “an enlightened 
world” can run on the basis that “promises may sometimes rightly be broken, that  our 
word is no more than our bond, that our bond is sometimes forfeit” (Pitch 103). He also 
believes, as Hent de Vries puts it, that “seriousness and sincerity require that we indeed 
grant and indeed cherish this semantic and ontological ‘let out’, which is a possibility 
for good and for ill, no mere escape from moral constraint and our answerability  to 
others, the world, and ourselves” (“Must” 111-2). His reframing of Austin is indebted to 
an understanding of separateness that, although not incompatible with Austin’s 
philosophy, does not  emerge from it. For Cavell, Austin’s distinction between false 
interiority and the seriousness of honouring our bond is pushed further: he concludes 
that precisely because there is no way  of telling another’s inner or private intention from 
his words, there must be something else that explains the everyday miracle of our 
mutual understanding, or “our unastonishing yet astonishing ability  to say what we say, 
I for you, you for you” (Pitch 59). We will have to take the other by his word, not 
despite, but because we are separate from him, because we can never really know what 
the other means, or what we mean. 
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 The consequences of Cavell’s interpretation of Hippolytus’ quote are 
momentous. In it  he hears something very  different from Austin. For Cavell, it rings 
with the “incessant, unending vulnerability of human action, its exposure to the 
independence of the world and the preoccupation of the mind” (Passages 53). He 
therefore subtly but significantly alters the meaning of Hippolytus’ famous phrase: it is 
no longer a metaphysical dodge, but an expression of an existential and insurmountable 
separateness. Cavell’s reading of Hippolytus is, however, not to be understood as a 
move away, but rather as a repositioning or amplification of Austin. We are again in the 
resonant space of Cavell’s writing where two different and at times divergent 
philosophical narratives chime. Cavell’s reading of Hippolytus is, for instance, 
dependent on Austin’s understanding of the ethical nature of language. According to 
Cavell, in “Other Minds” Austin argues that saying “I know” is similar to saying “I 
promise,” because in uttering both statements one “takes a step, makes a commitment, 
beyond saying that you fully  intend to” (Little 320). In other words, saying “I know” 
transports you to a place beyond or after knowledge. For Cavell, Austin implies “that the 
step beyond can be said to be the same or sufficiently similar step that is taken in the 
case of promising … namely, that you give others your word” (320-1). Cavell writes: 
“(Say that it reveals human speech to be radically, in each uttered word, ethical. 
Speaking, or failing to speak, to another is as subject to responsibility, say to further 
response, as touching, or failing to touch, another. To have muttered such a thing then 
would have seemed, well literary.)” (321).
 Cavell’s reading of Hippolytus also depends on an amplification or 
radicalisation of Austinian perlocutionary utterances into “passionate utterances.” In 
How To Do Things With Words, Austin not only distinguishes between constantive and 
performative speech acts, but also differentiates between illocutionary and 
perlocutionary speech acts, where illocutionary acts do something in saying something 
(i.e. I christen this ship Lucy), and perlocutionary acts do something by saying 
something. Whilst Austin pays a great deal of attention to illocutionary acts, he seems 
reluctant to engage more deeply  with perlocutionary acts. One of the reasons he gives is 
that, unlike illocutionary speech acts, the effect of perlocutionary  speech acts is 
impossible to control or trace properly. If, for instance, I say “I frighten you” this would 
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not necessarily frighten you, in fact it might just make you laugh. Conversely, if read as 
a simple statement, this sentence might actually frighten you, depending on the context 
in which it was uttered. Perhaps unable to find a serious flaw in his teacher, Cavell does 
not read Austin’s lack of interest in perlocutionary acts as an inconsistency on his part, 
but merely as a missed opportunity for exploring another way in which language and 
our relation to it are intertwined. For Cavell, the unexplored potential of perlocutionary 
acts lies precisely in the fact that their effects are hard to trace. In his “Foreword” to 
Felman’s The Scandal of the Speaking Body, Cavell characterises the difference 
between performative and passionate utterances as follows: “I mark this difference 
between performative and passionate utterances by saying that with the latter the ‘you’ 
comes essentially into the picture” (xx). Or, as Ian Munday summarises, “whether or not 
my words (which may  appear in all manner of forms), succeed in frightening you 
depends not just on the words I use to try and bring this effect off, but also (and this is 
crucial) on how ‘you’ respond to them” (63). Perlocutionary  acts are hard to trace 
because they are “passionate,” because they do not only  account for what is said, but 
how it is said, or indeed how something that is left unsaid affects the other. 
 Like Austin, Cavell takes the fundamentally ethical nature of language seriously, 
the fact that whether we want it  to or not, it traces out the bond that each utterance 
creates between speaker and addressee. Unlike him, however, he believes that the 
“expressive” in speech also bears on the bond language creates between interocutors; in 
other words that the body’s silences and sounds may  also affect it. In Munday’s words: 
“taking seriously the importance of the perlocutionary effects of language is to 
acknowledge the individual/expressive uses of speech in which people establish 
relationships with one another” (63). Whilst Bell is right to describe Austin’s gift to 
Cavell “not in terms of a body  of work, but  of an ear, one lent to one’s own voice, to 
find or hear that voice of one’s own,” Cavell’s ear differs slightly from Austin’s (150).15 
Ordinary language philosophy’s reliance on listening to, or if you will, sampling 
ordinary  speech to understand what we mean when we say something, suggests that for 
Austin there is in fact a link between heart and tongue. Just as the heart, tongue or 
breath can carry  intention, the way something is delivered – in writing as well as in 
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15 As I show in the Second Interlude,  hearing this nuanced difference is also pivotal in beginning to sound 
out the difference between Cavell and Derrida.
speaking – can give an indication as to its meaning. As Austin puts it, “the force of 
utterances” – for instance the “tone of voice” or “cadence” – can be an indication for 
how it is to be taken (73, 74). At the same time, Austin’s damning of Hippolytus rests on 
the possibility that there can be a discrepancy between heart and tongue, in other words 
that expressions can be feigned. Austin’s relationship to phone and to the expressive in 
speech is therefore a contradictory one: on the one hand the surface of language, phone, 
is to Austin’s ear imbued with intention; on the other hand intention is, according to 
Hippolytus and Austin, what is in the heart and not what is propelled by  the tongue. In 
his “Foreword” to The Scandal of the Speaking Body, Cavell describes “Austin’s vision 
of the human being as a field of vulnerability whose actions imply wider consequences 
and effects and results – if narrower meaning – than we should have to be answerable 
for” (xvi). In listening out for “intention,” Austin is thus not seeking to satisfy  a 
metaphysical desire for origin, but, instead, protection against the danger of the 
metaphysicians’ avoidance of responsibility or the “metaphysical dodge.”
As Cavell’s attention to Cordelia’s voice in his reading of King Lear illustrates, he is 
much less reluctant than Austin to embrace the expressive character or the passions of 
speech. Cavell is therefore not only expanding Austin’s idea of perlocutionaries but also 
addressing what in “Passionate and Performative Utterance, Morals of Encounter” is 
called Austin’s “relative, continued neglect of the passions, or say the expressive in 
speech” (180). This is where the nuanced difference between Cavell’s and Austin’s ears 
comes to the fore. When Cavell pricks his ears up to the breath and voice of characters 
(as if they were real people), he is not listening out for Austin’s metaphysical dodge. 
Whilst, as Cavell notes in “Knowing and Acknowledging,” “the skeptic is going to be 
impressed by the fact that my knowledge of others depends upon their expressing 
themselves, in word and conduct,” these expressions not only  give room to the 
possibility of feigning or lying but also “to discover[ing] the specific plight of mind and 
circumstance within which a human being gives voice to his condition” (254, 240). He 
is, in other words, listening out for separateness, for what demands our full attention 
and, in time, acknowledgment.  In his “Foreword” to The Scandal of the Speaking Body, 
Cavell explicitly describes the perlocutionary as the field of passions:
61
 The perlocutionary is the field of human interaction which is not governed by  
 the conventions and conditions or rituals Austin invokes, but represents the 
 complementary  field occupied by or calling for improvisation and passion 
 and aggression. It is the region Austin backs away from in backing away from 
 investigating the perlocutionary. (xx)
Whilst, as Sparti points out, the sceptic’s dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that 
expressions can be feigned – “although [criteria] enable us to establish whether a piece 
of behavior expresses pain or joy, they cannot discriminate whether that behavior 
expresses real pain or the simulation of pain” – it is precisely in the other’s (and my 
own) expressiveness that the chance of acknowledgment lies (87). Cavell is even “(... 
perhaps prepared to recognize, regarding a cry in pain, or a prolonged silence, as a 
‘preverbal’ call for help; a tear as a trace of rage, perhaps at oneself; a sob as a reminder 
of comfort)” (“Passionate” 196).16  Our responsibility to others lies in how willing we 
are to listen out for the traces of their separateness. Or as Sparti has it: “our 
responsibility to the others lies in our responsiveness to them” (91).
 When Cavell listens out for Cordelia’s stifled breath, or when he imagines how 
she would have confronted her father in the play’s first scene, he is listening out for how 
her being is abandoned to her words. “It  is,” Cavell writes in Philosophical Passages, 
“in recognizing this abandonment to my words, as if to unfeasible epitaphs, presaging 
the leave-taking of death, that I know my voice, recognize my words (no different form 
yours) as mine” (65). The expressive in speech, created by gestures, but also by our 
intonation, our hesitations, our breath, is what may betray  us. Cavell is interested in the 
sound of characters’ utterances because, as the later Wittgenstein and Freud have 
recognised, they become “victims of expression – readable in every  sound and gesture – 
their every  word and act apt to betray  their meaning” (“Passionate” 195). As Cavell 
writes at the end of “Knowing and Acknowledging”: “when you have twisted or 
covered your expressions far or long enough, or haven’t yet found the words which give 
the phenomenon expression, I may know better than you how it is with you. I may 
respond even to the fact of your separateness from me (not to mention mine from you) 
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16  Particularly interesting in this sense is his reading of Carmen’s pianissimo in response to Don José 
(194). Cavell’s notion of “passionate utterances” has, I believe, great potential in illuminating 
contemporary theatrical and indeed operatic performance, in particular the perlocutionary repercussions 
that singing has on the audience. 
more immediately  than you” (266). The other’s ethical demand on us is therefore also 
made in the almost imperceptible, and absolutely idiosyncratic, bodily collaterals of 
speech or singing (for instance breath, swallowing, or trembling of the voice). Matters 
of the ear in Cavell’s readings of Shakespeare are therefore not only a philosophical 
metaphor through which Cavell locates the root of scepticism, but testament to the fact 
that the ear can also pick up  those sounds (or lack of sounds) that speak of the body’s 
tragic predicament.
In the past, a failure to consider the role the ear plays in Cavell’s readings of 
Shakespeare has contributed to a failure to fully comprehend the role Shakespeare plays 
in his philosophy. Cavell’s idiosyncratic use of aural imagery, as well as his attention to 
what the ear can actually pick up, in his readings of Shakespeare helps us identify the 
root of “separateness,” and thus come to a clearer understanding of what Cavell wants 
philosophy to alleviate. With an account of the way he shifts his attention to the ear in 
crucial moments in his readings of The Winter’s Tale and Hamlet, I have argued that the 
ear is figuratively and imaginatively intertwined with the experience of separateness. 
The existential and traumatic experience of the separation from the mother leaves its 
mark on the ear: whether this be on the scarred tympanum, addressed in the 
autobiographical writings, or in the ear poisoning or ear-whispering described in 
Shakespearean tragedy. I have also suggested that for Cavell the pseudo-intellectual 
problem of scepticism is the symptom of a metaphysical lack, which, although projected 
onto the mother’s body, in fact represents the problem of coming to terms with our own 
existence as separate. Just as the figure of the ear shows the root of separateness, the 
process of listening can help  us acknowledge the other better. By extending Austin’s 
ethical understanding of language and his perlocutionaries into passionate utterances, 
and by making amends for his neglect of the expressive in speech, Cavell also locates 
our ethical relationship to the other in the sounds that accompany utterances. He thus 
encourages us to listen out for the bodily and audible marks of the other’s separateness. 
It is only now after we have sounded out his clairaudient reading of Shakespeare that, to 
return to Nussbaum, we can truly fathom how and why these acts of readings do 
philosophy. Only after showing both that Cavell’s turn to philosophy  is motivated by a 
wish to alleviate the human suffering he saw portrayed in Shakespeare, and under what 
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terms this separateness is investigated, can we begin to address how the Shakespearean 
oeuvre can come to play a crucial role in absorbing the very separateness that it 
portrays. 
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3. Mending the Heart of Language in a Heartless World
At the end of “Skepticism and Iconoclasm,” Cavell wonders about the possible effect 
Shakespeare’s words might have on us, considering that “any and all of them are words 
on a page; and all of us are flesh and blood. What exchange between us can we 
understand as working to cleanse our imagination of each other – to mend the heart of 
language in a heartless world? Where do words come from?” (247). This question 
reverberates with the concerns of traditional ordinary language philosophy, which deals 
with more important issues than we might think. As Laugier observes, the questions 
posed by ordinary  language philosophy have “a significance that goes beyond the 
philosophy of language” (20). Indeed, The Claim of Reason posits that “the 
philosophical appeal to what we say, and the search for our criteria on the basis of 
which we say what we say, are claims to community” (20). Whilst the link between 
criteria and the claims to community have been widely discussed in the secondary 
literature, only a few critics turn to what Cavell seems to be aiming at here. The 
reverberations of Shakespeare’s language not only  reach our flesh and blood, but also 
our soul. 
 At the beginning of Disowning Knowledge, Cavell writes that it  is his “intuition” 
that the advent of scepticism as manifested in Descartes’ Meditations is “already in full 
existence in Shakespeare, from the time of the great tragedies in the first years of the 
seventeenth century, in the generation preceding that of Descartes” (3). Despite the fact 
that a comparison with Montaigne’s scepticism would have made more sense from a 
chronological point of view, “the skeptical problematic [Cavell] has in mind is given its 
philosophical refinement in Descartes’s way of raising the question of God’s existence 
and of the immortality of the soul” (3). In Shakespeare, Descartes’ scepticism is already 
anachronistically present because the issue is no longer “how to conduct oneself best in 
an uncertain world” but “how to live at  all in a groundless world” (3). In other words, 
for Cavell, Shakespeare “registers a shift in the skeptical problematic from its earlier 
formulations, a shift  to which Descartes’s Mediations (1641) would give decisive 
expression for the future development of Western philosophy” (Davies 139). The 
difference between the problem of scepticism as posed by Descartes and by 
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Shakespeare respectively  is, however, the status of God. What Rhu calls “Cavell’s 
Renaissance Skepticism” is even more modern than Descartes because it runs on the 
assumption that there is no God, or at least no God that could grant us certainty as 
Descartes’ does (American Dream 84). For if the Cartesian problem (i.e. that there is no 
way for us to find out  whether or not there is “a rough adequation or collaboration 
between our everyday judgements and the world”) is accepted, but the Cartesian 
solution (that such an adequation or collaboration can only  be granted by the existence 
of God) is rejected, then the “ground of the everyday” remains irrevocably shaken 
(Disowning 3). What Cavell’s readings of Shakespeare point towards in particular is that 
in a world where the ground of certainty has been shaken, where even the ground of a 
Cartesian solution to scepticism has been unsettled, our search for redemption must 
begin with ourselves. In contrast to Kant, who “banked the immortality of the soul on 
the fact that in this world goodness and happiness are unaligned,” and that supposedly 
therefore they must be aligned in the afterlife, Cavell believes that “immortality  is not 
necessary  for the soul’s satisfaction” (81). What is necessary  is rather the soul’s “own 
coherence, its ability to judge a world in which evil is successful and the good are 
doomed; and in particular its knowledge that while injustice may flourish, it cannot rest 
content” (81). And for Cavell an encounter with Shakespearean drama can help  the soul 
regain such coherence; it rivals religion in an age where religion has lost  its purchase. 
Although Fergus Kerr is to some extent correct in saying that “Cavell is typical of the 
Western intellectual who insists, against all the evidence, that religion is declining,” 
Cavell’s relationship to religion is more complex than the notion of a simple and 
complete rejection might lead us to believe (127). God is, to echo what has become a 
Nietzschean platitude, not so much dead as replaced. As Kerr argues and as certain 
passages in “The Avoidance of Love” clearly indicate, the other comes to bear the 
weight of my existence in God’s stead (130). Parallel to Derrida’s messianism without a 
messiah, we are dealing here with a religion without God, a religion of perfectionism 
and of acknowledgment, and of the therapy they entail.
 The suggestion that Shakespeare’s tragedies are expressive of Cartesian 
scepticism is bold enough. Even bolder is his proposition that the Shakespearean text 
offers a “salvation” from it. Speaking about King Lear, Cavell, for instance, maintains 
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that despite the heart-rending ending “there is hope in this play, and it is not in 
heaven” (Disowning 80). This is what Mulhall has called “the doubling of issues within 
the plays” – that scepticism is not only illustrated in them, but that the plays themselves 
can help the audience to transcend the sceptical position that we have brought to them 
(196). Although Mulhall’s assertion that “this doubling of the theme of failures of 
acknowledgment presupposes that human beings can stand in (at least some of or some 
version of) the same relations to fictional characters as they can to fellow human 
beings” is illuminating, he does not address the question of what allows Shakespearean 
drama to make the demand of acknowledgment in the first place (197). At the beginning 
of the second section of “The Avoidance of Love,” Cavell suggests that it is not (or not 
only) the content of Shakespearean drama that teaches us how to endow justice, peace 
and salvation, but also its form:
 These last remarks come from a response not so much to the content of the play 
 as to its form. It is a drama not about the given condition in which the soul finds 
 itself (in relation to gods or to earth), but about the soul, as Schopenhauer puts 
 the vision of Kant, as the provider of the given, of the conditions under which 
 gods and earth can appear. It  is an enactment not of fate but responsibility, 
 including the responsibility for fate. However this is finally  to be put, its 
 reception demands a particular kind of perception. (Disowning 81)
I take this passage to mean that Shakespearean drama is about the conditions in which 
the soul (in the absence of God) finds itself (finds its separateness, hence is able to 
acknowledge itself and others); but in order to see, in order to realise this, it  needs to 
learn a new kind of perception. 
The philosophical importance of Shakespearean tragedy lies not only in the way its 
plots problematise Cartesian scepticism, but also in the way their very form points 
towards its absorption. The tragedies do indeed play  out “the progress from ignorance to 
exposure, I mean the treatment of an ignorance which is not to be cured by information 
(because it is not caused by a lack of information)” (85). Since this progress from 
ignorance to exposure, from scepticism to acknowledgment if you will, is the main 
“motive” of what  philosophy means to Cavell, Shakespeare’s theatre is a “philosophical 
drama” (85). Cavell goes a step further still: Shakespeare’s “philosophical drama” not 
only helps us to overcome the sceptical position that we bring to it, but it  also enables us 
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to better acknowledge those outside the theatre’s borders, empowering us to lead more 
ethical lives. Shakespearean drama does not indicate certain tenets or rules by which we 
should live; rather, it  addresses and helps us overcome the hindrances that stand in the 
way of our acknowledgment. This, then, is the kind of conversion Cavell describes in 
Contesting Tears: “for me there is no itinerary, say no approach, to philosophy; rather 
philosophy comes upon me, approaches me, like a conversion” (64). He is speaking 
about a conversion rather than a cognisance because in his eyes, Shakespearean drama 
no longer simply  belongs to the order of knowledge, but rather is imbued with a quasi-
religious significance. Here “philosophy” competes with religion or, strictly speaking, 
takes the place of religion because it is aiming at a fundamental shift not only in our 
perception of ourselves but in our perception of others. This turning point  is thus the 
vanishing point of Cavell’s philosophical-literary investigations; harking back to the 
previous chapter, and his auricular narration of the child’s traumatic separation from the 
mother as the root of our painful experience of separateness, it is also to be understood 
as the ultimate objective of the therapeutic or healing progress Cavell wants his 
philosophy to achieve. 
 We would run the risk of grossly misunderstanding Cavell’s philosophy and 
what it hopes to achieve from an encounter with Shakespeare if we shut our ears to its 
quasi-religious, or therapeutic, overtones. The religious reference may, however, be less 
jarring than it might initially seem. When Disowning Knowledge puts forward the 
notion that Shakespeare’s theatre is “in competition with religion, as if declaring itself 
religion’s successor,” this is less a metaphysical claim than a claim about the import of 
language (218). Speaking specifically  about the last scene of The Winter’s Tale, Cavell 
equates “the resurrection of the woman” with the “claim that the composer of this play 
is in command of an art that  brings words to life” (218). The quasi-religious claim 
Cavell makes for Shakespeare is not a departure so much as a radical reconsideration of 
the arrogation of philosophy. What the strange concomitance of saving the world and 
mending the heart of language elliptically  gestures towards is this: if the question of 
what we mean by what we say, and whether we must bear the consequences of what we 
say, belongs to the precinct  of philosophy, and if what we do and do not say  to each 
other (and how we say it) defines us and our relationship to others, then we must begin 
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to save the world by trying to mend the heart of language. This chapter will therefore 
put forward the hypothesis that, for Cavell, the hope that the plays give is not in them as 
much as in our relationship to them. In order to understand the redemptive nature of 
Shakespeare’s words, however, we must first turn to Cavell’s reading of Shakespeare 
through Henry  James, Wittgenstein and Emerson and his relocation of sceptical doubt 
from questions about the bard himself to the effect his language has on us.
3.1 The Relocation of Sceptical Doubt
“Unbestreitbar heißt Cavell lesen immer auch wieder lesen, was er an anderer Stelle, an 
anderem Ort, und davor an noch anderer Stelle und an noch anderem Ort bereits gesagt 
oder geschrieben hat” (Thiele 72).17  The texts in which Cavell explicitly mentions 
Shakespeare are many  and varied, among them those collected in Disowning 
Knowledge, A Pitch of Philosophy and The Claim of Reason. However, the texts in 
which Cavell explicitly addresses the Shakespearean form are few and far between: 
some parts of Disowning Knowledge (especially  the “Introduction” and “The Avoidance 
of Love”); “The Interminable Shakespearean Text” and “Henry James Returns to 
America and to Shakespeare” in Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow; the “Foreword” to 
Philosophical Shakespeares; “Skepticism as Iconoclasm” in Shakespeare and the 
Twentieth Century: the Selected proceedings of the International Shakespeare 
Association World Congress Los Angeles 1996; and “Henry  James Reading Emerson 
Reading Shakespeare” in Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes.18 In this conglomerate of 
near-identical texts, Cavell weighs up the issue of the relationship between philosophy 
and Shakespeare by asking a question that is as easy  as it is impossible to answer: Why 
praise Shakespeare? The problem of praise is understood as the difficulty of praising 
Shakespeare without stating the obvious, without diminishing his achievements, without 
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17 “Undeniably, reading Cavell always means re-reading what he has already said or written previously – 
in another place, another time; and perhaps even before that.” 
18  Confusingly in Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes, “Skepticism as Iconoclasm” is referred to as 
“Skepticism and Iconoclasm”. Perhaps this is merely a typo. Since this is a text that Cavell returns to 
and rewrites multiple times, I am inclined to think that this change was made consciously, in order to 
highlight that scepticism about Shakespeare must not always lead to iconoclasm – quite on the 
contrary.
falling into bamboozled idolatry, and without searching for the man in the artist.19 Three 
other thinkers directly influence Cavell’s reading of Shakespeare. Wittgenstein and 
Emerson not only have a great impact on Cavell’s view of language and scepticism; 
their reading of Shakespeare also directly  influences Cavell’s reading of what he 
sometimes dubs Shakespeare’s “endlessness” (Disowning 4). There is also a third 
influence, that of Henry James. James, Wittgenstein and Emerson all grapple with this 
problem of praise, and each of them gives voice to a fundamentally  sceptical attitude. 
Although Cavell gains important insight  into the workings of Shakespeare’s text (and 
how in turn it  works on us) from all three, their readings are conflicting in ways that 
prove crucial for the philosophical importance Cavell bestows on Shakespearean drama.
In his 1907 “Introduction” to Sidney Lee’s edition of The Tempest, James wonders at 
the widespread assumption that this play represents Shakespeare’s farewell to the stage. 
James is trying to understand why Shakespeare should have chosen silence after this 
most perfect command of expression: “How did the faculty so radiant there contrive, in 
such perfection, the arrest of its divine flight?” (xxxi). James does not deny  the myth of 
the farewell to the stage, accepting that there are no facts that disprove it. What James 
contends with is rather what Cavell calls “the weight” of this acceptance: whether we 
fully  “understand what we have accepted” when we have accepted what we have 
accepted about Shakespeare (Transcendental Etudes 234). What we readers of 
Shakespeare have knowingly or unknowingly accepted is precisely  the fact that we will 
never know who Shakespeare really  was, yet the weight of this acceptance – the 
consequences and desires it brings with it – are not always understood, perhaps not even 
by James himself. 
 In the “Introduction” to The Tempest, James defends his “persistent or recurrent 
desire … to touch, or glimpse, the man in the artist,” whilst  at the same time 
recognising the futility  of such a desire (234). And yet the desire persists, is even 
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19  Cavell may have been thinking of Wittgenstein: “If e.g. I hear expressions of admiration for 
Shakespeare made by the distinguished men of several centuries, I can never rid myself of a suspicion 
that praising him has been a matter of convention, even though I have to tell myself that this is not the 
case. I need the authority of a Milton to be really convinced. In this case I take it for granted that he 
was incorruptible. – But of course I don’t mean to deny by this that an enormous amount of praise has 
been & still is lavished on Shakespeare without understanding & for specious reasons by a thousand 
professors of literature.” (Culture and Value 55e)
heightened by our lack of knowledge. The little that we do know only “throw[s] us back 
on the work itself with a rebellious renewal of appetite and yearning” (“Introduction” 
xxxi). Although the “tapestry” or “long arras … hides him,” he is “always there” and 
James cannot but wonder whether in the future it would merely necessitate “a finer 
weapon, the sharper point, the stronger arm, the more extended lunge” to catch him 
(xxxi-ii). With this image of a blind dab at a curtain, James’ desire “to touch the man 
directly  in the Artist” takes on a markedly violent and obsessive character (xxxi). In 
James’ “argumentative rhythm” – swinging between statements such as “there are 
moments, I admit, in this age of sound and fury … when we are willing to let it pass as 
a mystery” and “its power to torment us intellectually seems scarcely  to be borne; and 
we know these moments best when we hear it proclaimed that a comfortable clearness 
reigns” – Cavell recognises “the rhythm of the skeptical problematic” (Transcendental 
Etudes 235, 234-5, 235).20  Just like the sceptic, James is alternately comforted and 
tormented by the “assurance that the matter is simple,” for instance that The Tempest is 
Shakespeare’s last play because he “had made, before fifty, all the money he wanted; 
therefore what  was there more to express?” (235); comforted because it relieves the itch 
of the desire to know, tormented because the sceptic does not want to be relieved of this 
itch. 
 The Shakespeare enthusiast’s sceptical problem is also at the heart  of James’ 
short story  “The Birthplace” (1903). Although this earlier text strikes an altogether 
different tone from the Introduction to The Tempest, the same sceptical problems lurk 
beneath its satirical veneer. The story  relates how the Gedges, the new wardens of the 
birthplace of a great poet who is never named, come to terms with the conflict between 
the lack of factual knowledge about his life, and their visitors’ thirst for the very  same. 
Much to his dismay, Mr. Gedge soon realises that  there is not much factual information 
about the poet and the place itself and thus initially  refuses to supplement his guided 
tours of the house with speculation about the poet’s life. He also becomes increasingly 
uncomfortable with the ease with which his wife Isabel plays up to the visitors’ 
expectations. One summer’s afternoon, a young American couple finally  encourages 
Gedge to expand on the paucity of facts on the birthplace. They soon convince him that 
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20 Interestingly Cavell also speaks about “the rhythm of skepticism” in his reading of Othello (Claim 
484).
what is most important are the literary works themselves, and that he should not feel 
guilty about earning his keep by indulging the expectations of his visitors. The story 
ends with Mr. Gedge being awarded a pay-rise for his charming new act, in which, 
much to the delight of his visitors, he expands on what kind of games the young poet 
used to play as a child. 
 Apart from being very  funny for Cavell, James’ story is about the sceptic’s 
oscillation, his rhythm.21  It “best isolates and analyses the compulsion to praise 
Shakespeare” and whilst  “it  obviously deals in some parody of banal religiosity” its 
underlying problematic is no light matter (Transcendental Etudes 238). Cavell quotes 
lengthily  from the first interview with the American couple, when the husband explains 
that for him “the interesting thing – or at all events the eternally  tormenting one” is “the 
fact of the abysmally little that, in proportion (that is in proportion to the magnitude of 
Shakespeare) we know” (“Birthplace” 239). Foreshadowing the sceptical rhythm of 
James’ 1907 Introduction to The Tempest, Gedge soon underplays his own desire to 
know more (or proportionally more) about the man in the artist by  making a point of the 
fact that “luckily” this particular lack of knowledge “doesn’t at all affect the 
work!” (“Birthplace” 283). As James has the American husband say, what matters is the 
work  itself (having him also echo Hamlet’s “the play is the thing”), not the author who 
wrote it. “Practically,” he continues, “there is no author”, there are only “all the 
immortal people – in the work; but there’s nobody else” (283). Mrs. Gedge’s protest  that 
surely someone must have written the plays, is met with her husband’s retort that “there 
was somebody” but that “they have killed him” and keep on killing “Him every 
day” (285). For Cavell, “Gedge’s triumph only serves to isolate him further, from the 
different, wordless, breathless satisfactions his curious virtuosity affords the American 
husband and Gedge’s wife” (Transcendental Etudes 241). Hence Cavell recognises 
different stances regarding the authorship question in James’ short story: a) the most 
primitive position (“taking our ignorance of origins to be simply  an empirical matter)”) 
of the American wife (“It’s rather a pity, you know, that He isn’t here. I mean as 
Goethe’s at Weimar. For Goethe is at  Weimar” (“The Birthplace” 280), b) the most 
“civilised” stance, “combining interest with torment, and ‘liking’ the fact of our 
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21 For me it is also a tale about the impact of financial pressures on academic freedom.
empirical ignorance” portrayed by the American husband and c) Gedge’s sceptical 
oscillation between not caring at all and caring very deeply about who wrote the work. 
 The idolatry of the American husband, the empiricism of the American wife, and 
the scepticism of Mr. Gedge and James himself all miss the point. Cavell traces Gedge’s 
declaration that He, the divine author, is dead back to Nietzsche’s ubiquitous “Gott ist 
tot” and to Emerson’s earlier version of the same concept. He argues that this praise 
misses the point of Shakespeare, just as according to Emerson’s “Divinity School 
Address,” preachers who either accord too much importance to the person Jesus or 
preachers who “speak of the revelation as somewhat long ago given and done, as if God 
were dead” have missed the point of religion or God (Transcendental Etudes 243). Mr. 
Gedge’s position is perhaps most like James’ own desire to pierce the “long arras” that 
hides the truth about Shakespeare, most like the sceptical rhythm oscillating between 
the desire for knowledge and the denial of the importance of such knowledge. Cavell 
does not comment on this, but it is somewhat astonishing that James here seems to be 
echoing Hamlet’s manic stab at a curtain. Yet like Hamlet, James and Mr. Gedge might 
be looking for one thing but killing another. The search for the man behind the text 
might not allow us to grasp something much more important that is happening in the 
text itself.
The originality of Cavell’s discussion of the Shakespearean form lies in the fact that he 
moves from James’ author- or text-based scepticism to one more akin to Wittgenstein’s, 
who locates this sceptical impulse not only in the authorship  question or textual history, 
but also in the form or language of the plays themselves. Wittgenstein’s relationship to 
Shakespeare is ambivalent, and the very little he wrote about him is tinged with a 
strange kind of reluctant praise. In his notes, published under the title Culture and 
Value, Wittgenstein repeatedly returns to Shakespeare, as if he were an itch that he 
could never quite scratch. I include only a few examples:
 I do not think that Shakespeare can be set alongside any other poet. Was he 
 perhaps a creator of language rather than a poet?
 I could only stare in wonder at Shakespeare; never do anything with him.
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 I am deeply suspicious of most of Shakespeare’s admirers. I think the trouble is 
 that, in western culture at least, he stands alone, & so, one can only  place him by 
 placing him wrongly. 
 It is not as though S. portrayed human types well & were in that respect true to 
 life. He is not true to life. But he has such a supple hand and such individual 
 brush strokes, that each one of his characters looks significant, worth looking at.
 “Beethoven’s great heart” – no one could say “Shakespeare’s great heart”. 
 ‘The supple hand that created new forms of language’ would seem to me nearer
 the mark.
 The reason why I cannot understand Shakespeare is that I want to find symmetry 
 in all this asymmetry. 
 It seems to me as though his pieces are, as it were, enormous sketches, not  
 paintings; as though they were dashed off by  someone who could permit himself 
 anything, so to speak. And I understand how someone may admire this & call it  
 supreme art, but I don’t  like it. – So I can understand someone who stands 
 before those pieces speechless; but  someone who admires him as one admires 
 Beethoven, say, seems to me to misunderstand Shakespeare. (Culture and Value 
 95e, 96e, 98e)
Here the object of sceptical doubt is not the person Shakespeare but the text 
“Shakespeare,” the plays or language themselves. Wittgenstein’s comments exude a 
kind of frustration at the fact  that  he himself could not do anything with Shakespeare. 
What would Wittgenstein want to do with Shakespeare, or rather what does 
Wittgenstein normally  want to do with words that  he cannot do with Shakespeare’s? He 
is uneasy about his poetry because there is something in his words that does not allow 
for Wittgenstein’s “late way of bringing words back to their homes, their home language 
games, back to the order he calls the ordinary, back, as if anew, from 
chaos” (Transcendental Etudes 236). Shakespeare’s works are deleterious to 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical investigations because they bring words further than what 
“language games discern home” (237). Rather than teaching us again what words can 
mean, rather than making us feel back at home in our language, fundamentally 
Shakespeare makes us feel that it is “something miraculous that words can mean at all, 
that such things can be said, that there are words”: they plunge us into the chaotic forge 
of language, where “chaos cling[s] to his creation” (237). The root of Wittgenstein’s 
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uneasiness about Shakespeare is thus that he is not a poet so much as he is a creator of 
language. 
Cavell shares the sceptical desire of James and empathises with Wittgenstein’s awe and 
frustration, but it is through Emerson that he finds a way to get to grips with the 
Shakespearean form. Cavell’s reading of the Shakespearean oeuvre as being able to 
transcend the scepticism we brought to it is thus dependent on marrying the reasons for 
Wittgenstein’s scepticism about Shakespeare with Emerson’s idea of Shakespeare as a 
poet-philosopher. In contrast to Wittgenstein, Cavell sees Shakespeare’s language not as 
something detrimental to philosophical endeavour, but rather as something which will 
allow philosophy to do something that it  cannot do alone. Emerson recognises the same 
distinctness in Shakespeare’s language as Wittgenstein does. Like Wittgenstein, 
Emerson notes that  whatever Shakespeare does, he does not only with our words but 
also with our concepts, with how we grasp the world around us. However, in contrast to 
Wittgenstein, Emerson is still able to do something with Shakespeare, or to allow 
Shakespeare to do something to him. Whilst for Wittgenstein, Shakespeare was not a 
poet, for Emerson he was supremely so. Indeed, he is cast as “the Poet” in 
Representative Men. Emerson argues that although “some able and appreciating critics 
think no criticism of Shakespeare valuable that does not rest purely  on the dramatic 
merit,” he himself does not agree that Shakespeare is “falsely  judged as poet and 
philosopher” (Representative 163). On the contrary, he argues that his “dramatic merit” 
is only “secondary” to his philosophical merit (163). For Emerson, Shakespeare is not 
only poet and philosopher, but also a philosopher because he is a poet. Emerson does 
not see the ultra-conceptual nature of Shakespeare’s language as a by-product of the 
poetry, but rather the other way around. Poetry becomes the tool with which 
Shakespeare seeks to do something conceptually.
 Emerson’s stance does not deny  the possibility for James’ and Wittgenstein’s 
intuitions of Shakespeare as unknown, perhaps unknowable, beyond or behind or within 
the things and persons we apprehend with our senses. But  on the back of Emerson’s 
account, there is a shift in the location of our sceptical doubt. As is noted in Philosophy 
The Day After Tomorrow, some critics have rejected Cavell’s reading of King Lear for 
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not taking into account the play’s complicated textual history (29). Cavell takes this 
objection seriously  and argues that the questions put by what he dubs New Textualism, 
about the true nature, provenance or dissemination of the Shakespearean text, though in 
many ways illuminating, miss the point of the tragedies: 
 The excessive certainty of the claims made for the New Textualism strikes me as 
 displacing the presence of words in its insistence on the absences of the absolute 
 text – as if the very  emphasis on the text’s materiality at the same time is meant 
 to avoid some encounter with what, in each case, it provisionally says. (47) 
Here, not unlike the sceptic, the reader hides behind a intellectual question in order to 
avoid an encounter with what the text actually says, with what demands it makes on us. 
As Rhie and Eldridge point out, although for Cavell “there are insight to be won” from 
other acts of reading, what is irreducibly  at  the centre of his own is “an agon of human 
subjectivity, poised between acknowledgment and avoidance” (11). In a move similar to 
his acceptance of the truth of scepticism, Cavell thus suggests that it is precisely 
because we cannot help  not knowing some things about Shakespeare that we must  turn 
our attention – and our praise – to something else. What is important for Cavell is not 
who wrote the plays, or what exactly he wrote, but what call or claim the Shakespearean 
text makes on us, and whether we hear it and, if we do, how we act  upon it. Reading 
Shakespeare through James, Wittgenstein and Emerson, Cavell shifts the grounds for 
scepticism away from matters falling into the realm of knowledge to issues pertaining to 
the effect his drama has on us. What we are called to do when reading Shakespeare is 
therefore not to seek out knowledge but acknowledgment.
3.2 Acknowledging Shakespeare
As a student in Berkeley in 1946, Cavell was part of a production of King Lear. He 
would go on to claim, in Little Did I Know, that  “no experience of theater I have been 
exposed to in my life has made a greater lasting impression on me” (218). As Beckwith 
indicates, his “lengthy exposure to the play’s words” provided occasion to “[consider] 
what each line means, a question of imagining the motivation and setting” (123). It was, 
perhaps, a first  exposure to “a form of ordinary language philosophy,” because it too 
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“requires us to ask” why characters say and do certain things and what it all means 
(124). It was, in the words of Little Did I Know, an opportunity  to “materialise the 
expression of what you say it means” (215, my emphasis). In giving rise to “eventual 
and perpetual considerations of the possibilities of mood and condition into which each 
line can be delivered then and there, and responded to then and there,” the 1946 
Berkeley student production of King Lear, and more importantly  Cavell’s endeavour to 
write incidental music for it, ultimately triggered the crisis for his (philosophical) 
conversion (215):
 Intellectually and artistically, the most lasting of these efforts was writing music 
 for the production of King Lear (running, it  will emerge, just over four hours, 
 with two intermissions). It was here, playing music cues at  the piano for scene 
 rehearsals, and for run-throughs, and, assembling and rehearsing a small 
 orchestra, conducting dress rehearsals and eight performances, that I came, not 
 without considerable anxiety, to the first clear inklings, consciously  and 
 unforgettably, that I was more interested in the actions and ideas and language of 
 the play, and in learning and understanding what might be said about them and 
 what I felt  I had to say about them, than I was in the music in which I expressed 
 what I could of my  sense of those actions and ideas and words (though doubtless 
 writing music in response to the play had led me further into its world than, at  
 the stage, I would or could have otherwise found myself). It  is to this 
 production, intermittently still on my mind twenty years later, that I refer in the 
 course of writing my essay on Lear …. (215)
There is something in King Lear that, though not incompatible with his love of music, 
draws Cavell away from his supposed vocation. The question of what happens on stage 
in Shakespearean drama, indeed what is at stake for its audience, fashions Cavell’s idea 
of what philosophy  should set  out to do. And in order to capture what happens in 
Shakespearean theatre and what contributed to his (philosophical) conversion we must, 
it seems, listen as he reverts to markedly musical metaphors.
 What provokes Cavell’s reference to music, however, is neither the role music 
plays in Shakespeare nor the language’s more or less musical properties. Whilst as he 
notes in Disowning Knowledge, “it is not uncommon to find Shakespeare’s plays 
compared to music,” his comparison does not simply “rest upon more or less superficial 
features of music, for example, on its balance of themes, its recurrences, shifts of mood, 
climaxes – in a word, on its theatrical properties” (91). Cavell places Shakespearean 
drama alongside music because since “Monteverdi (born three years after 
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Shakespeare),” or at least since “the establishment of tonality,” finally climaxing in “the 
development of the sonata form,” music has been “dramatic in a more fundamental 
sense” (92). What Cavell has in mind here is the “development” of the sonata form, 
particularly “preeminent in late Beethoven or Brahms ... in which all later material can 
be said to be ‘contained’ in the rising and falling interval of a third in the opening two 
bars” (92). Viewed in conjunction with his previous discussion of Beethoven in “Music 
Discomposed,” this comparison gains further importance: 
 But in the late experience of Beethoven, it  is as if our freedom to act no longer 
 depends on the possibility  of spontaneity; improvising to fit a given lack or need 
 is no longer enough. The entire enterprise of action and of communication has 
 become problematic. The problem is no longer how to do what you want, but to 
 know what would satisfy you. (201)
Echoing his discussion of Shakespeare in the “Introduction” to Disowning Knowledge, 
this passage suggests that the difficulty  and possibility of living “in a groundless world” 
is posed by a characteristic present in both Shakespeare’s dramatic and in Beethoven’s 
late style (Disowning 3).22  Just like in Beethoven’s Sonatas, when listening to 
Shakespeare we perceive only what is in front of our ears and our eyes at that given 
moment:
 I will say that  the quality we are to perceive is one of directed motion, controlled 
 by relations of keys, by rate of alteration, and by length and articulation of 
 phrases. We do not know where this motion can stop and we do not understand 
 why it has begun here, so we do not know where we stand or why we are there. 
 The drama consists in following this out and in finding what it takes to follow 
 this out. (92) 
In this sense, the difference between “waiting for a sentence in prose or conversation to 
end and attending to a line of poetry or a tonal phrase” is that “in conversation, a remark 
which begins a certain way can normally have only  one of a definite set of endings,” 
whereas in “dramatic poetry and tonal music” this is not the case:
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22  Theodor Adorno also found philosophical parallels in Beethoven’s late style.  For an illuminating 
account on the relationship between music and philosophy,  see Daniel Steuer’s “Adorno’s Beethoven: 
Some remarks on the relationship between music and philosophy,  with particular attention to the themes 
of recognition and reification.” Germanistik in Ireland: Jahrbuch der/ Yearbook of the Association of 
Third-Level Teachers of German in Ireland. Vol. 3. Weg und Bewegung: Medieval and modern 
encounters. Festschrift in honour of Timothy R. Jackson and Gilbert J. Carr. Ed. Cordula Politis and 
Nicola Creighton. Konstanz: Hartung-Gorre Verlag, 2008. 161-173.
 It is as if dramatic poetry and tonal music, forgoing these givens, are made to 
 imitate the simplest facts of life: that life is lived in time, that there is a now at  
 which everything that  happens happens, and a now at which for each man and 
 each woman everything stops happening, and that what has happened is not here 
 and now, and that what might have happened then and there will never happen 
 then and there, and that what will happen is not here and now and yet may be 
 settled by  what is happening here and now in a way we cannot know or will not 
 see here and now. (92-3)
Cavell’s comparison to music indicates that both separateness and its companion 
acknowledgment are to be found not only in the plays’ themes but also in what he calls 
their “dramatic form.” Although we are told that Shakespeare’s dramatic poetry shares 
the feature of “constant presentness” with music, we are not given a clear indication of 
how the plays (or perhaps the way they are performed) establish it. We are, however, 
offered some clues. One contributor to the quality  of “constant presentness” of 
Shakespearean drama is the absence of narration. In “accounts which are simultaneous 
with the events they describe,” we are somewhat removed from the events, because the 
narrator is always “in a position to know something we do not know” (107). Modern 
playwrights thus often feel that the audience has to be taken “into the confidence of the 
tale.” Consequently  the “awe in experiencing [the unravelling of tragedy] was like the 
awe in suddenly falling into the force of nature or of crowds watching a building 
collapse” (89). In Shakespearean drama, with no God and no fate to blame, tragedy is 
no longer simply  fated and thus inevitable; and yet never do we find ourselves in 
Shakespeare’s confidence. Because there is no meta-level – neither narration nor a 
metaphysical mechanism – from which we can overlook the actions on stage, we are at 
all times “present at what is happening” (107). We are, to use Cavell’s image, in the 
building as it collapses. 
The “constant presentness” of Shakespeare’s plays radically changes the way we relate 
to this drama. What demands does Shakespearean drama place on us? In what 
relationship  do they stand to the demands that others place on us? What are the 
consequences of how we relate to it? These questions are raised by a particularly 
haunting moment in Disowning Knowledge when Cavell compares our perception of the 
events that happen on stage in Othello with our perception of an everyday scene:
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 That couple over there, drinking coffee, talking, laughing. Do I believe they are 
 just passing the time of day, or testing out the field of flirtation, or something 
 else? In usual cases, not one thing or another; I neither believe or disbelieve. 
 Suppose the man suddenly puts his hands to the throat  of the woman. Do I 
 believe or disbelieve that he is going to throttle her? The time for that question, 
 as soon as it comes to the point, is already passed. The question is: What, if 
 anything, do I do? What I believe hangs on what I do or do not do and on how I 
 react to what I do or do not do. And whether something or nothing, there will be 
 consequences. At the opening of the play it is fully true that I neither believe nor 
 disbelieve. But I am something, perplexed, anxious….Much later, the warrior 
 asks his wife if she has said her prayers. Do I believe he will go through with it? 
 I know he will; it is a certainty  fixed forever; but  I hope against hope he will 
 come to his senses; I appeal to him, in silent shouts. Then he puts his hands on 
 her throat. The question is: What, if anything, do I do? I do nothing; that is a 
 certainty fixed forever. And it  has its consequences. Why do I do nothing? 
 Because they are only pretending? That  would be a reason not to do anything if 
 it were true of the couple over there, who just a moment ago were drinking 
 coffee, laughing. There it is a reason because it tells me something I did not 
 know. Here, in the theatre, what does it tell me? It is an excuse whistling in the 
 dark; and it is false. Othello is not pretending. Garrick is not pretending, any 
 more than a puppet in that part would be pretending. I know everything, and yet  
 the question arises: Why do I sit there? And the honest answer has to be: There 
 is nothing I can do. Why not? (100-1)
In transposing a scene from Othello to a mundane setting, Cavell is highlighting the 
differences in how we relate to a “real” or a “staged” scene. At the same time he casts 
doubt over our choices by suggesting that our position in both scenes is very similar. 
Because we are not given a detached narration explaining the events, we are faced with 
figures on stage which “are radically and continuously free, operating under their own 
power, at every  moment choosing their destruction” (88). The characters on stage are 
“in a word, men and women” and “our liabilities in responding to them are nothing 
other than our liabilities in responding to any person – rejection, brutality, 
sentimentality, indifference, the relief and the terror in finding courage, the ironies of 
human wishes” (89). For Bruns, what this comparison highlights is neither 
“psychological projection,” nor a simple identification with these characters; rather, it is 
a question of “finding some internal connection with them, taking them as, in some 
sense, irreducible to mere representations – in other words, taking them as not really 
intelligible as (just) fictions” (“Cavell’s Shakespeare” 623). For Cavell the “constant 
presentness” of Shakespearean drama “literalise[s] the conditions we exact for existence 
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outside – hiddenness, silence, isolation” (Disowning 104). The characters’ separateness 
hence crystallises something about how Cavell understands our relationship  to the 
other: our knowledge can never make us understand the other fully, instead the only 
thing we can hope for is to be able to make the other present to us:
We are not in, and cannot put ourselves in, the presence of the characters; but we 
are in, or can put ourselves in, their present. It is in making their present ours, 
their moments as they occur, that we complete our acknowledgment of them. 
But this requires making their present theirs. (108)
In Mulhall’s words, “Shakespeare employs the medium of poetic drama in such a way 
as to locate the members of his audience in a position which is structurally analogous to 
that of the play’s characters” (197). And yet in all probability  we will react differently to 
staged events than we would to real ones. 
 When we go to the theatre something more than the suspension of disbelief 
happens to us: it is something more akin to paralysis. This something that happens to us, 
tells us, for instance, that  getting up  and begging Othello not to kill Desdemona would 
not only  be unacceptable behaviour in a theatre, but would also be quite beside the 
point. Imagine a theatregoer who for one reason or another did not understand the 
concept of playacting. Imagine him getting up during the play and telling Othello what 
Iago is really  up to. Imagine him wrestling Othello off Desdemona. Imagine him even 
succeeding in stopping the play. Still nothing has changed: “It  has merely  interrupted an 
evening’s work. Quiet the house, pick up  the thread again, and Othello will reappear, as 
near and as deaf to us as ever –” (Disowning 101). Whilst the character can be present 
to us, just as they are present to themselves, to their now, we can never be present to 
them. The “grammatical entity” of the character – the fact that “we are not in their 
presence” and that they cannot be aware of us – is underlined by our theatrical 
conventions. “Darkened, indoor theatres” and “a theatre whose house lights were left on 
(a possibility  suggested, for other reasons, by Brecht),” for instance “might dramatize 
the equally significant fact  that we are also inaudible to them, and immovable (that is, at 
a fixed distance from them)” (103). As Rhu observes in “Competing for the Soul,” in 
“patiently” attending a play, the audience “becomes present not only to the sufferings 
undergone by  the characters in the drama” but also “to its separateness from the 
sufferers” (145). The way Cavell listens to Shakespearean drama is, however, not only 
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an example of what Bruns calls “careful attention to particular human situations and to 
what people say and do in them vis-à-vis each other,” it is also, as I will go on to show 
in the next  subsection, to some extent  what attunes Cavell’s ear to the separateness of 
others (Tragic Thoughts 200).
Under Cavell’s gaze, the theatrical situation becomes marked by  an insurmountable and 
paradoxical disjunction between theatre and audience: insurmountable because we can 
never change the events that happen on stage and paradoxical because it  is precisely this 
disjunction which is the basis for a cathartic identification with the staged events. In 
highlighting our separateness from the events played out on stage, the theatrical 
situation also illuminates our relationships to other people; at the same time, a 
comparison between our reaction to other people and to the characters on stage also 
reveals a truth about what our behaviour in the theatre entails. Because our relationship 
to the characters on stage is structurally akin to our relationship to other people, our 
choice not to do anything to stop Othello killing Desdemona is not caused by  a lack of 
knowledge. As Cavell’s transposition of the situation to a daily scene shows, the 
question of knowledge should not and effectively  does not come into play in my 
decision about whether or not I should stop a man strangling his wife. The recourse to 
knowledge is an excuse whistling in the dark. In positing and emphasising the 
separateness of its characters, Shakespearean drama demands that our perception and 
relation to them move beyond knowledge. But how can we understand these demands 
that the Shakespearean form makes on us, especially since there is nothing that we can 
really do to stop Othello? And what are the ethical implications of my failure to 
acknowledge others both inside and outside of the theatre?
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3.3 “hidden and silent and fixed” – The Theatricalisation of Others and the Passionate 
Utterances of Shakespearean Drama 
With its overt hints at the actual political situation in America of the mid 1960s, and 
with its likening of America to Lear, the second part of “The Avoidance of Love” may 
perhaps take its place amongst Cavell’s most outraged political writings:
 Now we are surrounded by inexplicable pain and death; no death is more 
 mysterious or portentous than others; because every death which is not the fruit  
 of a long life is now unaccounted for, since we cannot or will not account for it: 
 not just because, taking local examples, we no longer know why a society may 
 put its own people to death for breaking its rules, nor when it may intervene with 
 death in a foreign place, nor because highway deaths need not happen, nor 
 because the pollution of our air and water has become deliberate, nor because 
 poverty  has become inflicted – but because we do not know our position with 
 respect to such things. We are present at these events, and no one is present 
 without making something happen; everything which is happening is happening 
 to me, and I do not know what is happening. I do not know that my helplessness 
 is limited only  by  my separateness, because I do not know which fortune is mine 
 and which is yours. The world did not become sad; it was always sad. Tragedy 
 has moved into the world, and with it  the world becomes theatrical. (Disowning 
 114-5)
Although publishers were reluctant to print the second more politicised part of “The 
Avoidance of Love” in subsequent editions and collections, the philosophical and 
literary  interventions he makes in the essay’s first part remain incomplete without it. 
Despite having “been requested for reprinting” more than any  other of his pieces, 
“without exception the request has been to use only  its first part, and even from that  to 
excise everything ‘philosophical’ (naturally the request  was not put that way), which in 
practice meant everything not contributing to a fairly direct recounting of the 
interpretation of the play’s narrative” (Disowning xiii). The second part of “The 
Avoidance of Love” shows that his interdisciplinary investigations are not a means unto 
themselves. Although it was written in the context of the Vietnam War, the previous 
quotation also throws light  on a very contemporary ethical problem: how we relate to 
the pain of others in the age of information? What do we do when we see the newsreels 
depicting the pain of others who – though we are in that moment not present to them – 
are very  present  to us and, furthermore, real? If we know that people are dying – dying 
perhaps at the hands of our country, or as a consequence of our country’s or society’s 
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actions – why are we not preventing this? Do we merely  sigh and change the channel? 
What else can we do?
 The theatrical situation shows us that – both inside and outside of the theatre’s 
borders – there is always “a point at which I am helpless before the acting and the 
suffering of others” (109). At the same time, in Shakespearean drama we are confronted 
at all times by  what we need to know in order to acknowledge. As Bruns notes, Cavell 
is interested in “what, in shifting attention from character to language or text or context, 
we [are] (ourselves, as readers) turning away from, or trying to avoid?” (“Cavell’s 
Shakespeare” 617). The fact that “the medium is one which keeps all significance 
continuously before our senses” also means that when we fail to acknowledge, this will 
have been “wilful, complicitous, a refusal to see” (Disowning 85). In this sense, Mulhall 
argues that Cavell’s illuminating reading of Lear has not been advanced before because 
we have “difficulty in seeing what is right in front of our eyes” (197). One such 
example is our inability to see what happens to Gloucester at the end of the play. Cavell 
spends a long time on Regan’s sending of Gloucester to “smell” his way to Dover 
(3.7.92-3). Critics have decided that this is a lapse in Shakespeare’s construction 
because there has been no talk of Gloucester going to Dover before this and because 
Regan knows that it is Lear and not Gloucester who is going to Dover. Shakespeare 
being Shakespeare, audience and critics tend to excuse this lapse. Cavell, however, 
notes that what looks like “a lapse is sometimes meant” (Disowning 54). Sometimes the 
failure to notice the lapse is in fact our failure. 
 As in all his readings of Shakespeare, here Cavell shifts the attention from 
traditional contentions (why does he go to Dover?) to the demands the Shakespearean 
text is placing on us. 
 We “do not notice” Regan’s confusion of identity because we share it, and in 
 failing to understand Gloucester’s blanked condition (or rather in insisting upon 
 understanding it  from our point  of view) we are doing what the characters in the 
 play  are seen to do: we avoid him. And so we are implicated in the failures we 
 are witnessing; we share the responsibility for tragedy. (54)
As Davies rightly notes, the issue for Cavell “is not to ask what we might know of a 
text, but rather to ask what it is that a text we care about might know, and how it might 
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call on us to receive its instruction” (135).23  The text is here giving us occasion to 
acknowledge our own separateness and our propensity to evade its consequences. We 
think there is an intellectual lack that keeps us from understanding why  Regan sends 
Gloucester to Dover, whereas in fact it is a metaphysical finitude that keeps us from 
grasping what is happening in this text, just as it keeps me from knowing if the other is 
in pain. In order to know what is going on in Shakespeare’s plays, it is not sufficient to 
know about early modern play conventions. It is not even sufficient to know precisely 
what originated from this author’s pen (indeed, the oeuvre we call Shakespeare’s resists 
such knowledge). To understand “why a given remark or a particular play was made 
here …. you have to know something more for that, and you have to look” (Disowning 
48). Unlike “a failure to know,” which can be seen as “an absence of something,” a 
blank, “a ‘failure to acknowledge’ is the presence of something, a confusion, an 
indifference, a callousness, an exhaustion, a coldness” (“Knowing” 264). Our blanking 
of Gloucester is not inevitable; we choose to do it by electing to “interpret a 
metaphysical finitude as an intellectual lack” (Disowning 11). Or put differently, 
“spiritual emptiness is not  a blank” (“Knowing” 264). We could respond differently  to 
Regan’s avoidance of Gloucester, but instead we choose to avoid him too.
Cavell’s description of the theatrical situation as one in which a semi-permeable 
membrane divides the audience from what happens on stage explains why we cannot do 
anything to stop Othello killing Desdemona, or why we fail to see Gloucester’s blanked 
condition, but it also shows why “we are responsible for the death of others even when 
we have not murdered them, and even when we have not manslaughtered them 
innocently” (Disowning 103). There is structurally really  no “difference between 
tragedy in a theatre and tragedy in actuality,” since in both “people in pain are in our 
presence” and unless we “put ourselves in their presence, reveal ourselves to them” 
acknowledgement in reality too remains incomplete and the world and all the pain in it 
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23 In this sense Cavell is very much Emerson’s disciple: “so the question Emerson’s theory of reading and 
writing is designed to answer is not ‘What does a text mean?’ (and one may accordingly not wish to call it 
a theory of interpretation) but rather ‘How is it that a text we care about in a certain way (expressed 
perhaps as our being drawn to read it with the obedience that masters) invariably says more than its writer 
knows, so that writers and readers write and read beyond themselves?’  This might be summarized as 
‘What does a text know?’ or, in Emerson’s term, ‘What is the genius of the text?’  (Transcendental Etudes 
95). This is a the genius of the text, similar yet different to the one Derrida hears in Shakespeare, and to 
which I shall turn in Chapter 7.
becomes our theatre (103-4). This claim that we may be responsible for an action that 
we have not committed and could in any case not  have prevented from happening is 
central to Cavell’s argument that Shakespeare can provide “education for 
grownups” (Claim 125). This argument is also based on the belief that a play or piece of 
literature as a whole (and not only  their characters) can make a demand on the audience 
and, furthermore, that this demand is ethical in nature. Put differently, Cavell’s reading 
of Shakespeare implies that this drama may be read in terms of his notion of passionate 
utterances.
  As discussed in Chapter 2, Cavell’s notion of “passionate utterances” is 
response both to Austin’s reluctance to expand on perlocutionary speech acts and his 
avoidance of the value and status of the expressive in speech. The concept of passionate 
utterances is such a compelling one because it shows that there is a strong connection 
between the expression or passion with which something is said and its ethical 
repercussions, understood primarily as the demand it makes on the interlocutor: “in 
speaking from my passion I must actually be suffering the passion (evincing, 
expressing, not to say displaying it, though this may go undeciphered, perhaps wilfully, 
by the other), in order rightfully to …. Demand from you a response in kind, one you 
are moved to offer, and moreover …. Now” (“Passionate” 193). Because the “staging” 
of my “perlocutionary invocation, or provocation, or confrontation” is not backed by 
“conventional procedure” as an illocutionary speech act because (we could add) there is 
nothing in the realm of knowledge that can assure us how we should react, or what a 
passionate speech act is expressing, hence demanding from us, it is solely “grounded in 
my being moved to speak, hence to speak in, or out of passion, whose capacities for 
lucidity and opacity leaves the genuineness of motive always vulnerable to 
criticism” (193). 
 Let us assume for a moment that a play  as a whole, or even a text that does not 
include dialogue, can be thought  of in terms of Cavell’s passionate utterances. Like 
passionate utterances, Shakespearean drama does not make a statement that is true or 
false, nor does it depend (or at  least solely depend) on convention (and here a point 
could be made about theatrical conventions); what it does do, however, is create a 
response in us: Othello, for instance, did not make Cavell “believe nor disbelieve,” nor 
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did it (at least not in the first instance) make him do anything – but it did make him feel 
“perplexed” and “anxious” (Disowning 100). According to the logic of “passionate 
utterances,” if we have failed to acknowledge the real reasons for tragedy, we are 
complicit in it, because we have not responded to the way the drama has singled us (and 
our common separateness) out, and this failure “puts the future of our relationship, as 
part of my sense of my identity, or my existence, more radically at  stake” (“Passionate” 
194). This is because “with perlocutions interpretation is characteristically in order, part 
of the passionate exchange” (194). In blanking Gloucester, we therefore become 
complicit in the unfolding tragedy.
 There is, nevertheless, at least one significant difference between “passionate 
utterances” and Shakespearean drama. Whilst “passionate utterances” may at times go 
unacknowledged, theatrical passionate utterances, if indeed we may call them this, must 
per definition remain unacknowledged: “If the suggestion is right that the ‘completion 
of acknowledgment’ requires self-revelation, then making the characters present must 
be a form of, or require, self-revelation,” and if we are right  to believe that there is no 
way in which I can reveal myself to the character on stage (reveal anything but our 
common separateness, that is to say), then acknowledgment in theatre must remain 
incomplete (Disowning 108). The same is true for reading Shakespeare. In trying to 
acknowledge a text, we are faced with the same problems as when we are trying to 
acknowledge a character on stage. Just as we cannot make ourselves present to a 
character, we cannot make ourselves present to a text: acknowledgment of a text, a play 
or a character therein will thus always remain structurally incomplete. The 
“educational” potential of our interaction with Shakespearean drama hinges on the 
realisation that although there are situations, such as the theatrical one, in which we 
literally cannot do anything, doing nothing is not always of the same ethical value. 
Although there is nothing we can do to save Desdemona, or Cordelia, or reverse 
Regan’s blanking of Gloucester, we still become complicit in the tragedy as soon as we 
fail to recognise (and act on) why we cannot help them. Unless I “know the true point  of 
my helplessness” (in other words, our common separateness), “I am not emptied of 
help, but withhold it” (109).
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 Shakespearean drama shows us that whilst  there is nothing we can do in theatre, 
if we choose to do nothing in reality  then we theatricalise the other. Or as Sparti sums 
up: “theater re-creates and reflects a peculiar situation that occurs in ordinary life, the 
one in which we are overcome, exactly like Lear (and the skeptic), by an impulse to 
neglect and avoid”  (94). Its redemptive character, however, does not only consist in 
showing us our complicity, but also in giving us a space in which we can change. As 
Cavell suggests in “Music Discomposed,” music offers similar respite, because it  plays 
with our “fate of being accountable for everything you do and are, intended or 
not” (199). In giving us “actions to perform whose consequences, commitments, and 
liabilities are discharged in the act  itself,” it momentarily  sets us free, and allows us to 
“cede the possibilities of excuse, explanation, or justification for [our] failures” (200). 
Sparti again offers a clear summary: 
Theater enables us to avoid the anxiety and the weight of having to put ourselves 
in the presence of the other, and this is the fascination but also the cost of the 
theatrical experience, which turns us into – ‘freezes’ us in the role of – viewers. 
On the other hand, Shakespeare’s work as such is also a warning and an 
invitation, the basis of an ethical commitment, because it enables us to understand 
that when we are hidden, and silent, and fixed, when we keep ourselves in the 
dark and isolate ourselves, the consequence is that we convert the other into a 
character, and make the world a stage for him or her. (95)
Indeed, Cavell argues that by offering us a situation where there is simply nothing we 
can do to stop tragedy from happening, theatre offers us a “respite within which to 
prepare for this necessity, to clean out the pity  and terror which stand in the way of 
acknowledgment outside [of the theatre]” (Disowning 103-4). Shakespearean drama 
gives us a space and a place for catharsis, but what is it that is encrypted in “pity  and 
terror”? Cavell returns to the question of catharsis in “Skepticism and Iconoclasm”: 
“According to my way  of looking at Lear, [the catharsis] is from enforced or stifled 
words, from enforced silence, from voices not our own, from falsifying accent, from the 
breath of words held too long” (246). In this sense, changing our words would mean 
ridding them of all those markers of the avoidance of our, and the other’s, separateness. 
And in true Austinian spirit, Cavell therefore identifies language as the space in which 
we must change our relationship  to the other, from one of avoidance to one of 
acknowledgment. In true Emersonian spirit, he believes that Shakespeare’s language 
can help us forge our own. 
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 Charles Altieri argues that Cavell’s work on Shakespeare “is typical of 
philosophical work on fiction in its eagerness to explore moral and psychological 
dilemmas” and in its “ignoring” of what he calls “the provocative imaginative space” 
disclosed “by attention to how the text builds distinctive structural relations that at  once 
distance it from the empirical world and model alternative ways of participating in that 
world” (267). This reading is, I believe, belied by the way Cavell’s readings locate the 
philosophical significance of the plays in something that happens not only in and 
through Shakespeare’s language, but precisely  in that “imaginative space” between the 
text and the reader. According to Beckwith, “Shakespeare’s theater ... charts from first 
to last, with huge clarity and remorselessness, the transformed work of language in 
human relating” (128). Shakespeare’s language, with its “extraordinary, unprecedented 
expansion in the expressive range, precision, and flexibility,” Beckwith claims, “takes 
up this terrible burden and gift of human relating when nothing but language secures or 
grounds human relations” (128). It is this shift in language that is “the miracle in an age 
where all miracles are past” (128).
 The miracle here is not something metaphysical, but rather relates to “language’s 
powers of representing the world and of expressing our relation to 
others” (“Skepticism” 241). It  relates to the fact that “when authority is no longer 
assumed in the speech acts of a sacramental priesthood, it must be found, and re-found 
in the claims, calls, and judgements of individuals” (Beckwith 128). The miracle is that 
the burden of language offers the chance of becoming once more attuned as a 
community  of speakers. In Aletta Norval’s words: “what is at stake is precisely the 
founding of community, its invocation in the claims we make, and what  we can say, and 
what others can say  for us in such voicing of claims” (173). Only if I change my words 
will I cleanse my  perception (of myself and others) of what keeps me from 
acknowledging our common separateness. Although they  are only words on a page, 
Shakespearean drama gives us occasion to re-evaluate what we mean when we say 
something, as well as the opportunity to give our words a different weight and thus 
change the way we reveal ourselves, the way we relate, to others.
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3.4 Words on a Page 
What exchange can take place between us and Shakespeare’s words, Cavell asks, if 
“any and all of them are words on a page; and all of us are flesh and 
blood” (“Skepticism” 247). One of the most striking things about “The Avoidance of 
Love” is that, although Cavell spends a considerable amount of time sounding out how 
the theatrical medium in Shakespeare “is one that keeps all significance continuously 
before our senses,” he ultimately ascribes the experience of the constant presentness of 
Shakespearean drama not to a performance but an act of reading:
This is a fact  of my experience in reading the play (it is not a fact of my 
experience in seeing the play, which may say something either about its 
performability or about the performances I have seen of it, or about the nature of 
performance generally). (Disowning 85)
In this sense, the notion that Shakespeare can help us change ourselves and our 
relationship to others is certainly  indebted to Cavell’s idiosyncratic blend of 
Wittgenstein and Emerson, but it is also underwritten by a reading model first 
formulated in his reading of Thoreau’s Walden. If we want to understand Cavell’s idea 
of Shakespeare’s salvational potential, we must understand the relationship  between 
reader and text, the interaction between audience and stage, and even our relationship to 
the other, as governed by the same – redemptive – act of reading. 
 Walden is a book about writing and reading.24 For Thoreau, acts of reading and 
writing are part of the same mechanism. In In Quest of the Ordinary Cavell advances a 
similar argument: “reading is a variation of writing, where they meet in mediation and 
achieve accounts of opportunities; and writing is a variation of reading, since to write is 
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24  Unfortunately, I do not have the space to delve further into Cavell’s reading of Walden. I would, 
however, briefly like to point out that the textual model that Cavell evinces from both Thoreau’s notes on 
reading and writing and from his experiences of reading Thoreau has been an important component in the 
formulation of “theatrical passionate utterances.” There are, of course, important differences regarding 
how a drama and a text make demands on their audiences. What highlights separateness in a text such as 
Walden is neither the experience of the insurmountable and paradoxical disjunction of the theatrical 
situation, nor the sound of a character’s utterances, but moments in the writing that are particularly 
difficult or hard to absorb. In Senses of Walden,  this is primarily understood as the ability of Thoreau’s 
words to on the one hand challenge us “to conjecture and calculate with them,” and on the other to be 
indifferent as to whether we do so or not. In Cavell’s words: “the choice to go on reading or not is left 
absolutely up to me – whether I am to invest interest here or not.  Nothing holds my interest, no suspense 
of plot or development of character; the words seem continuously at an end” (Senses 47-8). The words are 
separate from us, but also, Cavell suggests,  from their author:  “we feel this as the writer’s withdrawal 
from the words on which he had staked his presence; and we feel this as the words’ indifference to us – 
that is, his willingness to remain obscure” (48).
to cast words together that you did not make, so as to give or take readings” (18). This 
reading model does not envisage the much-lamented death of the author. For Thoreau, 
as well as for Cavell, the mechanism at work in reading and writing is one in which 
reader and text can change each other. In Gould’s Hearing Things, the description of 
this model is further refined as consisting of a chain of reversals echoing the original 
oscillating reversals of the relationship  between text and reader. The first reversal must 
be the one in which the philosopher stops seeing himself as a writer producing a text 
and becomes a reader reading a prior text. In the second reversal, the philosopher-
turned-reader has to acknowledge that he does not read but is read by the prior text. The 
third reversal is the most difficult: the philosopher/reader’s own reader, in other words 
us, must join into the chain of reading reversals and the philosopher/reader must invite 
him (Gould 148). If this reading model is to function properly, the text must invite the 
reader to take his position in its weaving net of mutual receptions. The writer must, as 
Cavell puts it in Senses of Walden, prepare a “ground upon which they will meet,” he 
“must establish or create his mode of presence to the word, he must admit or create the 
reader’s mode of presence to it” (61). Equally, in In Quest of the Ordinary he argues that 
there is not philosophy “until the philosopher is being read (at least, necessarily  by 
himself, by herself)” (19). An act of writing must, in other words, always inaugurate an 
act of reading.
 The mutual reception between text and reader that Cavell observes in Thoreau’s 
account of reading and writing in Walden is, in Gould’s words, “fed by explorations of 
Shakespeare and film and Cavell’s increasingly  less subterranean conversation with 
Freud’s writing and with various ideas and methods of therapy” (4). These “various 
ideas and methods of therapy” are, however, far less subterranean and far more 
important that Gould would have us believe. In “Beginning Cavell,” Davidson 
highlights the therapeutic aspirations of Cavell’s philosophy and juxtaposes them 
directly  to what he calls the “professionalisation of English-speaking philosophy” (239). 
For Davidson, Cavell’s writing explodes the norms of professional philosophy  not 
because it is “self-indulgent,” but because the writing itself (just as the reading) can 
resist the oppression of the human voice and “allow one to recall or remember wishes, 
fantasies, temptations, illusions, urges, desires, and hopes.” For Davidson, “this explains 
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why Cavell understands reading and writing as redemptive and therapeutic, and why he 
says that any  credible model of such reading and writing will have to be psychoanalytic 
in character” (239-40). Gould, on the other hand, believes that “one must not be too 
quick to characterise the liberation in exclusively  psychoanalytic terms” (41). He is 
adamant that Cavell’s idea of the relationship between text and reader is not based on 
psychoanalysis. It  “only  borrows features of psychoanalytic therapy in order to further 
develop a model of philosophy as a kind of reading” (41). I disagree with Gould’s 
notion of the incompatibility  of a psychoanalytic influence and a rigorous philosophical 
methodology. About a decade after Senses of Walden, Cavell returns to this reading 
model when writing about the influence of psychoanalysis on his work. Here Cavell 
calls the mutual receptiveness of text and reader “countertransference”: every  reception 
of the text is already made possible by the text itself or rather by  “a further 
understanding of the text’s relation to me, and that that further relation cannot be said 
either (or can be said both), to be prior or/and posterior to any approach (or say 
attraction) to a text” (Contesting 112-3). In light of the ultimate therapeutic or salvific 
objective of Cavell’s philosophy, we would be mistaken to dismiss the similarities 
between Cavell’s textual model and the mechanisms of psychoanalytic therapy, in 
particular Freudian notions of transference and counter-transference.
 The act of reading Shakespeare can, Cavell claims, help us free ourselves and 
our words from “enforced or stifled words, from enforced silence, from voices not our 
own, from falsifying accent, from the breath of words held too long,” because his 
textual model allows for the fact that we can take the author’s breath away 
(“Skepticism” 246-7). Sometimes, Cavell writes in Pitch of Philosophy, the “drive of 
reading will present itself as taking away an author’s breath, not taking away the right to 
speak, but following the inspiration otherwise than we find it followed; the author may 
or may  not be glad” (16). Again we encounter Cavell’s interest in breath, but this time 
not as an expression of the body’s separateness, but of the “intention” of a text. In In 
Quest of the Ordinary, he links this idea of the text’s breath back to the sceptic’s 
anxious relationship  to language as something that  always says more and less than it 
says:
 Both the idea of grasping the intention of a text and the idea of sharing or 
 hearing what has called it, are interpretations of reading, of following a text. But 
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 the idea of being intended can close out what the idea of being called and of 
 obedience, of listening, bring into investigation: namely, how is it that one writes 
 better than one knows (as well as worse) and that one may be understood better 
 by someone other than oneself (as well as understood worse). (24-5)
The parallel drawn between the breath of the words uttered by a person (or a character) 
and the breath of words written by an author again expresses the significance the act of 
reading (Shakespeare) holds for Cavell. The full weight of this equation will become 
apparent if we link it back to Cavell’s discussion of Lear’s hysterica passio, his sense of 
suffocation addressed in the previous chapter. In Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes 
Cavell asks: “Without you, Lear’s isolation, his breathlessness, would go unrelieved. 
And what, since noting that condition may well isolate you, will relieve you?” (248). 
The importance of Cavellian acts of reading lies in the fact that they aim to alleviate the 
characters’ (and thus our own) breathlessness or suffocation, and in the notion that  this 
is precisely what philosophy should contend with. 
In this chapter I have identified four pillars on which Cavell’s idea of Shakespeare’s 
salvific potential is founded. First, Cavell’s shift of the sceptical focus away from the 
author of the plays to what the plays can do to their audience; second, his marriage of 
Wittgenstein’s idea of Shakespeare as a creator of language and Emerson’s 
acknowledgment of his poetic-philosophical force; third, the notion that, just like 
passionate utterances, Shakespearean drama makes a demand on us, and fourth, a 
textual model detailing the reciprocal permeability  of text and reader, formulated on the 
back of his reading of Thoreau’s Walden. Gould was the first to recognise that this 
textual model also influences Cavell’s philosophical writing style (Hearing Things 23). 
In turning to his polarising philosophical voice in my final chapter, I will suggest that 
we must listen to Cavell’s perfect pitch of philosophy if we want to sound out yet 
another aspect of how literature comes to bear on his philosophy.
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4. Perfect Pitch 
The ear not only plays an important role in Cavell’s description of his own separateness 
and in his discussion of the tragedies, but also in his account of his philosophical 
vocation and style. Cavell speaks of his philosophical vocation and particular 
philosophical style in terms of perfect pitch, most notably in A Pitch of Philosophy, his 
first, partially  autobiographical, work. For the young Cavell, his mother’s and uncle’s 
perfect pitch was a source of mystery, admiration and envy; of mystery because the way 
a person with perfect pitch knows the note she hears in her head to be a C seemingly 
exceeds traditional modes of knowing; of admiration, because his mother’s perfect pitch 
somehow seemed to be intertwined with her uncanny ability to sight-read, and hence 
with her unsurpassed and inexplicable natural musical talents; and of envy because 
Cavell did not have perfect pitch, and therefore his mother’s musical vocation could 
never be his. Although he could not follow in his mother’s footsteps, her natural musical 
ability  made him want to find his own vocation, his own perfect pitch: “Yet I felt there 
must be something I was meant to do that required an equivalent of the enigmatic 
faculty of perfect pitch” (Pitch 21). Cavell’s perfect pitch was, however, not to be found 
in music and neither in a traditional study of philosophy and literature, but rather in a 
philosophical pitch that would allow him to address and absorb the experience of 
separateness. 
 Whilst an encounter with King Lear convinced Cavell that his vocation lay in 
philosophy rather than in music, it was only  after engaging with Austin that  he 
understood what  kind of philosophy he wanted to pursue. Austin made Cavell “throw 
away beginnings and plans for a perfectly  good Ph.D. dissertation,” because it  was 
“good enough to have earned the degree but not good enough to have given me what I 
variously  imagined as a voice, a way, a subject, a work of my own” (55). The idea of 
finding a vocation, which here also means finding one’s voice, is inextricably linked to 
questions of the ear and of a certain modality of hearing. When in The American 
Philosopher, Giovanna Borradori asks whether “the idea of the perfect ear” is “tied to a 
primitive sense of nature, unfastened by cultural contextuality” and whether it  is “tied in 
some way to [his] reading of skepticism,” Cavell replies: 
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 Skepticism is the denial of the need to listen. It’s the refusal of the ear. 
 Skepticism denies that perfection is available through the human ear, through the 
 human sensibility. This is what Wittgenstein calls the “sublimation” of our 
 language, and he means sublime in the same sense that  Kant did. It’s as though 
 we were on a slab of ice: on the one hand there is smoothness of the surface, its 
 perfection; on the other, our inability to walk on it. In one sense, conditions are 
 perfect, but, for that reason, we as humans cannot belong. We are all too human. 
 Skepticism as a search for the inhuman is a search for a means to the perfection 
 of the ear, to the extent that the ear is no longer required to listen. It is the denial 
 of having to hear. (133-4)
What is addressed here through the gateway of the ear is Cavell’s wish to allow the 
human voice, a voice that is imbued with our separateness, to ring through 
philosophical discourse. When Cavell speaks of philosophy’s denial of the ear, he is 
transposing the sceptic’s deafness to the human voice and the separateness that is 
ingrained in it to philosophy. Like Austin and Wittgenstein, Cavell is therefore 
interested in “shaking up” the existing distinctions governing philosophy  and 
supplanting them with new ones that, though perhaps not “finer,” are nevertheless 
“fruitful where the others stop cold” (Must 103). When in A Pitch Of Philosophy, Cavell 
therefore writes that “certain questions of ear that run through my life – questions of the 
realities and fantasies of perfect pitch, of telling pointed stories, and of the 
consequences of a scarred tympanum – become, in these pages that record fragments of 
my life, questions of the detections of voice,” he is speaking of nothing other than his 
idiosyncratic philosophical style (30). When Cavell proposes to talk about philosophy  in 
connection with the ear, he does not only mean opening up  philosophy to the passionate 
utterances ingrained in the voice;  he means writing a certain kind of philosophy, taking 
a certain “tone of philosophy,” as well as his “right to take that tone” (3).
 Cavell’s style is often considered a regrettable by-product of his philosophy. 
Nussbaum is in good company when she voices her suspicion of his “difficult” and 
“opaque” style, and although she immediately  concedes that “we should see this way  of 
writing as expressing the agony of human emotions and the intense difficulty of 
philosophical thought,” she sees his style as quite distinct from his writings on 
Shakespeare (“Stages” 2). A similar argument can be found in Bruns, who claims that: 
“Cavell’s writing does not try  for transparency, nor does it always coincide with itself, 
and anyhow Shakespeare is not so much an object as a region of Cavell’s 
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thinking” (“Cavell’s Shakespeare” 613). Bruns, Nussbaum and others erroneously 
distinguish between Cavell’s acts of reading and his writing style. I believe, on the 
contrary, that to refuse to understand his style as an intrinsic part of what doing 
philosophy means for him, we run the risk of mishearing him completely. Cavell’s style 
is not an unfortunate eccentricity  in an otherwise sober thinker; it is not extraneous but 
central to his philosophical method. I am by no means the only  defendant of Cavell’s 
style. Arnold Davidson has convincingly argued that  Cavell’s style is not merely “self-
indulgent,” or narcissistic as others would have it, but “redemptive and therapeutic,” 
aimed precisely  at “transform[ing] the reader’s sensibility, to undo his self-
mystifications and redirect his interest” (240). Gould, too, has written extensively on the 
relationship  between voice and method in his philosophy. In Hearing Things, Gould 
tells “a story about a fundamental shift  in the philosophical methods and procedures of 
Stanley Cavell” (1). In this story the leading role undoubtedly goes to the voice, first as 
“a condition of human expression and meaning to be recovered from its philosophical 
neglect,” then as “a way of conceiving the medium and the goal of the philosophical 
method of appealing to ordinary language,” and finally  as “the sound of Cavell’s voice 
as a writer” (1). 
 Gould is in good company when he asks why “Cavell keep[s] writing in ways 
that seem to flout the normal tone and mode of addressing an audience in academic 
philosophy?” (3). I am, however, alone in arguing that Cavell’s encounter with 
Shakespeare is central to the development of his distinct philosophical style. More than 
any other of his works (apart, perhaps, from Senses of Walden) Cavell’s readings of 
Shakespeare shows that philosophy is to be understood “not as a set of problems to be 
solved but as a set  of text to be read” (Claim 3). It is precisely  by formally playing out 
“the progress from ignorance to exposure, I mean the treatment of an ignorance which is 
not to be cured by information (because it  is not caused by  a lack of information),” that 
the Shakespearean dramatic form stretches Cavell’s conception of what a text, and 
therefore also a philosophical text, can be understood to do (Disowning 85). Apart from 
offering an illustration of the modality of thought Cavell is after, Shakespearean drama 
also puts forward a palpable model for writing philosophy. I will argue in this sense that 
Cavell’s style can be understood as an attempt to reproduce within philosophical writing 
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the dialogue between a “male” and a “female” voice as observed in remarriage 
comedies, such as The Winter’s Tale.
4.1 Remarrying the Human Voice and Philosophy 
For Cavell, Shakespeare’s tragedies illustrate and enlighten the sceptical problematic, 
and their dramatic form can help us to transcend the sceptical position we bring to them 
and to our lives. There is, however, a third side to how Cavell’s literary-philosophical 
investigations blur the borders between the disciplines. Plays such as The Winter’s Tale, 
in which “men must  and must not hear the woman’s voice,” come to represent the 
relationship  between the human voice and “that philosophical self-torment whose shape 
is skepticism, in which the philosopher wants and wants not to exempt himself from the 
closet of privacy, wants and wants not to become intelligible, expressive, 
exposed” (Pitch 132). Equally, if The Winter’s Tale is “understandable as a study of 
skepticism – that is, as a response to that which skepticism is a response – then,” Cavell 
writes in Disowning Knowledge, “its second half must be understandable as a study of 
its search for recovery” (198). Plays and films belonging to the genre of Remarriage 
Comedy, for instance The Lady Eve and The Winter’s Tale, fascinate Cavell because 
something happens in them that he would like to see happening in philosophical 
writing.
 Since Cavell recognises in “remarriage comedy” something that his own 
philosophy sets out to achieve, it would only seem natural to scrutinise the prototype of 
this genre – The Winter’s Tale – for something approaching a model for his own 
philosophical style. In Contesting Tears, Cavell states that Shakespearean comedy 
usually  revolves around “the overcoming of obstacles to a young pair’s desire to be 
together in the first  place and in a condition called marriage” (4). In contrast, remarriage 
comedies “begin or climax with the threatened end of a marriage, that is to say, with the 
threat of divorce; the drive of the narrative is to get the original pair together again” (4). 
In Pursuits of Happiness, Cavell describes remarriage comedy as an “undertaking to 
show how the miracle of change may be brought about and hence life between a pair 
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seeking divorce becomes a marriage” (23). As Cavell notes in relation to The Winter’s 
Tale, remarriage comedy entails “the reconciliation of a genuine forgiveness; a 
reconciliation so profound as to require the metamorphosis of death and revival, the 
achievement of a new perspective on existence” (19). For Cavell, this change, which is 
nothing short of miraculous, is dependent  not on the intervention of a deity or a superior 
power but instead can be gained by means of a dialogue or conversation between the 
couple seeking divorce. These conversations, Cavell suggests, bring on “a phase of the 
development of consciousness between a woman and a man, a study of the conditions 
under which this fight for recognition (as Hegel put it) or demand for acknowledgment 
(as I have put it) is a struggle for mutual freedom, especially of the views each holds of 
the other” (17-18). By achieving acknowledgment, by revealing one’s separateness to 
the other, the couple seeking remarriage also has a chance to regain attunement. In 
Cavell’s mind, acknowledgment, like attunement is, so writes Viefhues-Bailey, “not 
simply  given … it is achieved by being worked out, threatened, and regained again 
through acts of speaking in mutuality” (83). Cavell wants to further a similar miracle in 
philosophy: he wants to remarry the human voice and philosophy.
 The gendering that underlies Cavell’s discussion of remarriage comedy and the 
“Melodrama of the unknown woman,” as well as his readings of Shakespeare, has been 
well documented. Indeed scepticism itself is characterised “as a distinctively  male 
response to distinctively male anxieties” (Scheman 95). But where, Scheman wonders, 
does this, leave Cavell’s female reader? Referring to Cavell’s reading of Othello, she 
writes: “I loved this account of skepticism, loved the grounding in human feelings, the 
palpable anxiety, the way in which bringing philosophical problems home brought 
home the fears. But I didn’t  know how to find myself in that story” (94). The gendering 
of Cavell’s reading of scepticism is nowhere more problematic – or more salient – than 
in his discussion of the difference between the male and the female voice in his reading 
of Mozart’s Le Nozze di Figaro. In this scene we find the betrothed couple in Susanna’s 
chamber. Figaro is measuring out their wedding bed and Susanna is trying on her veil in 
front of the mirror. Susanna’s “pointed interruptions demanding attention to the 
narcissistic measures she is taking before a mirror” are to be understood as an ecstatic, 
narcissistic “irrupting of a new perspective of self to itself” (Pitch 152, 145). 
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Conversely, Figaro’s repetition of his measurements (just like Leontes’ repetition of 
words) betrays his desire “to remain in control of his answers, a desire that makes his 
answers echo, new existences of course, but not new enough” (146). Susanna’s 
measuring shares a narcissistic element with Figaro’s; yet, despite this structural 
similarity, for Viefheus-Bailey, there is a significant difference between them. Whilst 
“male skepticism leads to a situation of painful conventionalism, where words are to be 
controlled and only echoes can be heard; female narcissism, on the other hand, allows 
for mourning and for creativity” (117-8). The female voice can also be understood in 
terms of what Cavell understands as singing. The word or concept “song” is, in Cavell’s 
vocabulary, not exclusively  reserved for singers or musicians. Singing “does nothing to 
speaking, as it were, that spoken words do not already do.” Singing merely “isolates, 
absolutizes, even theorizes what words do to themselves, as proposed in the idea that 
the voice become signature is absolutely abandoned to its song” (Pitch 153). It is 
important to note that “male” and “female” are not gender categories here but categories 
of writing or thinking: “the woman’s [voice] narcissistic, erotically imaginative far 
beyond the man’s worldliness; the man’s [voice] at once expansive and constricted, self-
congratulatory and blind” (152-3). Whilst male narcissism is aimed at staying in control 
of words, the “female” voice’s self-eruption of itself to itself allows for a passionate, 
complete and expressive abandonment that speaks, and sings, of separateness.
 The second half of The Winter’s Tale is a story  of recovery and redemption, but 
this is not achieved through Hermione and Leontes regaining their attunement. Come to 
life, Hermione “hangs about” Leontes’ neck, but she never addresses him directly 
(5.3.112). She is there, yet she remains separate from Leontes. To echo Cavell’s terms, 
Hermione is not the star of remarriage comedy, but of “the Melodrama of the unknown 
woman” as described in Contesting Tears. Viefhues-Bailey  gives a pithy description of 
this figure: “the stars in the Melodrama stand for a humanity that can be gained only 
through a rejection of the terms of a society that has no words for these types” (108). 
Although “the women of the melodrama demand the transformation of a man’s world,” 
they  do not achieve it. In contrast, the stars in the Comedies do, because they “stand for 
humanity achievable in mutuality” (109). The melodramatic star abandons herself fully 
to her words, even if this means that she won’t be understood, even if this means that 
99
she will have to die. It  is precisely the melodramatic star’s ability to abandon herself 
fully  to her words, thus fully expressing her own idiosyncrasy, which prevent her from 
entering into dialogue with the sceptic and potentially shifting his ground. The pure 
self-expression of the melodramatic star cannot change the latter’s position in the world; 
nor can it avert tragedy and divert it into comedy  because, being totally other from the 
male sceptical discourse, it cannot enter into a dialogue with it. 
 In Shakespeare’s play, most of the dialogue takes place not between the couple – 
Hermione and Leontes – but between Paulina and Leontes. Paulina is, even for 
Shakespeare’s standards, an extraordinarily  witty and eloquent character, amongst 
Shakespeare’s women perhaps only second to Rosalind. She does with her own and 
other’s words as she pleases, twisting and turning them and, to stay with a Cavellian 
image, taking her interlocutors’ breath away. Paulina is a good match for the sceptic-
philosopher Leontes in The Winter’s Tale and their conversations make for some very 
good theatre, like for instance in Act 2, scene 3. Hermione has given birth to Perdita in 
disgrace. In this scene Paulina is taking Perdita to Leontes, eager to convince him that 
she is truly his daughter and that Hermione is, as before, his “good” Queen. 
 PAULINA:  Good my liege, I come,
    And, I beseech you hear me, who professes
    Myself your loyal servant, your physician, 
    Your most obedient counsellor, yet that dares
    Less appear so, in comforting your evils, 
    Than such as most seem yours; – I say, I come
    From your good queen.
 LEONTES:  Good queen!
 PAULINA:  Good queen, my lord, good queen: I say good queen,
    And would by combat make her good, so were I
    A man, the worst about you.
          (2.3.52-61)
Paulina and Leontes are here battling it out for the territory of the word good; the 
winner will redraw its borders, coin its meaning as if for the first time. There is, of 
course, nothing special about the way Paulina uses words, just as there is nothing 
special about the way Leontes does. Paulina and Leontes merely use the full spectrum 
of language, they hear the echoes spreading and oscillating between one fixed meaning 
of the word “good” and the other. Leontes sceptical sensibility for words leaves him 
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stranded on a sceptical island, but Paulina uses that very  same skill to try  and reel him 
back on to common ground and attunement. Despite her best efforts, Paulina’s re-
shifting of Leontes’ philosophical ground does not work and tragedy  ensues. Leontes’ 
ear remains deaf to her deft manipulation of his language, because her recounting still 
happens in the realm of knowledge, because, in other words, her strategy does not 
explode Leontes’ sceptical territory. 
Before Leontes is fully cured of his scepticism at the end of the play, four things 
escaping reason must occur: the oracle must speak; Mamillius must die; a statue must 
come to life; Perdita must be found. Although all of these marvellous events form a 
necessary  counterpoint to the sceptic’s clinging onto knowledge, not all of them are 
equally successful in counteracting or absorbing Leontes’ scepticism. Leontes, as we 
well know, does not believe the oracle:  “There is no truth at all i’th’ Oracle” (3.2.140). 
And even Mamillius’ death, though chilling to the core, still does not suffice to shake 
Leontes’ scepticism. Although the coming to life of Hermione’s statue is generally 
understood to be the play’s miracle, the play’s real miracle is the finding of Perdita. For 
Rhu, for instance, “Hermione’s final silence toward her husband, Leontes, expresses the 
perhaps unbridgeable gap  between them, just  as the blessing she solicits for her 
daughter, Perdita, indicates what is the significant reunion that Shakespeare is staging 
here” (American Dream 170). Many critics, amongst them Garber, discern strong 
parallels between Shakespeare’s characterisation of Perdita and the Prosperina/ 
Persephone myth (Shakespeare 847-8). The name Persephone derives from the Ancient 
Greek pherein phonon: to bring or cause death. Persephone is thus the one who is alive 
and yet brings death, or the one who, though dead, is allowed to walk among the living. 
Persephone, sometimes also known as Kore, is the daughter of Zeus and Demeter. In 
Homer, she is the wife of Hades. According to another version she is unwillingly  so, 
having been carried off by Hades. In this other version, Demeter demands that Hades 
restore Persephone to the world of the living. Hades, however, tricks Persephone into 
eating a kernel of pomegranate. In eating it, Persephone becomes doomed to the lower 
world. An agreement between Hades and Demeter establishes that Persephone “lives 
there for part of the year, and in spring she returns to the world above and spends the 
other part of the year with her mother” (Cancik, Schneider 811). 
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 Perdita’s story shares many of the guiding themes of the Persephone / Prosperina 
myth: Perdita was condemned to die before she was born and yet, when returned to her 
parents, it was as if she was “stolen from the dead” (5.3.115). Again and again she is 
likened to the earth (“Most peerless piece of earth, I think, / That e’er the sun shone 
bright on” [5.1.94-5]). She is often referred to in terms of spring or prosperity. It is for 
example a “prosperous south-wind” (5.1.160) that brings Florizel and Perdita to Sicilian 
shores. Upon greeting her, Leontes says: “Welcome hither, / As is the spring to 
th’earth” (5.1.150-1). Like her mother, Perdita is brought back from the dead. Unlike 
Hermione, however, she is able to converse with her father. Indeed it  is she who leads 
Leontes to Hermione’s statue and who in the end turns tragedy into (albeit problematic) 
comedy. Perdita thus inhabits the space between Paulina’s quasi-sceptical recounting 
and Hermione’s narcissistic expression of self. In balancing on the cusp between two 
precincts, she also stands for the kind of style of philosophical writing that Cavell 
aspires to: a writing attuned to separateness, which can nevertheless still be heard by the 
sceptical philosopher. 
 In § 107 of his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein rejects the way 
philosophy has been using language: 
 The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
 conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, 
 of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.) The conflict  
 becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty. – We 
 have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the 
 conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We 
 want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground! 
In order to do philosophy, to walk and progress, we need friction. By the same token, 
we cannot do philosophy if the friction is so great that we cannot move. Hermione 
cannot be heard by  Leontes, precisely because she is voicing her total separateness in 
the trial scene (or indeed in the last scene). A philosophical style modelled solely  on the 
“female” voice would be just such an overly rough ground. Although the “female voice” 
is important in Cavell’s philosophy, it only becomes philosophically viable as part of a 
dialogue. I find this view confirmed by  Cavell’s telling reading of the gesture 
Wittgenstein describes in § 217 which, just like his idea of ice and rough ground, is 
about how philosophical style might renew philosophy.
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 “How am I able to obey a rule?” – if this is not a question about causes, then it  is 
 about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do.
 If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is
 turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.” 
It is precisely in this gesture that Cavell reads the remarrying of “male” scepticism and 
the “female” voice: “the implement is, so to speak with due banality, masculine, but the 
gesture (of waiting, putting one’s self, or body, on the line that way) is feminine” (Pitch 
15). Cavell concludes that “patience, and a recognition of rebuff and exhaustion, also 
become earmarks of the writing of this (or philosophy’s) pedagogy” (15). For Adam 
Gonya, the point about this picture of two distinct yet interdependent  philosophical 
voices is “that both parts of speech are necessary, the economy of speech (control of 
concepts by criteria) and the aesthetics of speech (self-revelation)” (595). In order for 
philosophy to address and comprise the human voice and still remain intelligible, “these 
two interests” most come “into some sort of productive calibration” (595). I have put 
forward the notion of remarriage comedy, in particular its prototype The Winter’s Tale, 
as a model for the dialogue between the two distinct voices at work in Cavell’s writing. 
I have also proposed that the main aim of this dialogue is the remarriage of philosophy 
with the ordinary, or human, voice. By offering a series of hypotheses regarding the role 
of parentheses in “The Avoidance of Love,” I will finally  analyse how this dialogue of 
voices translates into his writing, and what this entails for us, as readers of Cavell.
4.2 Parentheses
Just as the Shakespearean form helps us absorb the sceptical position we bring to it, the 
style of Cavell’s writing becomes part  of his philosophical endeavour. In Cavell’s 
writing two voices call to each other: the voice of traditional philosophy  (echoing, as it 
were, Wittgenstein and Austin) and a voice resonating with something that exceeds its 
realm. Although Cavell is on the margins of traditional “analytic” philosophical 
discourse he is not at  odds with it. The reason why Cavell does not pay heed to Richard 
Rorty’s suggestion that “if he finds professional philosophy so bankrupt, then he should 
give up his quarrel with it,” is that he wants to heal philosophy, so that it can heal us 
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(Davidson 239). This, to be sure, is not an easy task. According to Davidson, it  requires 
a “delicate and never-ending balance to claim, on the one hand, that the 
professionalisation of philosophy can lead to a ‘desert of thought’ and yet, on the other, 
to refuse to renounce that profession’s paradigms of comprehensibility” (239). As 
Davidson rightly points out, this balance is “nowhere ... more striking than in Cavell’s 
essays on Shakespeare” (239). By way of concluding my exploration of the importance 
of Shakespeare for Cavell, I will listen to this balancing act, to this duet between “more 
than one voice,” and try  to heed its demands (Gould 2). Robert N. Watson calls Cavell’s 
style “oracular” (54). I believe that it is rather “auricular,” in that it asks its reader to 
constantly listen out for the interplay and conversation between a “male” and “female” 
voice, in other words, two voices adhering to different philosophical or stylistic rigours. 
The “female voice” takes hold in a variety of forms in Cavell’s writing; a turn of phrase 
that remains ajar and hence invites a plurivocal reading, or repeated intimate and 
autobiographical insertions, or the introduction of a different viewpoint  or tone. The use 
of parentheses, among other stylistic quirks, allows Cavell to write in a way  that will 
produce flashes of idiosyncrasy  that escape immediate understanding, whilst  still being 
audible to the ear of more traditional philosophers.
 Cavell’s style has many resonances with Shakespeare’s late style; the late plays 
not only  delight their audiences’ ears with a revolutionary use of music, song and sound, 
but also challenge them with a highly concentrated or distilled prose. Sense is 
concentrated as the poet exerts more and more pressure on his language. On a micro-
textual level this becomes evident in the increasing removal of syllables between words, 
which wreak havoc with metre (McDonald 92). Although the literary  standard in Early 
Modern England had very loose syntax, Shakespeare stretches its connective tissue to 
its utmost limits. Sentences becomes more and more convoluted and twisted by 
semantic postponement (92). According to Russ McDonald, “the conspicuously 
suspended sentence … represents a kind of gamble, a form of verbal play  within the 
play.” Shakespeare is “testing the listener’s patience and acuity, pressing towards the 
limits of comprehensibility, and, what is more, he seems to be doing so playfully, as if 
the verbal medium were a kind of athletic bar to be continually  raised” (97). Lines of 
thought, too, seem more spasmodic, whilst metaphors are often only hinted at rather 
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than explained, “some utterances break off and resume in another direction, while other 
sentences that would seem to have reached completion are extended, often to 
remarkable length, by the accretion of participial phrases and other modifiers” (92, 94). 
Shakespeare is no longer concerned with spelling out connections. As McDonald puts it, 
“words, phrases, clauses, and sentences are less significant than the meaning beyond 
them, and the playwright seems to be pointing us to that mysterious region 
beyond” (96).
 Shakespeare’s late style is also characterised by  pleonastic addition. The late 
Shakespeare is also very fond of parenthesis; The Winter’s Tale alone contains 396 pairs 
(95). Keir Elam is therefore right in speaking about a Shakespearean “parenthomania,” 
or “the alarming outbreak of brackets” (69). Like Shakespeare, Cavell has a penchant 
for semantic postponement and continual clauses. They share a fondness for elision and 
ellipsis and semantic postponement and tend to over-use parentheses. One example of 
his idiosyncratic use of parentheses is the long citation from The Claim of Reason with 
which I opened the second chapter (58). Here parentheses within parentheses do not 
only interrupt the flow of reading, they also contain Cavell’s exuberant prose, which 
seems to want to shoot off in all directions at any  moment. Another good example is the 
following paragraph taken from his reading of The Winter’s Tale:
Wittgenstein’s Investigations draws this most human predicament into 
philosophy, forever returning to philosophy’s ambivalence, let  me call it, as 
between wanting to tell more than words can say and wanting to evade telling 
altogether – an ambivalence epitomized in the idea of wishing to speak “outside 
language games,” a wish for (language to do, the mind to be) everything and 
nothing. Here I think again of Emerson’s wonderful saying in which he detects 
the breath of virtue and vice that our character “emits” at every moment, words 
so to speak always before and beyond themselves, essentially and unpredictably 
recurrent, say rhythmic, fuller of meaning than can be exhausted. So that it may 
almost be said of every word and phrase in the language what William Empson 
has said of metaphors, that  they  are pregnant (or are they, or at the same time, 
seminal?). (Disowning 201)
Here we have interpolation (“let me call it”) and aggregation (“language to do, the mind 
to be”). We also have ellipsis in the last parenthesis, which omits the second and 
clarifying “are.” The greatest syntactical knot, however, is tied in the first  parenthesis, 
which is not a pleonastic addition, since the intricacy and pluridirectionality of the prose 
105
depends on it. What we have here is a sort of concatenation alluding to but never 
choosing or closing down any of the four potential syntactic alleyways. It is almost as if 
Cavell was leaving open all four possibilities; that the sceptic’s wish was either for 
language to do and the mind to be either everything or nothing. The end of the extract is 
marked by a similar openness. The parenthesis does not only question the apparent 
conclusion of the previous sentence, but again here we have a syntactic concatenation 
leaving open all and closing nothing. Cavell, of course, does not always write like this. 
But he does so more often when his argument comes under pressure, or to a point, when 
he is struggling with a particularly  difficult hypothesis or comparison. In moments such 
as this, Cavell seems to want to test the listener, like Shakespeare’s late plays, and 
challenge him to listen out for a region beyond knowledge.
Cavell can perhaps be said to share Shakespeare’s “parenthomania.” There are 
approximately 197 parentheses in “The Avoidance of Love.” Parentheses are a stylistic 
feature of Cavell’s writing, conspicuous in his work since his early essay “Knowing and 
Acknowledging.” Parentheses are one of the hallmarks of what some would like to call 
Cavell’s under-edited, un-rigorous, obfuscating style. To me, though, these are marks of 
Cavell’s voice and therefore of the “seriousness” of his philosophy. Although 
parentheses are not the only stylistic means by which Cavell pursues literary 
philosophical writing, they illustrate the strategy by which Cavell’s writing manages to 
resonate beyond the disciplinary  boundaries of literature and philosophy. When writing 
about Gloucester’s blanked position and our complicity in Lear’s tragedy, a moment I 
discussed in Chapter 3, Cavell inserts a parenthesis, somewhat unnecessarily, one might 
say. 
 We “do not notice” Regan’s confusion of identity because we share it, and in 
 failing to understand Gloucester’s blanked condition (or rather, in insisting upon 
 understanding it from our point of view) we are doing what the character in the 
 play are seen to do: We avoid him. (Disowning 54)
By putting this surmising in brackets, Cavell might want to highlight his voicing of the 
text, thereby inviting us to voice ours, to insert our own take or voicing of these 
particular lines in King Lear into the text. Even if we might not agree with a reading, its 
voicing will illuminate our position as readers. It might be the arrogation to be matched 
106
by my interrogation, as Cavell suggests in The Pitch of Philosophy (15). Parenthetical 
insertions are usually thought to contain material that  could be omitted without 
destroying or altering the meaning of a sentence or a text. They  also mark a modulation 
of voice, therefore, and most probably  also an ever so slight change in the pace of 
reading. On a different level, parentheses also allow the grafting of a different voice – 
be it a voice that is in dialogue with the main body of the text or a quoted voice etc. – 
into the text as a whole. There is, however, a further twist to Cavellian parenthesis, a 
twist that explains to what extent  the visual/textual marker of the parenthesis underlines 
what happens in textual acknowledgment. This parenthesis visually  marks the 
audience’s sceptical position whilst also describing it. We fail to understand 
Gloucester’s position because we, as sceptics, insist on understanding it  from our point 
of view: on the basis of knowledge, we conclude that the sending off of Gloucester to 
Dover can only  remain unknown, hence we brush it off as a lapse. We overlook the fact 
that Regan is identifying Gloucester with her father (hence is failing to acknowledge 
him) because we are asking the wrong question. The question we should be asking, for 
Cavell, is not why Shakespeare inexplicably has Regan send Gloucester to Dover, but 
what demand this makes on the audience. Cavell’s parenthesis highlights that as readers 
and spectators we are confronted with an element of the Shakespearean text that is 
completely alien to us; we cannot wrap our minds around it; we cannot subsume it into 
our knowledge. The audience’s inability  to transcend the separateness that divides us 
from Gloucester is visually marked by this parenthesis: we bracket something off 
because we cannot make sense of it  and because we are unable, as it were, to 
incorporate it into our reading.
 Whilst the blanking parenthesis marks the inability to transcend separateness 
towards acknowledgment, parentheses can also mark acknowledgment. Parenthesising 
on Lear’s “If thou wilt weep my fortunes, take my  eyes; / I know thee well enough; thy 
name is Gloucester” (4.6.172-3), Cavell writes “(Here ‘take my eyes’ can be read as a 
crazy consolation: Your eyes wouldn’t have done you any good anyway  in this case; 
you would need to see what I have seen to weep my fortunes; I would give up my eyes 
not to have seen it)” (Disowning 51-2). Perhaps the space of the bracket (so in and yet 
so out of the text) is most akin to the reader’s position. To weep for his fortunes, 
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Gloucester would have to take his eyes, to see things from his perspective. The next 
time we encounter this beautiful phrase is when Cavell speaks about Cordelia: “If we 
are to weep for her fortunes we must take her eyes” (73). This time Cavell does not 
frame it with parentheses. The progress from knowledge-bound hiding behind 
separateness to acknowledgement in “The Avoidance of Love” is marked by how what 
Cavell first mentions as a quotation or in a parenthesis – in other words, in a way that 
marks it off from the rest  of the text “proper” – is later subsumed into the main body  of 
the text. Reading and text have come to a full acknowledgment. They are as much in 
each other’s presence as will ever be possible. The visual out-bracketing of parentheses 
does not, of course, do the work of (textual) acknowledgment, it  merely  marks it. What 
invites the reader to acknowledge Cavell’s text and indeed Shakespeare’s is a duet of 
voices: the “male” voice adhering to the standards of the philosophical profession, 
punctuated by the “female” voice ringing through the idiosyncrasies of Cavell’s 
philosophical practice, of which his interest in Shakespeare and his “parenthomania” are 
only two examples. 
Cavell’s writing style, so entrenched in the lessons of Shakespearean drama, is able to 
articulate cracks in the very philosophical ground which Austin and Wittgenstein 
criticised for being too far removed from ordinary language and the human concerns it 
voices. We thus find ourselves back at the scene Wittgenstein paints in §217 of the 
Philosophical Investigations. Having reached bedrock, spade in hand, there is nothing 
left to do for the Wittgensteinian teacher than to shrug his shoulders and to say, “This is 
simply  what I do.” There is no way in which the teacher can make the student 
understand or know; learning does not only  happen by  virtue of a linear transferral of 
knowledge, but  by acknowledgment as well. Cavell’s style then is perhaps nothing other 
than a shrugging of shoulders, a simple admission: “This is simply what I do.” In this 
scene of learning and of reading, who teaches and who learns remains uncertain; when 
philosophy is a text to be read the reversal of roles characterised by Gould is always a 
possibility. But with these cracks already before us, it is perhaps our turn to take the 
shovel from our teacher and start digging.
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First Interlude
Cavell listens to Shakespeare with a scarred tympanum, with an ear attuned to our 
common separateness. Uniting both the actual and philosophical ways in which he 
listens to Shakespeare, the ear proves instrumental in sounding out what Cavell hopes to 
gain from the encounter with Shakespeare and in revealing how his Shakespearean acts 
of reading influence his philosophical project. In Shakespeare, Cavell finds a persuasive 
master-narrative, succinctly exposing the sceptic’s predicament and eloquently tracing 
what our response to it has to be. Cavell is drawn to Shakespeare specifically and 
singularly; in Shakespeare he can find answers to philosophical questions he cannot, at 
least not at first, find in other works of literature. Whilst  Shakespeare is arguably the 
catalyst for Cavell’s turn to philosophy, there is no such dependency  in Derrida’s 
thought. If Cavell had not written a single word about Shakespeare his contribution to 
philosophy would have been very different, and perhaps not nearly as notable. We 
cannot say the same thing about Derrida. Like Cavell, Derrida seems to suggest that we 
should sound out Shakespeare; his ears, however, are pricked up to hear something 
different. 
 Tuning in to how Derrida draws on Shakespeare in his philosophical writings, I 
am obliged to change frequency. No longer will I listen to Cavell’s arias of separateness. 
What I must listen to from now on is not separateness but “frequencies”: Shakespeare’s 
spectral voices, sounds and syllables that come to haunt not  only our English, but also 
Marx’s German or indeed Derrida’s French. From now on I must transpose Derrida’s 
critique of ontology  to the ear and listen to how a moment of silence, a rhythm or 
caesura opens the resonant space which allows for Derrida’s differential tones of 
reading Shakespeare... But wait, I am anticipating, fast-forwarding to the end when 
really I should be thinking about a way to start.
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Part II - Frequencies 
5. Flèches
Now halfway through my thesis, I have to start again. At the beginning of “Let’s Start 
Again,” Sarah Wood suggests that we cannot start again without also listening to the 
other words folded up inside this monosyllabic word: “v. i. to shoot, dart, move 
suddenly forth, or out ... to break away, to make a sudden or involuntary movement as 
of surprise or becoming aware: to spring open, out of place, or loose: ... to set forth on 
a journey, race, career. – v. t. to begin: to set going: ... to startle ... – n. a sudden 
movement: a sudden involuntary motion of the body: a startled feeling: a spurt: an 
outburst or fit ...” (1). Starting is not easy. As soon as we start, the start runs away with 
itself, taking us to places we did not anticipate. Mostly, to start is always to make an 
incision and to allow ourselves to be wounded by whatever will start and shoot off.
 These are the difficulties I am faced with when trying to start my  reading of 
Derrida and Shakespeare. I recognise my anxiety in Sean Gaston’s deceptively titled 
Starting with Derrida. If anything, Gaston’s book makes you realise that you will never 
finish with starting with Derrida, never finish with wondering how Derrida starts. We 
cannot start, Wood reminds us, without starting again (1). There is something of what 
“Cogito and the History of Madness” calls the palintrope in Derrida’s writing about 
Shakespeare (76). Palintrope is at work within these texts. It is, for instance, at  work in 
the strange preface to Specters, the “Exordium,” as well as, on a purely syntactical 
level, the knot of reported speech that kicks it off: “I would like to live finally [je 
voudrais apprendre à vivre enfin]” (xvi/13).25  Similarly, “Aphorism Countertime” 
begins with its hypothesis and conclusion: “1. Aphorism is the name” (416). Here, 
words and themes are always forwarding and rewinding to somewhere else in the text, 
or stretching their antennae to a different part of the oeuvre. As Derrida writes in 
“Living On,” each text is a machine with multiple reading heads for other texts (88). As 
Gaston points out, it thereby not only starts with its end, but it is always starting again 
differently, thereby “startling” itself and losing its “logos” (Gaston viii). In Little Did I 
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25 When referring to both the French original and the English translation, the first reference is always 
to the English text from which I am working, and the second indicates Derrida’s French.
Know, Cavell claimed that if philosophy wants to “seriously  begin to take effect” it 
cannot follow a straight or linear path (254). Even if Cavell’s writing, and particularly 
his writing on Shakespeare, does not follow a linear path, it is however held together by 
something like a “logos”: its wish to heal an existential wound and to absorb our 
common experience of separateness. Derrida’s work on Shakespeare is, in contrast, 
palintropic in the very  sense outlined above: in resisting a linear account, in starting and 
restarting again differently with Shakespeare, it loses its logos, and we lose the very 
possibility of gathering these disjointed and disjointing texts together. It is, however, 
precisely in this impossibility of offering a simple, linear answer to what he does to 
Shakespeare (and the other way around) that the thrill and the promise of the Derridean 
act of reading lies.
 Let me therefore start with the end. My acts of reading Derrida reading 
Shakespeare will never quite draw to a close. All one can hope for in thinking about 
Derrida is to put reading heads into motion. The more time I spend in the company of 
Derrida, with the texts he wrote on and with and in the company of Shakespeare, the 
more I realise that trying to write only about one of these texts is nearly  as impossible as 
playing the root and third of a triadic chord without hearing the fifth in your mind’s ear. 
Even when I speak of one of his texts on Shakespeare, of a single theme addressed in it, 
an isolated word or sound, another of his texts (whether on Shakespeare or something 
else) will always be resonating just  out of our earshot. The challenge is to impose an 
order onto this intricate net of harmonies, resonances – to identify the different strands 
of sound and the way they harmonise or clash with Cavell’s philosophical-literary 
investigations of Shakespeare – without muffling them. It is perhaps a challenge similar 
to the one Derrida faced when writing Dissemination. As translator Barbara Johnson 
remarks, “to perfectly  disseminate the exposition of dissemination would require a kind 
of textual mastery  that would belong among the recuperative gestures that dissemination 
undercuts” (Dissemination xxxiv). Derrida’s readings of Shakespeare, indeed the role 
Shakespeare comes to play in his writings, undercuts our desire to master either 
discourse. However, although it disseminates, Derrida’s writing on Shakespeare neither 
shatters nor scatters. It does not, as many would have us believe, dissolve into the thin 
air of mystification or obscurantism. Dissemination does not mean dispersion, and with 
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every  cross-reference, resonance and echo, his writing, which is always an act of 
reading, hurtles itself ever more violently  towards us and therefore towards the “to 
come,” which thus becomes the vanishing point of his rendezvous with Shakespeare and 
with literature.
 Rather than aspire to an unattainable textual mastery, I will therefore resort  to a 
more palintropic, and hopefully more resonant, mode of exposition. I will make use of a 
chain of “non-synonymous substitutions” which surface in Derrida’s Shakespearean 
reading acts (“Différance” 12). In response to Derrida’s acts of reading, themes and 
figures like frequencies, contretemps, arrows (ƒlèches), peepholes (meurtrières), the 
porpentine and Persephone will emerge to illuminate different aspects of Shakespeare’s 
role in his philosophical writing. According to the logic traced by Derrida’s “non-
synonymous substitutions,” neither can supplant nor supersede the other. Indeed, for 
Johnson the merit of Derrida’s writing lies “in its inscription of the ways in which all 
theoretical discourse – including its own – for ever remains both belated and precipitous 
with respect to the textual practice it attempts to comprehend” (Dissemination xxxiv). 
None, not even frequencies, can serve as a master-term to unlock what is at stake in 
Derrida’s reading of, and writing with, Shakespeare. If we believe we can ever distil 
such a master term from his innumerable acts of reading, then we have misunderstood 
something crucial about Derrida and thus run the risk of misunderstanding what he does 
with literature and with Shakespeare. Derridean acts of reading resist pinpointing; like 
music we may best appreciate them if we allow them to resonate unboundedly. 
 It is hard to pin down exactly what Shakespeare does in Derrida’s writing and 
what Derrida in turn does to Shakespeare, because these acts of reading unsettle any 
linear understanding of textual transmission. Derrida no longer comes after 
Shakespeare. Instead, Shakespeare becomes one of us, always trying to catch up with 
Derrida. At the same time, he is always in front of Derrida, who is forever at his heels. 
If I had to begin with one word to describe these acts of reading, it  would perhaps be 
contretemps. Let us therefore start, as if by chance, with contretemps, the palintropic 
force per excellence, that  strange trajectory of a vibrating arrow, which gives us a start 
and makes us start reading Derrida reading Shakespeare.
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5.1 Contretemps
Derrida reads Shakespeare à contretemps. In French contretemps means “mishap,” as 
well as “out of time,” or more literally, “against time” (French Collins Robert 
Dictionary). Speaking about “Aphorism Countertime” to Attridge in “This Strange 
Institution Called Literature,” Derrida states that he simply does not possess “the 
necessary  competence to read [Romeo and Juliet] ‘in its period”’ (62). Neither does 
Derrida read Romeo and Juliet as an ensemble, in other words as “a group of items 
viewed as a whole” (OED, sense 2). Just like Specters of Marx, “My  Chances,” “The 
Time is Out of Joint,” and “What is a ‘Relevant’ Translation,” “Aphorism Countertime” 
does not venture to give a “general” reading of a Shakespeare play. Whilst, as Hélène 
Cixous notes in her recent “Shakespeare Ghosting Derrida,” “it is to Shakespeare and 
Company that he wishes to face owing [se veut devant].”  He does not read “‘all’ 
Shakespeare,”  but only “some of the plays, a few features, a few tropes, a few words. 
Almost nothing, apparently. And yet…”  (2). Shakespeare is, as the very form of 
“Aphorism Countertime” seems to indicate, cut up, distorted, un-hinged and 
desynchronised. Yet this contretemps or temporal disjunction is not external to the play 
but rather, Derrida suggests, one of its effects.
 In “Aphorism Countertime,” Derrida clears the stage for the theatre of 
contretemps (“Strange Institution” 62). Here contretemps “opens theater,” opens Romeo 
and Juliet, as it creates space (“Aphorism” 421). What would Romeo and Juliet have 
been without contretemps? Although this play has often been “represented as the scene 
of fortuitous contretemps, of aleatory anachrony,” nothing, “the failed rendezvous, the 
unfortunate accident, the letter which does not arrive at its destination, the time of the 
detour prolonged for a purloined letter, the remedy which transforms itself into 
poison ...” comes as a result of a freakish conjuration of time and chance against Romeo 
and Juliet; instead all these things are symptoms of a more essential contretemps (419). 
What would Romeo and Juliet  have been without their contretemps? They, their love, 
their story  depend on it, in many ways. For Derrida, Romeo and Juliet’s “impossible 
synchronization” is what ultimately disjoins and joins them together; it is, if you will, 
the and between their proper names (418). “In the beginning” of deconstruction, if there 
is such a thing, “there is an and,” Derrida observes (“Et Cetera...” 282). Like 
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deconstruction, Romeo and Juliet is perhaps nothing but a “theater of this ‘and”,’ of this 
monosyllabic out-of-joint hinge of impossible synchronisation (“Aphorism” 419). 
 Romeo and Juliet’s love is not thwarted by  contretemps, their love depends on 
the “essential impossibility of any absolute synchronization” (418). When “the 
impossible happens,” when Romeo and Juliet “live in turn the death of the other, for a 
time, the contretemps of their death,” this comes to illustrate the heart of love, namely 
that “right from the pledge which binds together two desires, each is already in 
mourning for the other” (422). Derrida: “There would have been no love, the pledge 
would not have taken place, nor time, nor its theater, without discordance” (420). From 
the beginning love is disjointed; we love, because we know with “absolute certainty … 
that one must die before the other,” that “one of us, only one of us, will carry the death 
of the other – and the mourning” (422). This “theater of double survival” is also the 
“mise-en-scène of all duels,” of all that happens between two (422). It  is linked with 
what, as Derrida writes in Specters, “happens between two, and between all the ‘two’s’ 
one likes, such as between life and death” (xvii). The impossibility  of synchronisation 
as bound to the ineluctable eventuality of our death is thus at the heart of love: I love 
you, because your time is not mine, because one of us will die before the other, because, 
although we are together now, one of us will – eventually  – be alone. Or as the I puts it 
in “Envois”: “no my love that’s my wake” (141).
 No love, then, without this (de)synchronising and (dis)joining and; this little 
syllable which radically  alters our idea of love and of time. The story of Romeo and 
Juliet “confounds” that “philosophical logic which would like accidents to remain what 
they  are, accidental,” by  marking the “absolute interruption of history as deployment of 
a temporality, of a single and organized temporality” (“Aphorism” 420). Here, Derrida 
seems to ventriloquise Hamlet’s “the time is out of joint” (1.5.186). But what exactly is 
Hamlet saying? Hamlet’s famous statement is usually read as primarily indicating that 
the age is out of joint, that something is not as it should be in Elsinore. However, it also 
suggests that in mourning Hamlet’s time is somehow out of kilter, disjointed from the 
passing of time that the other characters perceive. Hamlet, as Derrida observes in “The 
Time is Out of Joint,” “is mad about dates,” more precisely about the date of his father’s 
death (17). “Hamlet,” Derrida continues, “seems no longer to know when his father 
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died. On what date? Since when?” (22). The time of mourning is strange. As Derrida 
writes in The Work of Mourning, the death of the other (a friend, a lover, a father, a 
mother) marks “each time another end of the world” (95). Mourning, that contretemps 
par excellence, disrupts the fabric of time. It is the end of the world, but it is also its 
beginning, because we always begin its work too early. Love is inaugurated by the 
possibility, and indeed by the anticipation, that the other will die before me, and that I 
will die before him. Mourning is itself in contretemps. 
 Derrida notes that as “time passes, time passes” for Hamlet time “disappears …
ceases to take place”; first it’s “the two months, then a month, the less than a month of 
the ‘within a month,’ and then without delay they  will become hours, less than two 
hours – ‘within two hours’ – or else ‘twice two months”’ (“Time” 23). He suggests that 
“time itself, the present indicative of the verb to be in the third person singular, the ‘is’ 
that says what time is, this tense of time is out of joint, itself and by  itself out of 
joint” (29). What is at stake here is a temporality which, in Hent de Vries’ words, “is 
neither an indivisible presence or now, nor a moment of retrospective retention or 
anticipatory protention, nor their total annihilation” (“Shibboleth  Effect” 185). Time, 
Derrida says in A Taste for the Secret, is “outside itself, beside itself, unhinged; it is not 
gathered together in its place, in its present” (6). And this is also true for the times of 
Derrida, suggests Bennington: “Derrida thinks with (the) time(s), not at all in that he 
represents the spirit of the times (‘post-modern,’ ‘post-philosophical,’ so they say), but 
in that the time he thinks dislocates all contemporaneity” (“Derridabase” 8). And this 
concept of time breaks what “The Time is Out Of Joint” calls the “shock waves” that 
create the tremor at the very heart of the question of “to be or not to be” (29). What is 
disjointed is, in short, not only  Hamlet’s perception of time, the time of mourning, but 
also “a very little word, the miniscule coupling of two letters,” in short a 
“minuscopule”: to be (16). 
Wreaking havoc with time, “Aphorism Countertime” confounds philosophy, literature 
and the way we think of their temporal unfolding. As Attridge notes in the 
“Introduction,” this piece does not only  disrupt the “spatiotemporal continuum” of the 
play, or its “historicity,” but also the “homogenous” space that is the “traditional critical 
116
essay” (“Aphorism” 415). Like thirty-nine arrows, the short paragraphs of “Aphorism 
Countertime” puncture our understanding of what literary  criticism is (or what a reading 
of Shakespeare might be), even of what the temporal relationship between a text and its 
reader may  be. Like Romeo and Juliet, it “cuts into the fabric of duration” (421). A Taste 
for the Secret discusses how the out-of-jointness of time affects the very act of reading: 
when “texts become so heterogenous, so little contemporary to themselves,” one indeed 
can no longer “treat a corpus, or a book, as a coherent whole” (9). And yet, “the survival 
of a theatrical work implies that, theatrically, it is saying something about theatre itself, 
about its essential possibility” (“Aphorism” 419). If the play has “been imprinted, 
superimprinted on the memory of Europe, text upon text,” it is not  only because the 
“anachronous accident comes to illustrate an essential possibility,” but also because it is 
saying something about its own survival, the play’s capacity to be reiterated text  upon 
text, staging upon staging, adaption upon adaption (420). The essential possibility of 
contretemps does not only undermine the very  idea that a text functions on a straight 
temporal line, even that it  can be securely and definitely allocated an original or singular 
historical context; Derrida’s reading of Romeo and Juliet also advances the argument 
that it  is precisely  this temporal skewing that secures the text’s survival through time. 
And contretemps stipulates that the text’s trajectory  is not linear, but rather palintropic, 
even “teleiopoetic.” 
5.2 Téléiopoièse
Téléiopoièse is what “we have been following, waiting for, preceding for such a long 
time – the long time of a time that does not belong to time. A time out of joint” (Politics 
of Friendship 77). The differing and differentiating nature of time goes hand in hand 
with the logic of contretemps Derrida dissects in “Aphorism Countertime.” 
Shakespeare’s drama of double survival, Derrida writes there, inaugurates a new 
“logic,” namely  that accidents are anything but “accidental” (420). This logic “at the 
same time, throws out into the unthinkable an anachrony of structure, the absolute 
interruption of history  as deployment of a temporality, of a single and organized 
temporality” (420). In French this sentence reads: “Cette logique, du même coup, rejette 
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dans l’impensable une anachronie de structure, l’interruption absolute de l’histoire en 
tant que déploiement d’une temporalité une et organisée” (“L’aphorisme” 134). 
Derrida’s word choice rejeter is striking. Rejeter means both (1) “to reject,” or “throw 
out,” as well as (2) “to throw back,” or (3) “discharge” (French Collins Robert 
Dictionary). Whilst holding on to the idea of throwing, Royle’s translation of rejeter as 
“to throw out” loses the word’s negative inflection, as well as the pluri-directionality the 
French word comprises: the anachrony  of structure is both thrown out into the 
unthinkable, and thrown back – but thrown back or towards what? Together with time, 
agency and address is also warped. 
 Contretemps throws and hurtles; it shoots (itself) off. The jet in rejeter refers us 
to an idea of speed and force, even of violence that might seem to jar with the tone of 
“Aphorism Countertime.” Rejeter also chimes with the coup of “du même coup” at the 
start of the sentence (“L’aphorisme” 134). In French coup is a (1) “knock” or “blow” 
and (2) a “stroke” or “shot” (French Collins Robert Dictionary). Throwing or shooting 
is what the aphorisms of Romeo and Juliet do. Aphorism 4:
 An aphorism is exposure to contretemps. It exposes discourse - hands it over
 to contretemps. Literally – because it is abandoning a word [une parole] to 
 its letter. (Already this could be read as a series of aphorisms, the alea of an
 initial anachrony. In the beginning there was contretemps. In the beginning
 there is speed. Word and deed are overtaken. Aphorism outstrips. [La parole
 et l’acte sont pris de vitesse. L’aphorisme gagne de vitesse]). (416/131)
Aphorism is an exposure to alea, it  throws the dice of chance (alea iacta est).26 It is also 
a question of speed. The initial anachrony  of the aphorism is produced or produces 
speed. Aphorism exposes us to contretemps, because word and deed sont pris de vitesse. 
This simple present passive construction is more ambiguous than it might at  first seem. 
Literally, it indicates that word and deed are taken, perhaps surprised, by speed. Prendre 
de vitesse, however, also means to gain speed. Word and deed are surprised and 
overtaken by speed; at the same time, they also do the overtaking. At the beginning of 
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26  Just as the scope of the thesis’ first part did not allow for a comprehensive account of all of Cavell’s 
Shakespearean readings, this second part dwells mostly on those acts of readings that are most telling for 
the role Shakespeare plays in Derrida’s philosophical writings.  Throughout my discussion of Derrida 
reading Shakespeare, “My Chances,” together with its elliptical and elusive reference to King Lear,  will 
be waiting in the wings: in the discussion of parenthetical citations in Chapter 6 and in the complicities 
between sound that echo in my discussion of génie in Chapter 7. For a more detailed account of this 
complicity see my “Freud’s Cadences: Taking Chances with Julius Caesar.” Mosaic. 44.4 (2011): 63-78.
aphorism, before it can outstrip and beat somebody  to the finish line, word and deed are 
not only overtaken, but also gather or increase speed. Word and deed in the aphorism 
are already exposed to the outstripping movement of contretemps. This sentence 
therefore not only links the ahistorical historicity of Romeo and Juliet to an essential 
contretemps, which confounds our image of a smooth and progressive unfolding of 
time, but also suggests that the former is, so to speak, a projection of the latter. This 
anachrony of structure results in téléiopoièse, as it  both radiates from and is projected 
back to Romeo and Juliet; it is both the result and the cause of Derrida’s aphoristic 
reading. Whatever allows Derrida to read Romeo and Juliet is not extrinsic to this play 
but intrinsic. Indeed, its “anachrony” of structure is something that radiates from it, that 
the play throws out, into the unthinkable, towards those readers who are un-thought of 
at the time, and those readers who might do the unthinkable to Shakespeare.
 In all of his acts of reading, Derrida seeks to reckon with the outstripping speed 
of contretemps and with what it  throws at us. We may, for example, recognise shadows 
of this outstripping movement in his discussion of missiles in “No Apocalypse, Not 
Now,” or his discussion of missives in The Postcard. In Specters, too, everything turns 
on the desire to respond to this “magisterial locution,” this “watchword” which shoots 
forth “from the lips of the master” and “vibrates like an arrow in the course of an 
irreversible and asymmetrical address, the one that goes most often from father to son, 
master to disciple, or master to slave” (xvi). When, at the beginning of Specters, Derrida 
is speaking of the vibrating arrow of the master’s locution, he is not only speaking of 
the ghost’s locution of Hamlet, but also, and most importantly, of the vibrating arrow 
that the Shakespearean oeuvre shoots at us:
 “The time is out of joint”: time is disarticulated, dislocated, dislodged, time is 
 run down, on the run and run down [traqué et détraqué], deranged, both out of 
 order and mad. Time is off its hinges, time is off course, beside itself, 
 disadjusted. Says Hamlet. Who thereby opened one of those breaches [brèches], 
 often they are poetic and thinking peepholes [meurtrières], through which 
 Shakespeare will have kept watch over the English language; at the same time 
 he signed its body, with the same unprecedented stroke of some arrow [et à la 
 fois signé son corps, du même coup sans précédent, de quelque flèche]. (20/42)
Every  time Shakespeare shoots an arrow at us, its trajectory is unthinkable and every 
time it hits us, our wounds are unprecedented: sans précédent. We are in the strange 
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temporality of the stroke or coup, where every  hit  is new and different and yet 
anticipated from the arrow’s very start.
All this time we have been following the traje(t)ctory of what Politics of Friendship 
calls the “arrow of teleiopoesis” (77). Just like in Specters and “Aphorism,” the 
metaphor of the arrow in Politics of Friendship traces a text’s trajectory from its 
original contretemps to the moment in which it  traverses the reader. This is an “arrow 
whose flight would consist  in a return to the bow,” and in its return “will nevertheless 
have reached us, struck home” (32). What is thrown or shot into the unthinkable in 
Politics of Friendship is not  some aphoristic fragment of a Shakespeare play, nor the 
asymmetrical demand of a ghost, but rather a “shudder of a sentence” from Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil: ‘“Alas! if only  you knew how soon, how very soon, 
things will be – different! –’ ( – Ach! Wenn ihr wußtet, wie es bald, so bald schon – 
anders kommt!)”’ (Politics of Friendship 31). This sentence flies like an arrow “of 
which it is still not known where and how far it  will go,” its trajectory is perhaps 
unprecedented like Hamlet’s “the time is out of joint” (31). At stake here is what Martin 
McQuillan dubs “the structure of writing-for-the-future which Derrida will later call 
‘telepoesis” (58). It is a writing for or towards the avenir. At the same time, its trajectory 
loops backward. The jet of this arrow traces the strange back-looping trajectory of 
téléiopoièse. Palintrope is traced in the stereophonic first three syllables of this term: 
téléio. Corinne Scheiner notes that “téléiopoièse references the adjectival stem teleio 
deriving from the adjective teleios (complete)” (243). In téléiopoièse, poetry (poesis) 
and a creative act (poeiesis) are therefore brought to fruition, if you will. As such, 
téléiopoièse is part of those acts called performative, or rather perlocutionary; it is what 
“renders absolute, perfect, completed, accomplished, finished, that which brings to an 
end” (Politics of Friendship 32). For Derrida, however, the teleiopoetic always 
reverberates with the teleopoetic; what plays into the teleiopoesis of this arrow is 
vibrating and flying in the air. Starting with its conclusion, its flight towards its aim 
covers an incalculable distance of both time and space.
 The distance covered by the arrow of téléiopoièse is unthinkable, at the same 
time immeasurably big and small. Again, speed expands and outstrips itself:
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 Infinite or nil speed, absolute economy, for the arrow [flèche] carries its 
 address along and implies in advance, in its very readability, the signature [la 
 signature] of the addressee. This is tantamount to saying that it withdraws from 
 space by  penetrating it. You only have to listen. It advances backwards; it  
 outruns itself by reversing itself. It outstrips itself [elle se gagne de vitesse]. 
 (32/50)
Perhaps the entire reading scene that Derrida sketches in “Aphorism Countertime” and 
in his other readings of Shakespeare can be summed up  in this enigmatic sentence: 
“L’aphorisme gagne de vitesse.” Like the aphorism, the arrow outstrips itself, overtakes 
itself and thus strips itself bare, annuls itself. It is the speed of the rejeter that kicks this 
reading scene off, that allows Derrida to read Romeo and Juliet à contretemps 
(“L’aphorisme” 134).27 
 Téléiopoièse is a trajectory  without fixed beginning and end, all flight and all 
start. As we shall see in Chapter 8, it is a resonating bodiless voice of differential tones. 
It is what in Politics of Friendship Derrida defines as a “generation by  joint and 
simultaneous grafting of the performative and the reportive, without a body of its 
own” (32). It  is a missive that  “pass[es] through the various destinations of his 
readership, [is] countersigned by the reader en route, without ever coming to rest at a 
final address” (McQuillan 58). Following the trajectory  of this arrow which shoots 
(itself) off “one begins,” “Envoi” suggests, “no longer to understand what to come 
[venir], to come before, to come after, to foresee [prévenir], to come back [revenir] all 
mean” (21). The pluridirectional jet of the teleiopoetic arrow makes the linearity of the 
act of reading quiver from the very moment it leaves its quiver. “As soon as, in a 
second, the first stroke of a letter divides itself, and must indeed support partition in 
order to identify  itself, there are nothing but post cards, anonymous morsels without 
fixed domicile, without legitimate addressee, letters open, but like crypts” (53). The out-
of-jointness of time, which is nothing else than the out-of-jointness of Being and 
Dasein, radically  shifts our paradigms of reading. Indeed, it makes any  paradigmatic 
mode of act of reading both impossible and redundant. When, as J. Hillis Miller notes in 
Speech Acts in Literature, the consequences of “iterabilty,” the division ab initio of the 
first stroke [coup] of a letter, mean both “that any utterance or writing can function in 
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27 It all resonates in this “re-” to which I shall return in Chapter 8.
the radical absence of the sender” and that “any  utterance or writing must be able to 
function in the radical absence of any particular receiver,” then traditional reading 
paradigms no longer apply (91). How can we apply traditional interpretative methods 
when, as Kamuf notes, the text “begins with this response that gives or gives back 
reason to the other” (Book of Addresses 6)? The teleiopoetic presence of the other at  the 
start of a text, pivotal to Derrida’s view of the act of reading, must supplant a general 
interpretative paradigm with a responsiveness to the singularity of the other. 
 The teleiopoetic trajectory of the act  of reading (which is also the act of writing) 
annuls time and space, but at  the same time it gives time and space. Téléiopoièse is what 
“makes the arrivants come,” that which “allows them to come” precisely by 
“withdrawing” (Politics 42-3). Its arrow “withdraws from space by  penetrating it” (32). 
When Shakespeare’s arrows are pointed at us and eventually shot at us, they do not so 
much wound us as create space for us and our signature so that we may wound it in 
turn. When Derrida speaks of the withdrawing-cum-penetrating of the arrow, he is also 
depicting the paradox of signature as a space for the other’s signature. Speaking of 
Nietzsche’s sentence, Derrida continues: “for what is indeed in question here is a 
poetics of distance at one remove, and of an absolute acceleration in the spanning of 
space by  the very structure of the sentence (it begins at the end, it  is initiated with the 
signature of the other)” (32). The phrase “elle se gagne de vitesse,” which I discussed 
above, in this sense not only refers to la flèche, but also to la signature of the addressee, 
which is teleiopoetically implied from the start. In “Signature, Event, Context,” Derrida 
speaks of the signature in similar terms to the flèche. It, too, has a “breaking force [force 
de rupture]” which “breaks its [immediate] context” (9). It too is “tied to the spacing 
[espacement] that constitutes the written sign” (9). This spacing – or what in Chapter 7 
we will come to understand as the caesura or moment of silence – is the means by 
which a poem may constitute its own poetics. 
 It is through this withdrawing signature that plays such as Romeo and Juliet, to 
put it in the words of “A Self-Unsealing Poetic Text,” “become, invent, institute, offer 
for reading in an exemplary  way, signing it, both sealing and unsealing it, the possibility 
of this poem” (180). The poem’s, understood here as the poematic, “both unique and 
repeatable moment of a signature” thus “opens the verbal body onto something other 
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than itself,” opens and carries it  “beyond itself, towards the other or towards the 
world” (180). “Address takes place,” and address makes space (for the other), Derrida 
writes in “Shibboleth” (33). Disrupting our idea of the linear unfolding of the time of 
reading, the Derridean act of reading “will have taken some time” (Politics 32). At the 
same time as covering the incalculable distance between the text and reader it implies 
from the very start the text which is belatedly  projected back from the reader. The 
incalculable speed of this reading, as I try to show in Chapter 8, “will have changed the 
order of the world even before we are able to awake to the realisation that, in sum, 
nothing will have been said, nothing that will not already  have been blindly  endorsed in 
advance” (32).
The arrow is in mid-air. Although we do not yet know what frequencies are “quivering 
here,” from what quiver these “vibrations of a shaft of writing” come from, we know 
that in its flight, this arrow “promises and calls for a reading, a preponderance to come 
of the interpretative decision” (31). In the temporal limbo opened by  Nietzsche, 
Shakespeare and other literary génies, in that “time of a time that does not belong to 
time,” in other words a time which is “out of joint,” the arrow, like the spectre, comes 
back from the future; although it “begins at  the end,” it “carries its address along and 
implies in advance, in its very readability, the signature of the addressee” (77, 32). As I 
will go on to argue in the next section, the singular response that this address demands 
must also be singular, perhaps like love’s wound. “O Romeo, Romeo...” (2.2.33). Just 
like the teleiopoetic arrow, the “address of love” is, Kamuf argues, “never issued by  a 
p re -ex i s t en t sub jec t in the d i rec t ion o f an ob jec t , i t s ob jec t , o r 
destination” (“Deconstruction and Love” 155). In the words of “Envois”: “You, my 
love, is it you I thereby name, is it to you that I address myself?” (8). “Call me but love, 
and I’ll be new baptis’d” (2.2.50).
5.3 How to Love Shakespeare
If there is deconstruction, it  is a kind of obsessive love, what in The Ear of the Other is 
called a “loving jealousy” (87). “Aphorism Countertime” is an extraordinary meditation 
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on love, on the and between Romeo and Juliet. We must, however, listen for the silent 
slippage between Romeo and Juliet and Romeo and Juliet; the one always rings in the 
other. Derrida is not only, and perhaps not even mainly, concerned with the contretemps 
of Romeo and Juliet, but with the contretemps of the play. We could not love Romeo 
and Juliet if it  were not for its contretemps. Just as “I love because the other is the other, 
because its time will never be mine,” we can love Romeo and Juliet because its 
contretemps does something to time (“Aphorism” 420). Just as the “very presence of 
[the other’s] love remains infinitely distant from mine,” the contretemps of Romeo and 
Juliet “cuts into the fabric of duration” (420, 421). What he is concerned with is 
therefore “the double survival, the contretemps, in short the aphorism of Romeo and 
Juliet. Not of Romeo and of Juliet but of Romeo and Juliet, Shakespeare’s play of that 
title” (433).
 “Aphorism Countertime” declares that such love as exists between Romeo and 
Juliet also exists between us and Romeo and Juliet. In “The Time is Out of Joint” 
Derrida admits that  Hamlet’s phrase is “cited, recited, analyzed there [in Specters], and 
also loved there like an obsession” (18). Something about Shakespeare, something that 
Derrida also calls “the force of the poem” makes him “quote it, again and again, by an 
irresistible compulsion,” and makes him learn it  by  heart (“Un-sealing” 198).28  In 
“Deconstruction and Love,” Kamuf asks whether we do violence to the concept of love, 
“which has to be (does it not?) either interpersonal or at  least a relation formed between 
animate, living beings” when we proclaim our love for a text, or even, as Derrida does 
in “The Time is Out of Joint”, for a phrase (152-3). We can love Romeo and Juliet and 
Shakespeare with the passion only a “singular name,” or a “signature,” can ignite. When 
in “This Strange Institution Called Literature” Derrida is asked whether Romeo and 
Juliet “merits special attention in terms of [his] interests and goals,” he concedes that its 
thematisation of proper names and contretemps is no doubt “exemplary” for “the effect 
of the same a-logical ‘logic’ of the singular and iterable mark,” which he seeks to 
respond to in all of his readings of literary or philosophical texts (66). Just as Juliet 
loves Romeo not despite but because of his name, such survival, Derrida suggests, 
would not “have been possible ‘without that title,’ as Juliet put it” (“Aphorism” 433). To 
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28 I will return to this question of “learning by heart” in my discussion of “Che” in the next Chapter. 
ventriloquise Juliet: What is a title’s play? It is not premise nor end, nor any  part 
belonging to a play. What, then, is it?
 The literary  work abides by the same paradoxical rules as the signature. In order 
to be recognizable, a signature has to have a “repeatable, iterable, imitable form; it must 
be able to be detached from the present and singular intention of its 
production” (“Signature” 20). The “absolute singularity of a signature-event” is 
precisely constituted by the “pure reproducibility  of a pure event” (20). It  is a spacing 
which not only  separates the mark “from other elements of the internal contextual chain 
(the always open possibility of its disengagement and graft),” but also “from all forms 
of present reference (whether past or future in the modified form of the present that is 
past or to come)” (9-10). Just like a signature, a singular literary work is therefore 
marked by “iterability,” that “logic that ties repetition to alterity” (7). Just like a 
signature, a literary  work would not be one, if it could not survive beyond its intended 
or implied sender and receiver (8). Romeo and Juliet “subsists” because it  “does not 
exhaust itself in the moment of its inscription,” and because it “can give rise to an 
iteration in the absence and beyond the presence of the empirically determined subject 
who, in a given context, has emitted or produced it” (9). Though aphoristic, Romeo and 
Juliet resonates with the “open theatre of narratives which bear this name” (“Aphorism” 
433). Derrida’s reading of Romeo and Juliet is hence founded on the iterable structure 
of the text, “which both puts down roots in the unity  of a context and immediately 
opens this non-saturable context onto a recontextualisation” (“Strange Institution” 63). 
The work is therefore understood in terms of this structure:
 So by oeuvre I mean something that  remains, that is absolutely not translatable, 
 that bears a signature (the signature is not necessarily  the narcissism of the 
 proper name or the reappropriation of something that belongs to me); in any 
 case, something that has a place, that has a certain consistency, that is recorded, 
 to which one can return, that can be repeated in a different context, that can be 
 read in the future in a context where reading conditions have changed. (A Taste 
 for the Secret 14)
None of the play’s printing and superimprinting could be possible, Derrida suggests, 
without the singular Shakespearean signature of Romeo and Juliet. This is that “play of 
uniqueness and repetition” (“Strange Institution” 66), that which “giv[es] rise every 
time to the chance of an absolutely singular event as it  does to the untranslatable idiom 
125
of a proper name, to its fatality (the ‘enemy’ that I ‘hate’), to the fatality  of a date and of 
a rendezvous”  (“Aphorism” 419). 
Derrida’s love of Shakespeare is tied to the idea that the “fatality  of a date and of a 
rendezvous” at the heart of Romeo and Juliet can in turn give rise to “the chance of an 
absolutely singular event.” Love is involved in his readings of Shakespeare, but  also 
death. Shakespeare watches over us and the English language through meurtrières. A 
meurtrière is an arrow slit or a loophole. It  is also a criminelle, a murderess. Meurtrier 
is an adjective meaning deadly, lethal. For Royle, meurtrières are also death traps, 
making Shakespeare’s a “death-trap English” (The Uncanny 123, 124).  Addressing his 
beloved in “Envois,” the “I” indeed writes about love in terms of meurtrières: “Our 
delinquency, my love, we are the worst criminals and the first victims, I would like not 
to kill anyone, and everything that I send you goes through meurtrières” (67). The 
arrows Shakespeare sent through those meurtrières are also love letters wounding the 
body of English, which is also Shakespeare’s body. The “stroke of some arrow” is an 
adequate image not only  because it delineates the spacing, perhaps the brèches, of the 
Shakespearean signature, but also because it implies violence. What we are dealing with 
is the “violent, ‘material’ effect” of Shakespearean words or phrases that sign their body 
and the body of English, words or phrases such as porpentine or the “time is out of 
joint”. “The signature is a wound, and there is no other origin for the work of art,” 
Derrida writes in Glas (184).
 Derrida speaks of a similarly violent transversal in Monolingualism of the Other. 
What is at stake, however, is not the love between animate things, not even with the 
animated work that is Shakespeare, but of the love between Derrida and the French 
language. Derrida speaks of how he
 ... seemed to be harpooned by  French philosophy  and literature, the one and 
 the other, the one or the other: wooden or metallic darts [flèches], a 
 penetrating body of enviable, formidable, and inaccessible words even when 
 they  were entering me, sentences which it was necessary to appropriate, 
 domesticate, coax [amadouer], that is to say, love by setting on fire, burn 
 (“tinder” [amadou] is never far always), perhaps destroy, in all events mark, 
 transform, prune, cut, forge, graft at the fire, let come in another way, in other 
 words, to itself in itself. (50-1)
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Although the translator, Patrick Mensah, opts to speak of “metallic darts,” Derrida is 
speaking here of those same flèches that Shakespeare is shooting at the English 
language, at Derrida, and at us. 
 We must not imagine that reading Shakespeare should leave either of us without 
a scratch. When reading Derrida, Nussbaum may  have been thirsting for the blood of 
humanity, but for all her thirst she misses something else that happens in Derrida’s acts 
of reading (Love’s Knowledge 171). In line with Kamuf, I would like to challenge this 
notion that “too much attention to textuality leads to bloodlessness” and propose instead 
that what matters to Derrida is not so much the blood of humanity  as the idea of the text 
and the act  of reading as a wound (“Deconstruction and Love” 168). This passage in 
Monolingualism of the Other is perhaps the closest Derrida comes to formulating a 
manifesto of what he wants to do with the French language, indeed what the French 
language does to him; he wants to woo, wound and change the French language as it 
woos, wounds and changes him. Monolingualism plays on the partial homophony 
between amadouer, to “coax” and amadou, “tinder”: here love is never far away from 
destruction. In an image that uncannily echoes Derrida’s flèches, Jean-Luc Nancy writes 
of love as a blade that is plunged into us, and each time in an absolutely singular 
manner: “for as long as it lasts, love does not cease to come from without and to remain, 
not outside but this outside itself, each time singular, a blade plunged into me and that I 
cannot rejoin because it  disjoins me” (“L’amour” 247-8). When Derrida is “harpooned” 
by French philosophy  and literature, the “penetrating body” of “enviable, formidable, 
and inaccessible words,” words enter his body, but they also withdraw. He is not only 
wounded by them, but he wounds and transforms them in turn: he “appropriates,” 
“transforms,” “forges,” and cuts them, as if the very space in which they are still in the 
process of penetrating him had become a wordsmith’s shop. 
 Although Derrida’s relationship to his “mothertongue” is different to his 
relationship  to (Shakespeare’s) English, the echoes between his two uses of flèches in 
Specters and in Monolingualism are important. This parallel implies that a similarly 
passionate traversal happens when he reads Shakespeare. Loving as deconstructing is 
what happens each time we fall in love with Shakespeare’s works (and words) all over 
again. Derrida “love[s] very much everything that  [he] deconstructs in [his] own 
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manner” (Ear 87). For him, being hit by the flèches of Shakespeare, or any great literary 
work, is a process as loving as it is passionately violent: he needs to forge the 
harpooning flèches that  penetrate him, he needs to “appropriate” and “domesticate” 
them, he needs to “love” them “by setting [them] on fire” (Monolingualism 50). It is 
this violent transversal that Derrida speaks about in The Ear of the Other; but this love, 
though violent, is not a “negative operation” (87). If there is a deconstructive position it 
would fall somewhere between the two, where we cannot “choose between an operation 
that we’ll call negative or nihilist, an operation that would set  about furiously 
dismantling systems, and the other operation” (87). Loving a text means to allow 
oneself to be traversed, to create space, but it also means doing something with this 
flèche, burning it with the fire of one’s wound and forging something else from it. 
 Love’s arrow wounds every  time as if it were the first time and each arrow is 
always “sans précédent” (Spectres 42). As mentioned above, the loving arrow of reading 
does something to time. In The Ear of the Other, Derrida claims that all the texts that he 
loves are “texts whose future ... will not be exhausting for a long time” (87). Their 
“signature is not yet finished – that is the destiny of signatures” (87). Whilst, Derrida 
argues in “Signature, Event, Context,” “the signature also marks and retains his {the 
signers} having-been present in a past now or present [maintenant],” at the same time it 
posits that this now is also a “future now or present [maintenant]” (20). Here, just like at 
the beginning of Specters, Derrida is playing on the flexible duration of the present that 
the French word maintenant traces. It  means (1) “now”, but it can also mean (2) “by 
now” or (3) “from now on” (French Collins Robert Dictionary).29  Although Derrida 
calls it “the transcendental form of presentness [maintenance],” what is at issue here is 
not an idea of transcendence, but rather the “singular present punctuality” pinpointed by 
the signature and the singular literary oeuvre (“Signature” 20). The text’s signature 
opens up toward the other because its singularity  demands a singular response, an act of 
reading that is as much counter time as steeped in its singular datedness.
Every  time Shakespeare’s arrow is pointed at us, we must, according to Derrida, 
respond to its singularity. In The Singularity of Literature, Derek Attridge argues that 
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29  See Michael Naas’ Derrida From Now On. New York: Fordham University Press, 2008,  for an 
illuminating account of what it means to read Derrida in this maintenant.
the singularity of a piece of literature, like the singularity of a loved one, is not to be 
confused with its uniqueness or its idiosyncrasy. Singularity  is not “what  Benjamin 
called the ‘aura’ of the specific, unique art-object”; it is not even limited to one single 
piece of art, but can “also inhere in a group of works or an entire oeuvre” (64). 
Singularity is rather to be understood as the “situatedness and datedness ... of the act of 
writing” (110). For Derrida the singularity of the literary text is also, as he suggests in 
“Shibboleth”, its solitude: “the only one: singularity, solitude, the secret of 
encounter” (5). At stake here is what, in A Taste for the Secret, is called “this singularity 
of the untimely, of non-self-contemporaneity”(13). As de Vries argues, “the date is not 
an indivisible hic et nunc, an atomic point in time and space. From its very inception, 
the date will always already  have broken the silence of a pure singularity” (“Shibboleth 
Effect” 186). For Derrida, the work’s singularity, its “signature,” however paradoxically, 
does not limit  it to “reside in the historical past”, but “bridges, in a way that  is not easy 
to explain, past and present” (Politics 64). The date is not silent “so that its utterance 
may resonate and clamour beyond a singularity that might otherwise remain 
undecipherable, mute, and immured in its date – in the unrepeatable” (“Shibboleth” 8-9, 
my emphasis). The text’s singularity  is dated, it  cuts into the fabric of time and it 
demands that our response to it be similarly wounded by our singular act of reading. 
 The wound of reading says: “It only  happens to me” (“Envois” 135; 
“Circumfession” 305). No matter how “ahistorical” a reading of Derrida’s may  appear, 
it is always steeped in time, in the coincidentals of reading. In “This Strange Institution 
Called Literature,” Derrida points out that “spontaneously” he “would never have had 
the audacity to write on Romeo and Juliet or anything at all of Shakespeare’s” (62-3). 
“Aphorism Countertime” is, rather, a specific response to a specific event. Derrida 
continues: “In this case, I was asked for a short, oblique text to accompany a 
production” (63). As such “Aphorism” is a stroke of luck: “If the actor-producer Daniel 
Mesguich had not put the play on at that point (but why did he?), if he hadn’t been 
interested in what I write (but why? - this opens up another chain of causality), he 
wouldn’t have asked anything of me and I would never have written this text” (66). 
Derrida “felt like signing and even dating” the singularity of his response “at a past 
129
moment in December, that year, at Verona (as it says at the end of the text)” (65). Here 
then is his countersignature:
 39. The absolute aphorism: a proper name. Without genealogy, without the 
 least copula. End of drama. Curtain. Tableau (The Two Lovers United in Death 
 by Angelo dall’Oca Bianca). Tourism, December sun in Verona (“Verona by 
 that name is known” [V, iii, 299]. A true sun, the other (“The sun for sorrow 
 will not show his head” [V, iii, 305]). (“Aphorism”  433)
Whilst some parts can be deciphered – for instance, his ‘‘signing and dating’ the time 
and place in which he wrote this little text – others remain for ever beyond our reach 
(“This Strange Institution” 65). In “Following Derrida,” Attridge suggests that we turn 
to the French: tableau in French conveys a transition from the theatre to painting in a 
way that “tableau” in English doesn’t, being much more rooted in the world of the 
stage. For Attridge, “the end of Romeo and Juliet ... presents a tableau mirrored in a 
painting (to be seen, presumably by visitors to Verona).” But we can never hope to get 
to the bottom of Derrida’s countersignature: for instance, why he refers to the painting 
by the Veronese painter Angelo dell’Oca, whose original title – Ultimi istanti di 
Giulietta e Romeo – refers, as if by  a stroke of chance, to the contretemps of the theatre 
of double survival. Together with what Attridge calls Derrida’s “irreducibly personal 
memory,” the aphoristic and parenthetical insertions from the end of Romeo and Juliet 
remain as incisive as they are irretrievable. All we can hope to do is countersign in turn. 
In succeeding in illuminating particular moments in the plays, and in shifting our focus 
to what the plays do to us, in other words in showing why philosophy must turn to 
Shakespeare, Derrida’s readings of Romeo and Juliet and Hamlet meet Nussbaum’s 
second and third criteria (“Stages” 2). I have maintained that although Derrida reads 
Romeo and Juliet à contretemps he does not deny  the “datedness” of Shakespeare. On 
the contrary, in “This Strange Institution Called Literature,” Derrida asks who 
“demonstrates better that texts fully  conditioned by  their history, loaded with history, 
and on historical themes, offer themselves so well for reading in historical contexts very 
distant from their time and place of origin” (63). Indeed, for Derrida, the oeuvre’s 
datedness, also understood as its singularity, radically  reopens “the question of the 
structure of a text in relation to history” (63). In Derrida’s reading, the Shakespearean 
oeuvre is teleiopoetic precisely because its datedness is a call for a similarly dated and 
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singular countersignature. Thus the work’s “initial” temporal incision is itself started by 
our incisive act of reading which is both anticipated and anticipatory. In turning to 
Nussbaum’s first criterion – that a philosophical reading of Shakespeare actually  do 
philosophy – in the next chapter I will argue that Derrida is not only responsive to 
themes in Shakespeare’s plays, but also, as his treatment of Hamlet’s “porpentine” in 
Specters implies, sensitive to the body  of the text’s idiom. Indeed, much of the 
wounding of Derrida’s acts of reading is played on the very body  of Shakespeare’s 
writing, at the level of syllable, sound and letter, and in ways not anticipated by 
Nussbaum. By following the catachrestic frequencies of this little textual animal and 
contrasting it with Hamlet’s mole – which has captured philosophers’ imagination for 
centuries – I am thus seeking to sound out how the porpentine influences Derrida’s 
philosophical writing beyond those texts which are overtly about Shakespeare. 
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6. Porpentine 
To understand and to hear [entendre] how Shakespeare keeps watch over some parts of 
Derrida’s philosophical writings, we must pay heed to a little catachrestic animal – not 
the mole or the hérisson, but the porpentine. The porpentine epitomises, I would like to 
argue, the Shakespearean wounded and wounding “signature.” It is what, like his cousin 
the hérisson, has the “arrows held at the ready [toutes flèches dehors]”; it is what 
wounds its own body with the teleiopoetic arrows it shoots at us (“Che” 235). Over the 
years, considerable philosophical importance has been attached to the figure of the mole 
in Hamlet. It has been argued that the mole represents a kind of consciousness, or at  the 
very least the unconscious, working somewhere beneath the surface of Shakespearean 
language. “Shakespeare in the Ear of Hegel” in Ned Lukacher’s Primal Scenes, for 
instance, as Royle notes in “Nuclear Piece,” “tracks the ‘mole’ to a number of 
purportedly compatible sites: something deep in Hamlet’s ‘character’ [205], .... 
something that is ‘still burrowing’ [209] ..., and – last but  not least – ‘Shakespeare’ 
‘himself’ [235]” (42). Nothing could be further from Derrida’s understanding of how 
Shakespeare watches over the English language. 
 If the mole can indeed be thought of as an example of what Shakespeare’s texts 
do, then this mole traces the “slow mole-like advance” Derrida speaks of in “Freud and 
the Scene of Writing” (97). This mole “moves out of sync with consciousness, erupting 
sporadically  to break new paths, like deconstructive writing itself” (de Grazia 260). In 
The Uncanny, Royle suggests that the mole-like character of Hamlet’s language allows 
us to think beyond “conventional boundaries of characterology, scenes and acts, and 
imagery,” to think towards a kind of “dramaturgic telepathy” (250). Such a 
“dramaturgic telepathy” would then also account for what Royle in Telepathy and 
Literature: Essays on the Reading Mind calls the “sort of telepathic repetition of 
utterance, apparent displays of telepathy  or thought transmission” rife in Hamlet and 
elsewhere, which “no amount of textual scholarship or editorial argumentation can 
efface” (146). 
 What I am concerned with on this occasion, however, is not only the mole-like, 
even telepathic, character of Shakespeare’s language, but how it is enmeshed within a 
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thick net of resonating and travelling sounds, letters and syllables. This resonant 
modality  is not what, in relation to the “imp” in Poe’s writing, Cavell calls “these little 
moles of language,” nor “the implanted origins of constituents of words, leading lives of 
their own, staring back at us, calling upon one another, giving us away, alarming – 
because to note them is to see that they  live in front of our eyes, within earshot, at every 
moment” (Quest 125). Although this impish animal is reminiscent of what Stewart calls 
“lexical dismemberment” and of the inter- and intratextual travel of sounds and 
syllables in which Derrida is so interested, it is for Cavell ultimately a negative figure 
(“World Viewed” 80). In Stewart’s words, “these disruptive ‘imp words’ prevent us not 
only from saying what we mean but  even from meaning it coherently” (80). For 
Derrida, there is not only no such coherent and self-present meaning to disrupt, as I will 
argue in more detail in the Second Interlude, but indeed the imbrication of 
Shakespeare’s texts and Derrida’s philosophical writing is made possible by the impish 
travel of sounds, lettres and syllabes. The figures of the imp, the mole and the 
porpentine therefore already allow us to trace a significant difference between Cavell 
and Derrida’s philosophical uses of Shakespeare, based on the former’s diagnosis of 
constant presentness and the latter’s sensitivity to the essential dispersal of words – the 
flight of the teleiopoetic arrow – that disperses its very possibility.
 Hegel, Marx and Derrida are not the only philosophers interested in Hamlet’s 
mole. Jacques Lacan and Sigmund Freud have used it respectively  to illustrate Hamlet’s 
“delay,” the “trajectory of [male] desire,” or the chthonic realm of the unconscious (de 
Grazia 261, 260). According to Ruth Stevenson, for all these philosophers the mole thus 
becomes a “cultural emblem, part of a progressive symbolism contributing to a 
historical allegory whose meaning and function reside outside the verbal patterning of 
the play” (438). She goes on to contrast this philosophical use of the mole with the 
sheer linguistic force the mole illustrates and exudes. For her, the mole comes to 
represent how different lexical or sound patterns (resonating for instance between 
“mice,” “motes,” “moles,” and “malecho”) “stir and stretch out to other words that 
acquire metaphoric power and momentum” (438). I disagree with Stevenson’s 
dichotomy between the linguistic force of Hamlet, and more precisely of the mole, and 
its philosophical and cultural use. Instead, I would like to propose the “porpentine” as 
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an alternative to the mole, and argue that this Shakespearean hérisson allows us to see 
how it is precisely the “linguistic” force of Shakespeare’s writing that opens up 
philosophical thinking space. By on the one hand considering the parenthetical 
supplementation of the “porpentine” to the French translation of Hamlet Derrida uses, 
and on the other hand by understanding the “porpentine” as a Shakespearean version of 
Derrida’s hérisson, this chapter will propose that, for Derrida, it  is precisely  the 
catachresis of the Shakespearean lettre that allows him to think and translate through 
Shakespeare as he does. But before we can turn to the porpentine, we must take into 
account the progress of Hamlet’s mole in Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire, since it is 
his performative translation of Shakespeare that frames the way, to put it  in Cixous’ 
words, “Derrida loves in French Shakespeare’s English”  (“Ghosting”  3-4, my 
emphasis). 
6.1 Marx & Mole
“Oh, Marx’s love for Shakespeare!” (Specters 10). In “Recollections of Mohr,” Eleanor 
Marx writes that Shakespeare was the Bible of the Marx household, “seldom out of 
hands or mouths” (Baxandall, Morawski 147). Shakespeare was also often used in 
Marx’s philosophical writings. His most  famous citation of Shakespeare is undoubtedly 
his use of Timon of Athens in “The Power of Money” from the Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, as well as in The German Ideology. For Derrida, 
Timon’s imprecation “against prostitution – prostitution on the face of gold and the 
prostitution of gold itself” shows “the genius of Shakespeare will have understood this 
phantomalization of property  centuries ago and said it  better than anyone” (Specters 52, 
51). In this single “poetic flash,” with “one blow going faster and farther than our little 
bourgeois colleagues in economic theory” (51-2). At stake once more is the coup de 
quelque flèche through which Shakespeare will, it seems, not only have watched over 
the English language, but also German, and through which he will have anticipated 
Marx’s critique of property. 
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 Marx knew about Shakespeare’s “poetic flash” and he also harnessed it in “The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon.” “The Eighteenth Brumaire” is widely 
considered to be Marx’s “most brilliant political pamphlet” and is concerned with two 
things primarily: to offer a rereading of recent French history through a satirical and 
critical lens, and to separate the wheat from the chaff, the good aspects of the revolution 
from the ones to be avoided (329). What Marx learns from Napoleon III’s rehashing of 
the French revolution is firstly  that repetition is always farcical: “Hegel remarks 
somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it 
were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce” (327). His 
second concern is to show that, as Derrida aptly  puts it, it  is “the condition of 
inheritance” that “men make their own history” (Specters 134). I quote from “The 
Eighteenth Brumaire”:
 The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot draw its poetry from the 
 past, but only from the future. It cannot begin with itself before it has stripped 
 off all superstition in regard to the past. Earlier revolutions required recollections 
 of past world history in order to drug themselves concerning their own content. 
 In order to arrive at its own content, the revolution of the nineteenth century 
 must let the dead bury the dead. There the phrase went beyond the content; here 
 the content goes beyond the phrase. (331)
While Marx brushes “the poetry  of the past” to one side, the feet of his argument are 
firmly placed on its ground. Here the phrase haunts the content. “Let the dead bury  the 
dead” is of course a citation from the gospel of St. Luke: “let the dead bury their own 
dead” (9.2). The poetry  of the past cannot quite be exorcised. In Specters, Derrida 
writes: “And the borrowing speaks: borrowed language, borrowed names, says 
Marx” (136). It is just now, as Marx is slowly enveloping himself in the poetry of the 
past, that Hamlet’s spectre makes an appearance and speaks:
 But the revolution is thoroughgoing. It is still journeying through purgatory. It 
 does its work methodically. By 2 December 1851, it  had completed one half of 
 its preparatory work; it is now completing the other half. First it perfected the 
 parliamentary  power, in order to be able to overthrow it. Now that it has attained 
 this, it  perfects the executive power, reduces it to its purest expression, isolates 
 it, sets it up against itself as the sole target, in order to concentrate all its forces 
 of destruction against it. And when it has done this second half of its preliminary 
 work, Europe will leap from its seat and exultantly exclaim: Well grubbed, old 
 mole! (345).
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As through a peephole or meurtrière, we are suddenly transported to Elsinore and to 
Hamlet’s Cellarage Scene.30  As Hamlet feverishly  shifts his ground, the ghost shape-
shifts: it is a “boy” (1.5.150), a “fellow in the cellarage” (1.5.151), a “worthy 
pioner” (1.5.162), and finally an “old mole” (1.5.161). Whilst the reference to the 
cellarage places Hamlet  and his ghost firmly in the wooden reality of the early  modern 
stage, with the reference to the mole and the pioner (a soldier who digs and lays mines), 
the scene becomes earthier (Thompson, Taylor 225). We are closer to the gravediggers 
that await us later in the play, closer to St. Luke’s image of dead burying their own 
dead. 
 Garber has eloquently written on the use of quotation, especially of Shakespeare, 
in popular culture: “quotations, especially disembodied quotations, can serve an 
educative function, providing (or counterfeiting) wisdom. Detached from their contexts 
they  seem not only  ‘true’ but iconic, monumental” (Quotation Marks 19). Do 
philosophical quotations of Shakespeare fall prey to the same monumentalising desires? 
Both of Marx’s references to Hamlet’s mole and Timon of Athens illustrate a 
philosophical point: whilst Timon’s speech illustrates the corrosive power of money, the 
mole epitomises revolution. It is what pushes “beyond the advances of 1848,” is able to 
push away through the “muck of ages” (de Grazia 252). The repercussions of his 
quotation of Hamlet’s mole in The Eighteenth Brumaire, however, explode the merely 
illustrative function Marx’s reference to Timon seems to have. Marx’s translation of the 
mole is not, to put it in Moi’s words, the projection of “a pre-existing theory or 
philosophy” (“Adventures” 18). Instead, it appears to fulfil at least one of Nussbaum’s 
criteria in that it actually  does philosophy (“Stages” 2). Here, however, philosophy is 
practiced in a way  that is not accounted for in Nussbaum’s criteria, namely  through 
translation. 
 Hamlet’s mole resurfaces, perhaps surprisingly, in another German philosophical 
text. In Hegel’s History of Philosophy this mole, as de Grazia argues, represents the 
“spirit  advancing dialectically  through historical time toward the freedom of full 
consciousness … like a mole tunnelling through the earth toward open light” (251). In 
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30  For a more in-depth reading of the Cellarage Scene and how this scene of “acousmatics” plays into 
Derrida’s inheritance of Marx, see Chapter 8.
Hegel’s own words: “Spirit ... is inwardly working ever forward (as when Hamlet says 
of the ghost of his father, ‘Well said, old mole! canst work i’ the ground so fast?’), until 
grown strong in itself it  bursts asunder the crust of earth which divided it from the 
sun ... so that the earth crumbles away” (547). Before Marx used Shakespeare’s mole to 
illustrate the steadily growing power of the proletarian revolution, Hegel had used the 
mole to make a quite different point. Marx’s German rendition of Shakespeare’s English 
differs both from Hegel’s and from Schlegel’s then current translation. There the mole is 
strangely silenced –“Brav, alter Maulwurf! Wühlst so hurtig fort” – thus leaving room, 
Martin Harries suggests, for the varieties of action imagined by Hegel and Marx: 
working and burrowing. Harries points out that Hegel translates “Well said, old mole” 
as “Brav gearbeitet, wackerer Maulwurf,” whilst Marx quotes Hamlet as saying “Brav 
gewühlt, alter Maulwurf!” (86). Marx’s does not  use Schlegel’s current translation – 
“Brav, alter Maulwurf! Wühlst so hurtig fort?” (80). Instead he changes it: “his slight 
alteration makes a past principle (‘gewühlt’) of Schlegel’s present tense verb (‘Wühlst’), 
and moves it from the beginning of the second phrase of Schlegel’s line to the second 
position in the first phrase” (86). Marx’s linguistic subversion of Schlegel, however, is 
also a subversion of Hegel. Harries continues: 
 The mole’s emergence, only potential in Hegel, is fulfilled in Marx. Marx’s 
 alteration of the present tense in Schlegel’s translation into his own past 
 participle is then, in miniature, a way of rehearsing his conception of his own 
 subversive work, his “Wühlerei,” as at once the completion and the overturning 
 of Hegel’s work. (86)
Marx’s “well grubbed, old mole” is not only a quotation of Shakespeare, but also a 
quotation of Hegel, and one that contains a tightly packed parcel of subversive gestures. 
For de Grazia, the mole not only illustrates the burrowing progress of the proletarian 
revolution but textually subverts a Hegelian brand of idealism in favour of Marxist 
materialism (252). For Marx, Shakespeare’s text is not merely an illustration of a 
distinct or separate philosophical point; rather, one part of the philosophical argument is 
made through a performative translation of Shakespeare.
Like Marx, Derrida’s thinking through Shakespeare is dictated by translation. There is, 
however, a significant difference between the way  Derrida and Marx translate and think 
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through Shakespeare. In Marx’s performative translation, to use the powerful image 
suggested in “What is a ‘Relevant’ Translation,” the passion of translation comes to lick 
with a flame his and Hegel’s German, and leaves the idiomatic body of Shakespeare’s 
English intact (175). In contrast, Derrida can only  love and read a text in the manner 
outlined in the previous chapter. Put in terms of the twinned image of Monolingualism, 
in Derrida’s act of reading and translating, Shakespeare’s “penetrating body of enviable, 
formidable, and inaccessible words” are “appropriat[ed], domesticat[ed], coax[ed] 
[amadouer], that is to say, lov[ed] by  setting on fire” (50). Turning to Specters, a text in 
which Derrida countersigns Marx by countersigning Hamlet, a parenthetical insertion of 
a very Shakespearean hérisson – the porpentine – will helps us think about precisely 
how Derrida does this.
6.2 A Shakespearean hérisson
Hamlet’s strange reference to the mole is also noted by Derrida. After reaffirming his 
own inheritance of Marx’s radical critique, Derrida inserts the first seven lines of Yves 
Bonnefoy’s French translation of the Ghost’s speech (“I am thy Father’s Spirit”) to 
Hamlet, and concludes: 
 Every  revenant seems here to come from and return to the earth, to come from it 
 as from a buried clandestinity (humus and mold, tomb and subterranean prison), 
 to return to it as to the lowest, toward the humble, humid, humiliated. We must 
 pass by here, we too, we must pass over in silence, as low as possible to the 
 earth, the return of an animal: not the figure of the old mole (“Well said, old 
 Mole”), nor of a certain hedgehog, but more precisely  of a “fretfull Porpentine” 
 that the spirit of the Father is getting ready to conjure away by removing an 
 “eternal blazon” from “ears of flesh and blood”. (Specters 116–17)
De Grazia argues that Derrida substitutes the “porcupine for the mole,” because the old 
mole “had reached the end of the teleological line” (266). For here the “porcupine exists 
in a post-molean, post-teleological era,” and stands for Derrida’s messianic promise 
(265, 266). De Grazia here incorrectly refers to a porcupine. What is unfortunately lost 
in the English translation is that Derrida opens one of these peepholes, not only when he 
quotes Hamlet, but also later when he shifts the attention away from the mole, via the 
hérisson, not to the porcupine but rather to the porpentine:
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 Il nous faut ici passer, nous aussi, passer sous silence, au plus près de la terre, le 
 retour d’un animal: non pas la figure de la vieille taupe (“Well said, old Mole”), 
 ni d’un certain hérisson, mais plus précisément d’un “inquiet porc-épic” (fretfull 
 Porpentine) que l’esprit de Père alors s’apprête à conjurer, en soustrayant un 
 “éternel blason” aux “oreilles de chair et de sang” (ibid.). (Spectres 154).
As Royle notes in The Uncanny, the “allusion to the mole” is “subsumed or encrypted, 
as it were, within an observation about that ‘fretful porpentine’ (1.5.20) to which the 
Ghost of Hamlet’s father refers” (245). Why does Derrida supplement Yves Bonnefoy’s 
porc-épic but not the “éternel blason” or the “oreilles de chair et de sang”? Is he 
pointing out the untranslatability of this Shakespearean word, “porpentine,” or is he 
remarking on the specificity of the phrase in Shakespeare’s idiom? Perhaps a bit of both. 
But there is more happening in this “taupological ellipsis” than Royle suggests: the 
allusion to the mole is subsumed or encrypted within an observation about that “fretful 
porpentine,” but not  without first mentioning and eliminating, or mentioning while 
eliminating, a certain poematic hedgehog or hérisson (The Uncanny 254). We must stay 
with Derrida’s strange shift from the mole – via the hérisson – to the porpentine in order 
to grasp the different model for imbrication between Shakespeare and literature that 
Derrida is proposing in Specters and elsewhere.
We might almost not have heard this porpentine. The Ghost is indeed conjuring away 
this porpentine by removing his narration from “ears of flesh and blood” (Specters 117). 
Shakespeare’s porpentine is almost silent, almost heard, almost listening and almost 
deaf. Wedged between two lunulae, the porpentine also remains silent, yet  strangely 
eloquent, in Derrida’s text. Here it is only a parenthetical afterthought to the porc-épic, 
which itself is an extension, say a variation, of the hérisson, which, like the mole, is 
named and immediately silenced. The hérisson, Derrida implies, only  has a supporting 
role: it  has already  taken centre stage in “Che cos’è la poesia,” where it helps him think 
about poetry. Derrida also dwelt  on this little poematic animal in an interview with 
Maurizio Ferraris, “Istrice 2: Ich Bünn All Hier.” Although the hérisson is not 
juxtaposed with the mole, porpentine or porc-épic here, as it is in Specters, but with its 
German cousin the Igel, the differentiations and distinctions are also applied by Derrida 
to our porpentine.
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 The hérisson, Derrida stresses, is not related to Schlegel’s prickly  image of the 
artwork. In his Athenaeums Fragmente, Schlegel writes that “a fragment, like a 
miniature work of art, has to be entirely isolated from the surrounding world and be 
complete in itself like a porcupine” or “Igel” (189). Derrida is suspicious of this idea of 
the artwork as complete in itself as a porcupine, because in its fragmentary wholeness 
this Igel always assumes a greater whole, an origin and a truth. Unlike Schlegel’s Igel, 
the hérisson is not part of a different whole or truth, but is only  idiomatic of itself. 
Derrida also makes it clear that his hérisson is not related to the Igel that briefly 
surfaces in Heidegger’s reading of Grimm’s tale “The Hedgehog and the Hare” in “The 
Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics” in Identity and Difference (“Istrice” 
303). Grimm’s tale is a version of the story  of the tortoise and the hare. This time, 
however, the hedgehog, to be sure of victory, sends his female mate to the finishing line. 
From there she is already in a position to turn around to the sprinting and surprised hare 
and declare triumphantly: “I have already been here.” In Heidegger’s reading, the 
ubiquity trick of Mr. and Mrs. Hedgehog speaks of Dasein’s ability to recollect its da 
and fort to a unity and presence, or, as Derrida puts it: “The Da or the Fort-Da of the 
Dasein would belong to this logic of destination that permits one to say, everywhere and 
always, ‘I have always already arrived at the destination’” (304). Yet, the mole’s 
ubiquitas is not as easily collectable into a hic. The Grimms’ Igel, indeed, has 
something of Hamlet’s mole about it: as the “old mole,” it  can be “hic et ubique.” 
Heidegger’s mistake, Derrida continues, lies precisely in this desire to collect Mr. and 
Mrs. Igels’ fort da, a desire that is utterly foreign to the humble little hérisson. To 
answer the question “What is poetry?” posed to him by the Italian journal Poesia in 
November 1988, Derrida chose the figure of the hérisson precisely in order to distance 
poetry  from Heidegger’s conception of Dichtung as a “setting-into-work of truth” (304). 
One of Derrida’s reasons for speaking of poetry through the figure of the hérisson is 
precisely “to remove what I am calling the poem (or the poiemata) from the merry-go-
round or circus that brings them back in a circular fashion to poiein, to their poetic 
source, to the act  or to the experience of their setting-to-work in poetry or 
poetics” (304). As “poematics,” and not as “poetics,” the hérisson remains profoundly 
alien to the setting-to-work of truth: while it is messianic, even eschatological, it is also 
profoundly a-teleological (303). It is, perhaps, teleiopoetic.
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 Derrida’s hérisson is neither Schlegel’s artwork, nor Heidegger’s Dichtung, and 
it is certainly  not an animal.31 Referring to Marx’s three voices, as heard by  Blanchot, 
Derrida asks in Specters: “How is one to receive, how is one to understand a speech, 
how is one to inherit it when it does not let itself be translated from itself into 
itself?” (42). We might ask the same about this Shakespearean shape-shifter, the 
porpentine, which is 
 ... indissolubly linked to the chance of language and of signifiers that play  the 
 role of temporary proper name (first istrice and then its fragile translation into 
 hérisson), come into being via a letter, this “catachrestic” hérisson is barely  a 
 name, it does not bare its name, it plays with syllables, but in any case it is 
 neither a concept nor a thing. (“Istrice” 303)
This “animal” is, Derrida admits, “barely a hedgehog, strictly speaking” (304). The 
word hérisson is indeed soon substituted with the word letter or lettre in French 
(“Istrice” F 321): “I would rather not re-semanticise this letter. It must remain of little 
meaning. Without secret but sealed. It is also better not to stuff polysemic vitamins 
down the throat of a humble little mammal” (“Istrice” 311). Everything rests, I believe, 
on Derrida’s word choice here. In contrast to mot, lettre does not merely indicate 
“word,” but also the sounds, measure, flow, and rhythm of parole, speech, that  cannot 
be linked to only one signification. In view of Derrida’s persistent interest in human and 
non-human animals, this reluctance to speak of the hérisson in terms of animality must 
seem peculiar, especially  since what is at stake is, in Derrida’s own words, “the return of 
an animal” or, as Royle paraphrases, “the ‘massively unavoidable’ question of 
animals” (Specters 117; Uncanny 245). Perhaps a discussion too centred on the figure of 
an animal, even if it  is only  a figure for something else, would be too vulnerable to the 
siren call of Being or Present that this very animal-figure seeks to uproot. Giving the 
figure of the hérisson too much weight, conceding it an importance in itself, would 
perhaps defy the very reason Derrida chooses to talk about poetry  in terms of this 
humble mammal in the first place. As Derrida puts it  in “Istrice,” his hérisson “can 
barely say  ‘Ich’ and certainly not  ‘bünn,’ still less ‘hier’ and ‘da’” (“Istrice” 304). 
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31  This word surfaces only four times in Shakespeare’s works and in none of these instances does it 
actually denote the animal. It appears as a brothel’s name in The Comedy of Errors. In York’s speech in 
King Henry IV Part 2, it emerges as a simile: one man, York claims, fought so long in battle “till that his 
thighs with darts / Were almost like a sharp-quilled porpentine” (3.1.361–2). The porpentine also 
resurfaces in Troilus and Cressida. When addressing Thersites, Ajax exclaims “Do not,  porpentine, do 
not. My fingers itch” (2.1.25).
Derrida’s hérisson consequently  does not gather itself up  into the presence implied by 
the fragment or the “always already there” of Dasein. Like Hamlet’s mole, it 
continuously shifts its ground, it is always hic et ubique, and we, like Hamlet, can 
barely keep up with it.
The ground on which the hérisson constantly shifts is not only ontological, but also 
linguistic. Due to the strange trans-linguistic publication history of this hedgehog of a 
text, the French word hérisson is simultaneously the original to be translated and the 
translation of an “original.” Poesia originally  published Derrida’s French response to 
the question “Che cos’è la poesia?”, along with Ferraris’ Italian translation, in 
November 1988. Before being collected in Elisabeth Weber’s Points de Suspension in 
1992, Derrida’s response was published in the French journal Po&sie in the autumn of 
1989. Although in both these latter cases only the “original” French is given, the Italian 
title remains, and with it the following note:
 Destinée à paraître en italien, cette “réponse”-ci s’expose au passage, 
 parfois littéralement, dans les lettres ou les syllabes, le mot et la chose 
 ISTRICE (prononcer ISTRRITCHÉ), ce qui aura donné, dans une 
 correspondance française, le hérisson. (“Istrice” F 303)
Hérisson is the “correspondance française” of istrice, and although “Che” was first 
published in Italian, istrice is the Italian translation of hérisson. Here as in so many of 
Derrida’s writings we are, to borrow Bennington’s words, “from the first  faced with a 
multiplicity of languages in a situation of reciprocal translation” (“Derridabase” 171). 
Let us stay a while with the different catachrestic word-guises that Derrida’s humble 
little animal assumes in “Che”, “Istrice” and Specters, be it  in Derrida’s original French, 
in Ferrari’s Italian or in Kamuf’s English translation. The first English translation of 
“Che” appears in Peggy Kamuf’s Derrida reader, Between the Blinds, in 1991. Hérisson 
is here translated as “hedgehog.” The hedgehog’s name is the composite of its likely 
dwelling place, a hedge, and its hog-like snout. According to the Oxford Dictionary of 
English Etymology, another English word for the hedgehog is “porcupine,” which is 
related via Middle English porc despyne and the Old French porc d’espine, denoting a 
pig (porc) with spikes (espine), to the French porc-épic. But istrice is, to complicate 
matters further, neither strictly  speaking a correct translation of hérisson, nor vice versa. 
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According to the Dizionario Etimologico Italiano, istrice, coming from the Ancient 
Greek Ystricha (ys for pig and thricha for hair) via the Latin hytricem, is similar to the 
porcupine or porc-épic, although it  seems to be less spiky. The Italian equivalent of 
porcupine would be porcospino. In contrast, the French word hérisson derives from the 
Latin ericius, which though once used to denote the hedgehog, now denotes an 
altogether different animal that in Italian is not called istrice but riccio, or urchin in 
English. It is important to point out that, in contrast to porc-épic, porcupine and 
porcospino, none of those words denoting this animal – hérisson, istrice or hedgehog – 
share an etymological root. 
 On the trail of the hérisson, we have found ourselves catachrestically criss-
crossing linguistic boundaries. Derrida’s insistence on the catachrestic character of the 
hérisson, his insistence on acknowledging again and again that he wrote in French but 
was always exposed to the Italian language, suggests that this criss-crossing of language 
is not an accidental but a fundamental effect of the hérisson. Derrida’s parenthetical 
supplementation of Yves Bonnefoy’s translation porc-épic with Shakespeare’s 
porpentine also bears witness to the fact that, as the poematic hedgehog, the 
porpentine’s catachrestic untranslatability posits an impossible injunction: 
 Promets-le: qu’elle se défigure, transfigure ou indétermine en son port, et tu 
 entendras sous ce mot la rive du départ aussi bien que le référent vers lequel une 
 translation se porte. (‘Che’ 226–8, my emphasis)
 Promise it: let it be disfigured, transfigured or rendered indeterminate in its port 
 – and in this word you will hear the shore of the departure as well as the referent 
 toward which a translation is portered. (227–9, my emphasis)
Like in “Aphorism Countertime,” Derrida is here playing on the verb porter, playing on 
the resonances between ‘bearing a name [porter le nom]’ and ‘being in mourning 
[porter le deuil]’ (418). There is no translating, no reading of Shakespeare without 
hearing this port. We will, for instance, re-encounter this port when, in “Injunctions of 
Marx,” Derrida claims that like différance, “the time is out of joint” does not only  mean 
“deferral” or “lateness.”
 Without  lateness, without delay, but without presence, it is the precipitation of an 
 absolute singularity because differing, precisely [justement], and always other, 
 binding itself necessarily to the form of the instant, in imminence and in 
 urgency: even if it  moves toward what remains to come, there is the pledge 
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 [gage] (promise, engagement, injunction and response to the injunction, and so 
 forth) [même s'il se porte vers ce qui reste à venir, il y a le gage (promesse, 
 engagement, injonction et réponse à l'injonction, etc.)].The pledge is given here 
 and now, even before, perhaps, a decision confirms it. It thus responds without 
 delay to the demand of justice. (Spectres 37 / Spectres 60)                                                 
There will be no justice, no “to come,” without hearing this port. In “Che,” Derrida’s 
translator Kamuf renders the verb porte with “portered” but leaves port untranslated and 
italicised. Port is a homophone. Le port (in French the t  is silent), or “the port,” denotes 
a haven or a harbour, also indicated in “the shore of departure” of translation. Deriving 
via the Middle and Old French from the post-classical Latin portus, this word also 
reverberates with the idea of portare, meaning in both Latin and Italian to bring, carry 
or bear. The impossible injunction of the por(t)pentine has to do with this port, this 
lettre that I cannot help but hear in its name. This impossible injunction to the 
translation of the poematic porpentine is therefore also inscribed in the ear. On the high 
sea of translation, Derrida seems to say, your compass and navigation will be your ears, 
with which you will listen for your shore of departure (the “original” text or word) and 
the shore towards which you are navigating.
 When threatened with translation, the porpentine, like the hérisson, becomes 
prickly. Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor note that porpentine means porcupine, 
parenthetically adding that “porpentine is Shakespeare’s usual form” (212). To our ears, 
however, there seems to be nothing usual about porpentine. The origins of the word 
porpentine are, according to the Oxford Dictionary Of English Etymology, obscure. 
Although today this word is used solely  as a Shakespearean quotation, Shakespeare did 
not invent this word. Skeat’s Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, for 
instance, notes this version of “porcupine” in Roger Ascham’s Toxophilus (1545). Like 
porcupine, the Early Modern English word porpentine derives from the Middle French 
porc despyne, borrowed from the Old French porc espin or porc d’espine (literally, pig 
of spines), a compound of Latin porcus and spina (Onion 697). I find myself wondering 
about the bi-furcated evolution of the Old French porc-espin, leading to two English 
words denoting the same thing: porcupine and porpentine. According to Skeat, there are 
two possible roots of this word. The earliest  trace can be found in Promptorium 
Parvulorum sive Clericorum Dictionarius Anglo-Latinus Princeps (1440), which lists 
144
“Poork-poynt, porpoynte, perpoynt, beste, Histrix”. The second trace can be found in 
Palsgrave’s Lesclaircissement de la Langue Francoyse (1530), which links “Porkepyn, a 
beest” to “porc espin.” The last trace is to be found in Huloet’s Abecedarium Anglo-
Latinum (1552) which defines something called “Porpyn” as a “beaste, havinge prickes 
on his backe.” Having listed these etymological traces, Skeat concludes that “the animal 
had two very  similar names, (1) ‘porkepyn, shortly porpin, easily lengthened to porpint 
by the usual excrescent t after n, and finally  altered to porpentine as a by-form of 
porkepyn’; and (2) pork-point, porpoint; the latter of which forms would also readily 
yield porpentine.” How either porkepyn or pork-point or porpoint could have “readily” 
yielded porpentine, how this quintessentially English version of a French porc-épic 
shuffled vowels and syllables, shed a c, acquired a t and the suffix -ine remains quite 
enigmatic. Perhaps it was a mere slip  of the tongue or swallowing of the ear that  turned 
the spiky  animal into a port-épic, something that bears spikes only  to immediately  add 
the suffix -ine, denoting again the bearing of a particular characteristic. Thus the 
porcupine has become the porpentine; the animal has become a name that does nothing 
but name, a pure signifier that defies translation.
 J. Hillis Miller has spoken of the hedgehog’s catachresis as “what is idiomatic 
about each literary work” (On Literature 34). The idiomatic is, in other words, defined 
as the impossibility of the idiomatic or rather the acceptance that the idiomatic consists 
merely of “the coincidence of its meaning and the materiality of its letters” (34). If in 
Specters Derrida prefers to speak of the porpentine rather than of a certain hérisson, it is 
because this peculiar and quintessentially English word porpentine transposes what 
Derrida has said about the hérisson into the materiality of Shakespeare’s idiom. It is 
almost as if through the parenthetical supplementation “porc-épic (‘fretfull 
Porpentine’),” Derrida’s encounter with the hérisson’s catachrestic nature was 
transposed to his reading of Shakespeare, his irreducible, untranslatable and haunting 
signature. From now on we can call the Shakespearean poem porpentine:
 You will call poem from now on a certain passion of the singular mark, the 
 signature that repeats its dispersion, each time beyond the logos, a-human, 
 barely domestic, not reappropriable into the family  of the subject: a converted 
 animal, rolled up  in a ball, turned toward the other and toward itself, in sum, a 
 thing – modest, discreet, close to the earth, the humility  that you surname 
 [l’humilité que tu surnommes], thus transporting yourself in the name beyond a 
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 name, a catachrestic hérisson, its arrows held at the ready [toutes flèches 
 dehors], when this ageless blind thing hears but does not see death coming. 
 (“Che” 235) 
In “Che,” we suddenly find ourselves in the vicinity  of Hamlet and Specters – back to 
the humus, to the mole and to the revenant. Only here it is not Shakespeare that shoots 
arrows, but the hérisson. Or perhaps it  is Shakespeare after all, only  in the guise of the 
hérisson or porpentine. Like the hérisson’s, the porpentine’s poetry is a-human, it is also 
not an animal, nor enveloped in the logos. It explodes into hic et ubique and transports 
us in the name beyond a name, the pure catachresis of port-pentine. This “demon of the 
heart,” Derrida writes, “never gathers itself together … it would rather let itself be torn 
to pieces by what bears down upon it” (“Che” 235). Waiting for us in the Ghost’s 
speech, it is a “converted animal, rolled up in a ball, turned toward the other and toward 
itself” (235). The Folio and the First Quarto read “fretful” rather than “fearful” (5.15). 
We no longer know whether the porpentine is afraid, or whether it is itself fearsome; are 
the quills raised in attack or in defence? Is this animal, which the Elizabethans believed 
to be aggressive and dangerous and which was said to “shoot its quills out like darts,” 
about to attack or to flee (Hamlet 212)? In wounding the other, this autoimmune lettre, 
wounds itself.
The points of the istrice/hérisson/porpentine have, Kamuf writes, “been sharpened on a 
‘passion of the singular mark’” (Addresses 207). And this passion also belongs to “the 
signature that repeats its dispersion” (“Che” 235). As I have tried to show in the 
previous chapter, the singularity of the Shakespearean oeuvre depends precisely on its 
dispersal. As Derrida suggests in “A ‘Madness’ Must Watch Over Thinking,” “there is 
singularity but ... it ‘consists’ in not collecting itself” (354). The hérisson/ istrice/
porpentine has invited us to think of this disseminating effect in terms of an idiom 
which is never present to itself. Idiom is, as suggested in “Fidelité à plus d’un”, “never 
proper or the proper identity of oneself [à soi du propre], it is already  different from 
itself, it is only of difference” (224).32  The idiom to be responded to, to be 
countersigned is always plus d’un, it is more than and no more one language. In leaving 
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32  I am using Oisín Keohane’s translation, printed in “Tongue-tied Democracy: The Bind of National 
Language in Tocqueville and Derrida.” Derrida Today. 4.2(2011): 233-256. p. 252.
the Shakespearean idiom – porpentine – intact in parenthesis, Derrida gives change to 
what Kamuf calls “the work of translation between languages and idioms: the chance of 
pluralisation of another language” (Addresses 219). What we are dealing with is what 
“Shibboleth” calls “Babel within a single language” (28-9). When reading Shakespeare 
we must, therefore, following Derrida, be faithful to a language which is (no) more than 
one. For Cixous, “the very operation of deconstruction ... consists in speaking in more 
than one language within one single language, like Shakespeare”  (“Ghosting”  4). 
Speaking, and allowing to be spoken to, in more than one language would entail the 
openness of the teleiopoetic trajectory in all its responsiveness to the other. It would 
also involve what Kamuf calls “the sense, perhaps, of a vigil and vigilance, the sense of 
being on watch for the passing of the singular other” (Addresses 281, my emphasis). At 
the same time, speaking in more than one language would also have to mean keeping 
watch over how this idiom finds itself in other languages. Let us therefore keep watch 
through one of these meurtrières, these loving and murderous peepholes, to see how 
Derrida translates Shakespeare’s idiom by loving his lettre and by allowing it  to haunt 
him even in texts that are not written in close proximity to Shakespeare.
6.3 Peepholes (meurtrières)
Shakespeare keeps watch over Derrida’s French through meurtrières, or peepholes. In 
Kamuf’s translation, there is no trace of the death trap, the murderess, of death, love and 
violence. “Peepholes” drowns out the passionate, bloodier facets of this word, 
reinforcing instead the image’s visual valence. Thus, the long slit  through which 
watchmen might shoot arrows at approaching enemies turns into the hole we might look 
through before opening our door to a stranger. But for everything that is lost in a good 
translation, something is won; in “peepholes,” for instance, we may find traces of a 
vigilance “for the passing of the singular other” (Addresses 281).
 In Derrida’s text, we may find visual traces of these round peepholes in the 
parentheses that frame Derrida’s insertions of Shakespeare’s English. In Specters 
Shakespeare’s porpentine watches over Derrida’s philosophy through peepholes: 
“‘inquiet porc-épic’ (fretfull Porpentine)” (Spectres 154). At the beginning of “What is a 
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‘Relevant’ Translation?,” however, the peeping is reversed. Here Derrida’s French is 
keeping watch over Shakespeare’s English. Perhaps matters are even more complicated. 
If, like me, you read Derrida in English first, we are peeping in on Derrida’s French 
through Lawrence Venuti’s English. Venuti, in another loop it  seems, has written about 
the impossibilities of translating Derrida on translating Shakespeare: “Then must the 
Jew be merciful (Je ne traduis pas cette phrase de Portia dans Le Merchand de 
Venise.)” (“Relevante” 21) or “Then must the Jew be merciful. (I leave untranslated this 
sentence from Portia in The Merchant of Venice.)” (“Relevant” 174). For Royle, “What 
is a ‘Relevant’ Translation” shows that translating peepholes are translating loopholes 
(In Memory 3). They are a fertile ambiguity by  which the translator can twist tongues; 
they  are the phrase or word that again and again throw the translator for a loop. Je ne 
traduis pas: leaving untranslated does not mean not to translate something. It hints at 
the fact that, as Derrida puts it elsewhere, “the idiom is untranslatable, ultimately, even 
if we translate it” (“Un-Sealing” 181). Here, je ne traduis pas therefore has to be 
understood in terms of leaving the idiom, that which cannot be translated, to work. 
Looping peepholes show that translation never only happens between two languages. 
Translation – whether it  be Venuti’s of Derrida, or Derrida’s of Shakespeare, or indeed 
Marx’s or Hegel’s – always criss-crosses between languages which are always more 
than one (plus d’un). I believe that the untranslatable Shakespearean idiom must be 
understood precisely in terms of such an un-collectability, precisely in terms of the 
porpentine’s wound(ing)/(ed) flèches.
 In all of his writing Derrida is aware of the impossible task of the translator. 
However, he gives his clearest description of it when, in 1998, he addresses the annual 
seminar of the Assises de la Traduction Littéraire à Arles, an organisation dedicated to 
promoting literary translation. Derrida’s address, later to be published as “Qu’est-ce 
qu’une Traduction ‘Relevante’?,” is a crucial moment in Derrida’s work on 
Shakespeare. This has less to do with the fact that he gives us a glimpse into how he 
translates him (to some extent all his texts on Shakespeare do), than with his contention 
that The Merchant of Venice tells us something about translation. In other words, “What 
is a ‘Relevant’ Translation?” is not only  concerned with how Derrida translates 
Shakespeare, but  also with how The Merchant of Venice, more particularly Shylock’s 
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fate, illustrates the impossible task of the translator. Derrida swiftly sets the scene. We 
are at the court  of the Duke of Venice. Shylock refuses Bassanio’s offer of double the 
amount of the original loan and insists on his pound of flesh (4.1.84-7). Portia, 
disguised as Balthazar, tries a different tactic: “Then must  the Jew be 
merciful” (4.1.178). What follows is Portia’s Christian interpretation of the concept of 
mercy, which equates mercy  with supreme power. What does our translator do with 
Portia’s “when mercy seasons justice?” After citing it in English, Derrida “translate[s] 
or rather paraphrase[s] it step by step,” suggesting we substitute Victor Hugo’s 
translation of “to season” as “tempère” with another translation that “will not respond 
to the name translation” and that will work outside the economics of translation (191, 
194): “Je tradurai donc seasons par ‘relève’: ‘when mercy seasons justice’, quand le 
pardon relève la justice (ou le droit)” (“Relevante” 42). Or as Venuti has it: “I shall 
therefore translate ‘seasons’ as ‘relève’: ‘when mercy seasons justice’, ‘quand le pardon 
relève la justice (ou le droit)’ [when mercy elevates and interiorizes, thereby preserving 
and negating, justice (or the law)]” (“Relevant” 195). As Bennington observes, like the 
translation of Hamlet’s “the time is out of joint,” here “the translations are themselves ... 
out of joint” (Interrupting 135). And this out-of-jointness of every translation “is of 
course rendered even more serious when Derrida’s work is translated back into English” 
as in this case (135). Like the porpentine, these translations (and translations of 
translations) “in their irreducible inadequacy  can only  aggravate or confirm the 
inaccessibility  of the other language” (135). Yet Derrida’s philosophical-literary practice 
rests on this inaccessibility of language, the fact that language will always remain 
irreducibly plus d’un.
Between translations, italics shift and peepholes (loopholes, meurtrières) are 
added. The words – to season and relève – consume each other in their idiomatic 
singularity, cutting and burning each other, like amorous murderesses. The translator 
has sworn his fidelity to Shakespeare, and keeps his word. Relever, of course, means to 
season. Furthermore it “effectively  preserves the gustatory  code and the culinary 
reference of to season, ‘assaisonner’: to season with spice, to spice” (195).
It is a question of giving taste, a different taste that is blended with the first taste, 
now dulled, remaining the same while altering it, while changing it, while 
undoubtedly removing something of its native, original, idiomatic taste, but also 
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while adding to it, and in the very process, more taste, while cultivating its 
natural taste, while giving it still more of its own taste, its own, natural flavour – 
this is what we call “relever” in French cooking. (195)
This gustatory or culinary  resonance captures the emulsion of justice and mercy Portia 
is after well. The second justification for this translation is that “relever” effectively 
expresses elevation (195). Justice is not only  qualified or “exalted” by mercy, mercy 
also “pulls and inspires justice toward highness” (195). In short, “mercy sublimates 
justice” (196). Derrida’s will therefore have been a relevant translation if it allows the 
idiomatic plus d’un to resonate, in the sense that it will have offered the “most 
economic” solution, allowing the use of “a single word to translate so many other 
words, even languages, with their denotation and connotations” (198). A translation for 
Derrida, however, needs to do more. It  needs to change itself and the other, it needs to 
season and to elevate: it needs to be “relevant.”
 In this cross-fertilisation of texts, Shylock’s oath comes to stand for the 
impossible task of the translator and of the reader of Shakespeare; what it demands is an 
impossible fidelity, impossible because it cannot be fulfilled without some wounding, 
the cutting of a pound of flesh closest to the heart. Like Shylock’s oath, translation 
demands to cut close to the heart of the idiom, but knows that this is impossible without 
breaking the oath. The bond of fidelity demands that the body of the word is cut open, 
and that it remain intact. Translation, like reading, has to engulf, love with a passion, 
“consume,” it  has to “arous[e] ... desire for the idiom,” whilst still leaving the “unique 
body of the other” “intact” (175). The idiom signs and wounds: “is only in the body of 
its idiomatic singularity  … where a passion for translation comes to lick it as a flame or 
an amorous tongue might” (175). What the translation between “the pound of flesh and 
money” highlights, therefore, is precisely  the “required but impractical translation 
between the unique literalness of a proper body and the arbitrariness of a general, 
monetary, or fiduciary sign” (184). Put simply, Shylock’s oath reaffirms the “law that 
presides over translation while commanding absolute respect, without any transaction, 
for the word given in its original letter [lettre]” (185). 
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In “Shakespeare Ghosting Derrida,” Cixous writes that “Derrida loves in French 
Shakespeare’s English. His dream is to take Shakespeare at his English word” (4). What 
would this mean to take Shakespeare at his English word? It may mean to listen beyond 
its meaning to the way it is posed or uttered in English. This would entail 
“simultaneously subjecting the word, the subject, love to its condition as a French 
word” (“Ghosting” 3). Loving Shakespeare’s English in French would perhaps mean 
transporting the Shakespearean idiom into French according to a movement in tr. that 
exceeds translation. For Cixous, Derrida indeed “declares his passion first to the word, 
au mot – to the ‘homoword’ [au mot homo], to the word with homonymic resources, 
which plays in and with itself, by itself, pivots, blinks so well that it  always eludes the 
claws of the desire to translate, and does not let  itself be clawed (back)” (“Ghosting” 3). 
What Cixous calls “au mot homo” here captures beautifully what I have been trying to 
think about it  in terms of the catachrestic porpentine. Like the porpentine, the 
“homoword” resists simple translation because some of its sound always remains to 
haunt its translation. A “homophonic or homonymic effect,” cannot be rendered by linear 
translation, it  rather demands to be rendered “‘one word by one word’,” in other words 
in and by its singular idiomatic body (“Relevant” 181). In “Translating Derrida on 
Translation,” Venuti argues that a homophonic and plurivocal reverberation can be 
heard in this “untranslatable” word “relevant,” which sounds the same as the French 
“relevante”; thus, this word “may be French and therefore translatable into English, or 
English yet undergoing assimilation into French and therefore resistant to 
translation” (240). This Shakespearean word resists translation, because its “unity” is 
“questionable,” because its “signifier potentially  contains more than one word insofar as 
it produces a homophonic or homonymic effect” (240). This word, Venuti continues, 
“derails the translation process” because it resists a conception of language that is not 
plurivocal (240). As the intertextual echoes of this word ‘relevant’ indeed suggest, what 
escapes Derrida’s translation and what simultaneously  haunts his translations beyond 
Shakespeare is precisely “the acoustic form that incorporates or signifies the indivisible 
unity of a meaning or concept” (“Relevant” 181).
 Derrida claims that the English word “relevant,” which kicked off his criss-
crossing translations, is a Shakespearean word (183). This is strictly speaking not true; 
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the word “relevant” never appears in the Shakespearean corpus, including The Merchant 
of Venice. What then makes this word Shakespearean for Derrida? For this answer and 
for the third justification for Derrida’s “translation” we must return to Derrida’s reading 
of Hegel:
 In 1967, to translate a crucial German word with a double meaning (Aufheben, 
 Aufhebung), a word that signifies at once to suppress and to elevate, a word that 
 Hegel says represents the speculative risk of the German language, and that the 
 entire world had until then agreed was untranslatable – or, if you prefer, a word 
 for which no one had agreed with anyone on a stable, satisfying translation into 
 any language – for this word, I had proposed the noun relève and the verb 
 relever. This allowed me to retain, joining them in a single word, the double 
 motif of the elevation and the replacement that  preserves what it denies or 
 destroys, preserving what it causes to disappear, quite like – in a perfect example 
 – what is called in the armed forces, in the navy, say, the relief (relève) of the 
 guard. This usage is also possible in English, to relieve. (196)
Again, Hegel is part of this theatre of spectres. The reason why Derrida translates “to 
season” with “relever” is that he had translated Hegel’s untranslatable Aufhebung with 
relève. “Relevant” and “to relieve” (as well as the noun “relief”) derive from the Latin 
relevare, meaning “to raise again, or to alleviate.” The word “relief” does appear in The 
Merchant of Venice (3.4.6). I would like to argue, however, that it is another frequency 
of this word which is haunting Derrida’s translation of Hegel, and in turn his Hegelian 
translation of Shakespeare. Derrida’s translation of Aufhebung as relève resonates with 
“what is called in the armed forces, in the navy say, the relief (relève) of the 
guard” (196). 
 Although Derrida is thinking about a frequency of this word in Joseph Conrad’s 
“The Secret Sharer,” like Marx he also seems to “evoke or convoke, right from the start, 
the first coming of the silent ghost, the apparition of the ghost that does not answer, on 
those ramparts of Elsinore” (Specters 11).33 Hamlet and its thematisation of mourning, 
inheritance and debt is also at work in the subtext of Derrida’s further elaboration of his 
word choice: “by elevating the signifier to its meaning or value, all the while preserving 
the mournful and debt-laden memory of the singular body, the first body, the unique 
body that the translation thus elevates, preserves, and negates [relève]” (“Relevant” 
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33  This must be the passage from “The Secret Sharer” he was thinking of: “My double followed my 
movements; our bare feet made no sound; I let him in, closed the door with care and after giving call to 
the second mate returned on deck to wait for my relief” (90).
199). Through this one-word peephole we are thus transported back to the beginning of 
Hamlet when one watchman asks the other: “For this relief much thanks” (1.1 6) or 
“Who hath relieved you?” (1.1.15). The ghosting is always reciprocal: before the French 
translation of Hegelian Aufhebung prompted a translation for Shakespeare’s English, 
Shakespeare’s English had already  haunted Derrida’s translation of Hegel. What 
Derrida’s translation of Shakespeare’s “to season” and Aufhebung with relève shows is 
that Shakespeare not only watches over the English language, but also over Marx’s and 
Hegel’s German, and even Derrida’s “native” French. The peepholes of Shakespeare’s 
catachrestic language do not only allow him to shoot flèches at the (English) language, 
but also allow language, in the form of other translators and other readers, to penetrate 
the body of his work.34 Moreover, they show that this haunting can also be a function of 
a phonic resonance: relève, relief, relevant, revenant. 
 Meurtrières are therefore not only for looking, but also for listening. We might 
say that Derrida reads Shakespeare through peepholes: not only  through a phrase or a 
word, but also through a lettre or syllabe, and with the help of his ears. When Derrida 
therefore says that “relevant” “carries in its body  an ongoing process of translation” 
criss-crossing between European languages, between French, German and English in a 
way that does not really  equal “strictu senso a translation,” he is pointing towards the 
actual body or sound of the word (“Relevant” 177). In “What is a ‘Relevant’ 
Translation” he writes: “Ce mot [“relevant”] n’est pas seulement en traduction, comme 
on dirait en travail ou en voyage, traveling, travailing, dans un labeur, un labour 
d’accouchement” (“Relevante” 24). Here Derrida’s string of thoughts seems to be 
propelled by alliteration and homophonic similarities. Traduction is not only  a travail, 
but since the French “ai” in travailing sounds like the English “e” in traveling, 
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34  In Derrida’s hands, the effects of the catachrestic porpentine thus exceed the strict context of one 
discourse or one language. This is nowhere clearer than in “My Chances” where Derrida concludes his 
analysis of the nature of the psychoanalytic discourse by referring to the conclusion of “Leonardo da 
Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood”.  There Freud is citing “da Vinci foreshadowing Shakespeare, or 
rather the son, Hamlet: ‘La natura è piena d’infinite ragioni che non furono mai in isperienza,’ instead of 
‘There are more things in heaven and earth Horatio / Than are dreamt of in your philosophy”’ (373-4). 
Derrida’s parenthetical and enigmatic insertion of King Lear in that same text also merits further 
consideration. This typically Derridean ellipsis opens peepholes not only on to King Lear’s many 
references to nature and fortunes,  and how they are enriched by all the movements in jet – whether these 
be letters or astral precipitations – but also on to The Merchant of Venice and thus also to Derrida’s “What 
is a ‘Relevant’ Translation.” For more on the relationship between chance and literature in Freud and ‘My 
Chances,’ refer to my article “Freud’s Cadence: Taking Chances with Julius Caesar” Mosaic.  44.4 (2011): 
63-78.
translation is also travel, a voyage. This attention to sounds is also represents the 
difficulty in translating Derrida. For instance, trouvaille is not translated with “windfall” 
or “lucky break,” but with “treasure trove”. Venuti chose this word, so he says, to render 
the “alliterative series” of the “consonant cluster ‘tr’” (253). Another ear-led translation 
is Venuti’s rendering of the French “travail” and “travailler” with the archaic “travail,” 
rather than “work.” A “relevant(e)” translation would therefore be travail of ears. What 
we are dealing with here is therefore not translation, but another action or actions 
beginning in tr, an action that we can also hear in meurtrières:
 I am not sure that this transaction, even if it is the most economic possible, merits 
 the name of translation, in the strict and pure sense of this word. It rather seems 
 one of those other things in tr., a transaction, transformation, travail, travel – and a 
 treasure trove [trouvaille] (since this invention, if it also seemed to take up  
 [relever] a challenge, as another saying goes, consisted only in discovering what 
 was waiting, or in waking what was sleeping, in language). The treasure trove 
 amounts to a travail; it puts to work the languages, first of all, without adequation 
 or transparency, here assuming the shape of a new writing or rewriting that is 
 performative or poetic, not only in French, where a new use of the word emerges, 
 but also in German and English. (“Relevant” 198)
Derrida’s radical rethinking of translation hinges on this idea of translation as a 
movement in tr., a movement that inaugurates a new performative and poetic writing 
that transcends linguistic borders, an understanding of the poematic as an istrice/
hérisson/porpentine.
As in Hegel’s or Marx’s translation of Shakespeare, in Derrida’s translation of Hegel 
something more than citation or translation in the usual sense occurs: something is 
done, something is performed. The importance of the ear and sound in Derrida’s acts of 
reading also show how he exceeds Nussbaum’s criteria. In forging its very  own 
idiomatic and phonetic body of words from Shakespeare’s Derridean translation is 
responsive to the materiality of the Shakespearean lettre. I have proposed the 
porpentine, this catachrestic lettre, to show how the untranslatable Shakespearean idiom 
watches over some of Derrida’s texts. Although the porpentine is a strong visual image, 
it is introduced in response to an act of listening that  is both actual and hypothetical. We 
encounter this porpentine in the ghost’s speech. The ghost, so it tells Hamlet, is 
“doomed for a certain term to walk the night,” until its “foul crimes” are “burnt and 
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purged away” in Purgatory  (1.5.10–13). The ghost continues with a narration that 
resembles an apophasis, a narration that, in short, is more like a infolding than an 
unfolding. It is perhaps what Royle calls a “strange occupatio – saying without saying, 
marking by  not marking, remaining by disappearing, the strangest folding-unfolding of 
all: signature or blazon in abyss” (After Derrida 98). Indeed, in the First Quarto this 
speech is introduced by “Nay, pity  me not, but to my unfolding / Lend thy listening 
ear” (5.7–8).
 GHOST:  But that I am forbid
    To tell the secrets of my prison-house
    I could a tale unfold whose lightest word
    Would harrow up thy soul, freeze thy young blood,
    Make thy two eyes like stars start from their spheres,
    Thy knotted and combined locks to part
    And each particular hair to stand on end
    Like quills upon the fearful porpentine –
    But this eternal blazon must not be
    To ears of flesh and blood. List, list, O list,
    If thou didst ever thy dear father love –
 HAMLET:  O God!
(1.5.13–24)
It is just as the Ghost envelopes the horrors of his prison house that  the porpentine 
makes its appearance. Listen, the Ghost says, my story is not for your ears. But if ears of 
flesh and blood could hear my tale, you would be so terrified that your blood would 
freeze, your eyes would bulge and your hair would stick out like the quills of a 
porpentine. Its quills are raised in dreaded expectation of what it might hear. It is 
through this “listening,” through a meddling with sound that transcends linguistic 
borders, that  this creature porters translation. When commenting on the fundamentally 
catachrestic nature of the hérisson in the first  French “monolingual” publication, 
Derrida insists that it  is always exposing itself to the letters and syllables of the word 
and the thing istrice. As Derrida’s parenthetic direction on how a Frenchman would 
pronounce istrice suggests, hérisson is always listening and exposing itself to the 
sounds of ISTRRITCHÉ. In this context, the str-sound that Kamuf stresses in the 
margin of her translation is not only  expressive of “the distress of the beast caught  in the 
strictures of translation”, it  also echoes i-str-ice, the hedgehog’s unavoidable 
catachrestic shadow (“Che” 223). This little hedgehog is, as its Shakespearean relative, 
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“un seul trajet à plusieurs voies” or “a single trek with several tracks” or voices (226, 
227). Both seemingly “come into being via a letter,” both seemingly “play with 
syllables” (“Istrice” 303). When the “arrows” of this little porpentine “are held at  the 
ready”, we must listen and expose ourselves to the pricks, spines or quills that it shoots 
at Derrida, and at us (“Che” 235). 
By following the traces of the porpentine, I have tried to show that in order to 
understand what Shakespeare does in Derrida’s texts we must listen. As far as I know, 
only three critics do this. When Royle listens to the Ghost’s first speech to Hamlet, he 
hears how all the wounds of “e(a)r(e)” weave themselves through these passages right 
to “the critical injunction to ‘Remember’ and to the final repetitions of ‘Swear’” (After 
99). In “A New International, Or What You Will…” Sarah Wood, similarly, asks us to 
listen to Shakespeare’s “ill-adjusted” and “lyric” English: “And what should I do in 
Illyria? / My bother he is in Elysium” (147). Here on the sea of Shakespeare’s English, 
Wood is asking us to “take our bearings from the syllables of the Captain’s phrase”, and 
to become “a bit deliriously  musical” (148). We are also invited to listen differently: 
how the letters in the names of Olivia, Viola, Malvolio “discretely read each other, 
fragment and reassemble each other” (148). Wood: “the interplay  of the letters of their 
names reminds us of the emergence of a mark, the possibility of meaning that cannot be 
exclusively  recruited in the service of a given meaning” (149). As I will argue in the 
next chapter, however, Kamuf’s reading of Othello in “The Ear, Who?,” suggests that 
when pricking our ears we should not only heed the catachrestic travel of sounds and 
syllables, but something beyond that, something altogether more difficult to listen to. 
Though the porpentine’s arrows may be started by sound, the wound they leave is also 
“aphonic” (“Che” 233). When thinking about how Derrida sounds out Shakespeare, we 
must therefore also prick up our philosophical ears to the “aphonic spacing” of silent 
genius.
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7. Génie qui es tu
Shortly after wondering about how Hamlet’s “the time is out of joint” disjoints its 
translations, Derrida speaks of it as “a masterpiece, a work of genius, a thing of the 
spirit which precisely seems to engineer itself [s’ingénier]” (Specters 20). With the play 
on génie and s’ingénier, Derrida is claiming that the genius of Shakespeare has to do 
with the ability  of Shakespeare’s writing to engineer itself, to put  itself to work through 
his words (20). Here Shakespeare’s work itself and not Shakespeare the man (whoever 
he was) has becomes the masterwork, the genius, “the thing, the Thing that, like an 
elusive specter, engineers [s’ingénie] a habitation without proper inhabiting, call it a 
haunting, of both memory and translation” (20). The oeuvre we call Shakespeare’s is 
animated, the words are animated, they engineer themselves, they themselves are 
thinking, are having ideas, are constructing. As Royle argues in How to Read 
Shakespeare, “words in Shakespeare seem to take on an autonomous life or machine-
like power. They are like little search engines, meddling imps, strange creatures with 
wills of their own” (5). Yet unlike Cavell’s imp, the porpentine’s meddling with sound is 
not disruptive (Quest 125). Shakespeare’s “stroke of genius” is based precisely  on this 
meddling capacity (Specters 25).
 Perhaps, as Derrida suggests in Politics of Friendship, all we have to do to grasp 
this “stroke of genius” – which in my ear seems to echo with the “same unprecedented 
stroke of some arrow” discussed in Chapter 5 – is to listen (20): 
 Infinite or nil speed, absolute economy, for the arrow carries its address along 
 and implied in advance, in its very readability, the signature of the addressee. 
 This is tantamount to  saying that it withdraws from space  by penetrating it. You 
 have only to listen. It advances backwards; it outruns itself by reversing itself. 
 (“Aphorism” 32, my emphasis) 
Sound is important in Derrida’s acts of reading Shakespeare, but here sound is to be 
understood both actual ly  and, to ant ic ipate one of Cixous’ terms, 
“philosophonically” (Armel 6). Like Cavell, although less markedly  so, Derrida uses 
musical analogies to describe the effects of Shakespearean drama. “Aphorism 
Countertime,” for instance, plays on the double meaning of contretemps, which, in 
French, can also mean “syncopation” or being “out of time” (414, 416). Romeo and 
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Juliet and Romeo and Juliet are, therefore, out of time in more than one way. No love, 
of either man or text, then, without syncopation, without the missing beat of a rhythm. 
A similarly aural vocable resonates in Derrida’s affirmation that there would have been 
neither Romeo and Juliet’s love, nor its theatre, without the “discordance” of 
contretemps (“L’aphorisme” 134). In French, just as in English, discordance means both 
difference and conflict, as well as musical discord, understood as a “lack of harmony 
between notes sounding together,” or “a chord which is regarded as displeasing or 
requiring resolution by another,” more specifically “any  interval except unison, an 
octave, a perfect  fifth or fourth, a major or minor third and sixth, or their 
octaves” (OED). Yet, this musical analogy  is aiming at something very different than 
that which underlies Cavell’s comparison of Shakespearean drama to Beethoven, and 
the kind of response – the act of reading/listening – it requires from the reader is very 
different.
 Derrida’s relationship  to music is complex.35 In “The Spatial Arts”, an interview 
with Peter Brunette and David Wills, Derrida admits to his love for words, his way of 
making them “explode so that the nonverbal appears in the verbal,” that is to say his 
way of using words so “that at a certain moment they no longer belong to discourse, to 
what regulates discourse – hence the homonyms, the fragmented words, the proper 
names that do not essentially belong to language” (20). Indeed, what Derrida loves 
about words is “their ability to escape their proper form ... letters representing the 
spatial visibility of the word, or as something musical or audible” (20). Whilst Derrida’s 
“breath” is rarely “taken away” “by  the beauty of pictorial or architectural works ... this 
does sometimes happen with music or when [he] hear[s] the spoken word or read texts – 
by listening to the voice, that is’”(23). What takes Derrida’s breath away is thus “what 
works through the voice as desire [ce qui dans le désir travaille le voix]” (23). “Music” 
is, Derrida confesses, “the object of [his] strongest desire,” perhaps not in spite of, but 
because of the fact that he does not have “any  truly presentable musical culture” (21). 
As Marcel Cobussen remarks in his Ph.D. dissertation, “Deconstruction in 
Music” (2002), Derrida is concerned with “the idea that texts, either spoken or written, 
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35  For the controversies between deconstruction and musicology,  see Christopher Norris “Music 
Theory, Analysis and Deconstruction: How They Might (Just) Get along Together.” International 
Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music. 36.1 (June 2005): 37-82.
are marked by a certain (non-sonorous) tone, or better, a multitude of (non-sonorous) 
tones”.36 As Cobussen points out, this does not mean that he “pay[s] no attention to 
sonority, sound, music.” As we have seen, homophones or the reverberations of syllabes 
and lettres are a crucial part of Derrida’s acts of reading. Cobussen: “his play with 
words, his fascination for the materiality of words, the working of dissemination is 
certainly also influenced by  their sounds, their audibility.” Cobussen’s entire project is a 
fascinating and important one. We must focus in particular on what he calls “a multitude 
of (non-sonorous) tones,” which, despite its lack of actual sonority of sound, is an 
intrinsic part of the kind of sonority Derrida is interested in. 
 Derrida’s love for words is thus related to what in “The Spatial Arts” he calls his 
“paralysed” desire for music; it is a desire not for music as an independent art form, but 
rather for something music-like that he recognises in the “nondiscursive sonority” of 
words (21). The porpentine – the figure through which, in the last chapter, we thought 
about what role Shakespeare’s English plays in Derrida’s French – is itself – though it 
opens up the questions of the role of sound in inter- and intratextual translation and 
reading – silent. Indeed, in Hamlet, the porpentine does not actually hear; rather, it 
trembles for fear of hearing. In Derrida’s text, too, the hérisson/porpentine, as already 
noted, balances on the edge of hearing. Like Hamlet’s porpentine, the hérisson is “a 
silent incantation,” an “aphonic wound” (“Che” 233). The hérisson, Derrida writes in 
“Che,” is blind but listens for death’s arrival. Death is in earshot, but these things are 
not for “ears of flesh and blood” to hear. Our porpentine is not listening, not yet, or not 
actually. Whilst  in Cavell, the musical analogy between Beethoven and Shakespeare is 
justified by the fact that both represent constant presentness, in Derrida the musical 
analogy does not aim at presentness, however momentary it may  be, but rather at an 
absence: not something that creates sound, but something that lets the other’s sound 
resonate.
I would like to argue that, like Cavell, Derrida’s concern with the aural is twofold: he is 
not only interested in what  ears can pick up, but also in how the act of listening can 
figuratively represent his acts of reading. As in Cavell’s work on Shakespeare, Derrida’s 
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36  Cobussen’s is a wholly remarkable text, not only for its content but also for its non-linear 
presentation: it is published online primarily as a hypertext including sound fragments. 
musical or aural analogies trace the relationship between text and reader, albeit very 
differently from the act of reading outlined in, for example, Disowning Knowledge. In 
Derrida’s readings of Shakespeare, the ear not only picks up homophonies and syllables 
that alloy and forge new connections and new meanings;  it  also hears the spacing of the 
mark or trace, in other words, différance. Nowhere is the enmeshment of actual 
listening and figural listening in Derrida’s readings of Shakespeare more provocatively 
formulated than in his definition of “frequencies,” a concept that is interspersed 
throughout Specters but only  defined once in relation to Marx’s Dissertation: 
“Frequency counts. The experience, the apprehension of the ghost is tuned into 
frequency: number (more than one), insistence, rhythm (waves, cycles, and periods)”, or 
“la fréquence compte. L'expérience, l'appréhension du fantôme s'accorde à la fréquence: 
le nombre (plus d'un), l'insistance, le rythme (des ondes, des cycles et  des 
périodes)” (133/174). When Derrida writes that the apprehension of the ghost is tuned 
into frequency, he is not primarily  saying that we must actually  listen for the sounds the 
ghost makes. What is at stake with frequencies is not only  hearing in the usual sense, 
but also the inscription of the spectre’s insistences, rhythms, waves, cycles, periods and 
radical fissuring of Being on the ear. Uniting both actual and figurative valences of the 
ways in which Derrida listens to Shakespeare, the multifaceted notion of frequencies, 
which pulls together the many  concerns addressed in Chapter 5 and 6, allows us on the 
one hand to formulate a comprehensive hypothesis for how Shakespeare works in 
Derrida’s philosophical writing. On the other hand, it  also illustrates how Derrida’s acts 
of reading are also acts of (philosophical) listening. I thus propose to add “frequencies” 
to the chain of Derridean “non-synonymous substitutions,” as a term through which we 
will be able to think about the interface between literature and philosophy in Derrida’s 
writing by way of the ear (“Différance” 12). This plurivocal term – fréquence – will 
therefore allow us to prick up our ears to both the ghost’s voice in Hamlet, as well as to 
how the relationship between literature and philosophy is inscribed in the ear.
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7.1 Listening to Hamlet’s Ghost
Listening has been my subject throughout. In Derrida’s writing on Shakespeare and 
others, we are often asked to sharpen our philosophical ears by the onset  of penumbra or 
darkness. Let us listen, for example, into the dark of the balcony scene in “Aphorism 
Countertime.” Juliet is here speaking “in the night, and there is nothing to assure her 
that she is addressing Romeo himself, present in person” (423). Everything revolves 
around the setting of this reading scene – in the dark and in the night. Derrida writes:
 20. Night. Everything that  happens at night, for Romeo and Juliet, is decided 
 rather in the penumbra, between night and day. The indecision between Romeo 
 and the bearer of this name, between “Romeo,” the name of Romeo and Romeo 
 himself. Theater, we say, is visibility, the stage [la scène]. This drama belongs to 
 the night because it stages what is not seen, the name; it  stages what  one calls 
 because one cannot see or because one is not certain of seeing what one calls. 
 Theater of the name, theater of the night. The name calls beyond presence, 
 phenomenon, light, beyond the day, beyond the theatre. It keeps – whence the 
 mourning and survival – what is no longer present, the invisible: what from now 
 on will no longer see the light of day. (425)
Listen closely to what Derrida is saying. The night, and Romeo’s subsequent stepping 
into the “penumbra” where Juliet can see him, illustrates the “indecision between 
Romeo and the bearer of this name.” Derrida is here, of course, referring to the scene’s 
context, but Juliet’s location in the dark on the balcony, addressing these words perhaps 
to nobody but the darkness, is also representative of what, for Derrida, happens 
whenever we call somebody, perhaps a loved one, by their name, which he bears [porte] 
despite himself: “Roméo et  Juliette portent ces noms. Ils les portent, les supportent 
même s’ils ne veulent pas les assumer” (“L’aphorisme” 136). Here the dark and the 
night illustrate and illuminate the “the lack of distinction between the name and the 
bearer of the name” (“Aphorism” 425). For the moment, Derrida notes, Romeo, who is 
lingering somewhere in the darkness, in the shadow, is not sure whether he should “take 
her at her word,” which would mean “committing himself to disowning his name,” and 
decides, for the time being “to wait and carry on listening” (424). As Juliet cannot see 
him, he who is “bescreen’d in night” (2.2.52), and as her “ears have yet not drunk a 
hundred words” (2.2.58) uttered by his voice, she too must listen to him. Not being able 
to see him, in the night, Juliet, as Derrida puts it, “identifies him on the one hand by the 
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timbre of his voice, that is to say by the words she hears without being able to 
see” (“Aphorism” 431). 
 What voice is Juliet listening to in this darkness? For Derrida, in listening she is 
giving in to her desire to distinguish between “Romeo himself, the bearer of the name” 
and “Romeo the name which he bears” (“Aphorism” 423). Juliet is not Cordelia and 
Derrida is listening for something very different to Cavell: “Speaking to the one she 
loves within herself and outside herself, in the half-light, Juliet murmurs the most 
implacable analysis of the name. Of the name and the proper name” (427). For Derrida, 
her analysis “is implacable for it announces or denounces the inhumanity or the 
ahumanity  of the name” (427). For Juliet, “a proper name does not name anything 
which is human, which belongs to a human body, a human spirit, an essence of 
man” (427). As Derrida paraphrases: “Romeo himself, the bearer of the name is not the 
name, it is Romeo, the name which he bears” (423). All Juliet hears in Romeo are 
names, and “the circle of all these names in o: words, Romeo, words, love” (429). When 
Derrida listens to Juliet  listening for Romeo he is not listening for his voice’s timbre, in 
the way Cavell listens to Cordelia’s. He does not listen out for the heaving of heart into 
tongue, the shortness of breath. He does not imagine how her voice would have 
sounded. He is much more interested in what resonates in all those names in O that 
Juliet the philosopher enumerates.37  Juliet’s recognition of Romeo is not, in other 
words, dependent on the recognition of a voice that is present to itself, which, as 
Cordelia’s does for Cavell, conveys something quintessential about who they are in the 
moment they speak. Rather, it is dependent on a voice that speaks because it  denounces 
itself, because it is (or no longer wants to be) what it is. Although, like Cavell, he 
suggests that Shakespearean drama demands an attentive ear, Derrida is not listening 
out for the separateness that we share with the character on stage and with everybody 
who is sitting in the auditorium. He is harking for something more disembodied, 
something altogether louder, but  more difficult to hear, for what in Paper Machine he 
calls a trace that is “never, fully  present, by definition,” but  that “inscribes in itself the 
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37  It would, in other circumstances, have been interesting to triangulate this enigmatic focus on O with 
Fineman’s reading of O in “The Sound of O in Othello: the Real of the Tragedy of Desire,” as well as 
what Cixous says and does with the O in “Ghosting Derrida,” to propose an alternative O-Factor to the 
one suggested by Bruce Smith.
reference to the specter of something else” (151). He is, in other words, listening for 
spectral or spectred voices.
 When Derrida claims that Romeo and Juliet is a “theater of the night,” he is also 
saying that in staging the name, it “stages what one calls because one cannot see or 
because one is not certain of seeing what one calls” (“Aphorism” 425). Specters of 
Marx, too, is about the night. Indeed in the “Exordium,” Derrida writes that Specters 
“advances like an essay in the night” (xvii). For Royle, “Derrida’s published texts on 
Shakespeare are night letters of a sort, essays about the night” (Uncanny 124). When 
Derrida writes that Shakespeare is the theatre of the night, he is, however, not only 
saying that the plays are about the night, but that they themselves are of the night. 
“Theater,” Derrida writes, “is visibility, the stage [la scène]” (“Aphorism” 425). But this 
theatre stages what  belongs to the night, what cannot be seen. This theatre is about the 
name as what “calls beyond presence, phenomenon, light, beyond the day, beyond the 
theatre” (425). Derrida is not so much seeing or reading Shakespeare, as listening to 
him. “Night writing”, Royle writes, “… would be an experience of hearing” (Uncanny 
116). When Derrida therefore writes that Specters advances like an essay in the night, 
he is also saying that he advances with his ears.
 In Hamlet, Derrida writes in Specters of Marx, “everything begins by  the 
apparition of a specter” (2). He immediately  qualifies. In Hamlet everything begins “by 
the waiting for this apparition” (2). “The anticipation is at once impatient, anxious, and 
fascinated: this, the thing (‘this thing’) will end up coming. The revenant is going to 
come. It won’t be long. But how long it is taking” (2). I will qualify even further: in 
Hamlet, everything begins with waiting to hear. From the very beginning of Hamlet 
something ghostly  happens to our ears. If Shakespeare “wrote for sound,” as Bruce 
Johnson has argued in “Hamlet: voice, music, sound,” then Hamlet is a “noisy 
play” (257, 259). This noise is not only produced by “around a dozen heraldic flourishes 
involving trumpets, drums and ordnance,” “instrumental and vocal music” but  also 
“includes references to the voice and hearing, and vocalisation which is purely sonic 
rather than lexical,” as well as sounds which are “acousmatic” or “acousmêtric,” in 
other words, sounds which have “no visible source” (259). Hamlet begins with an 
example of such an acousmatic effect: “it begins with disembodied voices in the 
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darkness” (259). For Johnson, moments such as these not only pose unsettling 
epistemological questions – “what may be known of a thing that is heard but not 
seen…” – but also unsettle our understanding of ontology (260).
 BARNARDO  Who's there?
 FRANCISCO  Nay, answer me. Stand and unfold yourself.
 BARNARDO  Long live the King.
 FRANCISCO  Barnardo?
 BARNARDO  He.
 FRANCISCO  You come most carefully upon your hour.
 BARNARDO  'Tis now struck twelve. Get thee to bed, Francisco.
 FRANCISCO  For this relief much thanks. 'Tis bitter cold
    And I am sick at heart.
 BARNARDO  Have you had quiet guard?
 FRANCISCO  Not a mouse stirring. 
            (1.1.1-8)
When we first hear Barnardo’s question in the dark, we, like him, do not know that he is 
not calling to a ghost, but rather to his friend Francisco, who has come to relieve him. 
And yet, from the very start of the play, the ghost  is already on the stage, already in our 
ears. There are no stage directions specified but, according to Bernice W. Kliman, the 
text’s punctuation functions as one, guiding “elocution” and “effect” (74). Both the 
Second Quarto and the First Folio use full stops and not commas. Although the first 
Sentinel and Barnardo’s dialogue in the First Quarto is different, it  too is punctuated by 
full stops, achieving a similar effect. The period after “Long live the King” is commonly 
read as indicating an “interruption where the speech might have been construed as 
complete”; eager to ascertain their identities, Francisco and Barnardo interrupt each 
other (78). Lines overlap, creating a ghostly effect of non-sequiturs that trail off the 
stage and confuse our ears. At the beginning of Othello our ears are similarly confused. 
A night-screened Roderigo asks old Brabantio whether he recognises his voice (1.1.93). 
Brabantio does not, and answers: “what are you?” (1.1.94). In “The Ear, Who?” Kamuf 
wonders about this use of “what,” where a “who” would have sounded more natural to 
our ears (177). Similarly, when Barnardo throws his question – “Who’s there?”– into the 
night air, he is really asking: “what are you? Are you a ghost?” In the night of this 
theatre, the “who” and the “what” mingle. Like Brabantio, who, as Kamuf notes, seems 
to be “calling upon the voice to attach itself again to a name,” Barnardo seems to be 
listening out and addressing a disembodied, spectral voice ringing in the dark (177).
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The ghost is in the ear; it is to be apprehended by tuning into frequency. What is at stake 
with frequencies, however, is not  only hearing in the common sense. Frequency is more 
than this: it is nombre (plus d’un). Like spirits, frequency is “the more than one/no more 
one [le plus d’un]” (xx). The spectre that  is “listened” to in the night of Shakespeare’s 
text is a “remainder” which “is not,” and which thus remains “inaccessible to a 
straightforward intuitive perception (since it refers to something wholly other, it 
inscribes in itself something of the infinitely other), and it escapes all forms of 
prehension, all forms of monumentalization, and all forms of archivation” (Paper 
Machine 151). It is, it seems, a paraphrase of différance and the chain of terms it 
belongs to: “Differance, which (is) nothing, is (in) the thing itself. It  is (given) in the 
thing itself. It (is) the thing itself. It, differance, the thing (itself). It, without anything 
other. Itself, nothing” (Given Time 40). Le plus d’un is a spectrally polyphonic term, its 
definition comprises insistence, rhythms, waves, cycles and periods. As Kamuf notes, 
“depending on whether or not one pronounces the ‘s’: plu(s)/plus, the expression shifts 
registers from that of counting by ones to that of counting without  number one, or of 
taking account of the other than one” (Addresses 219). It  is perhaps because its 
definition is so wide-meshed that this net of a term can be thrown over the ghost, which 
can only be apprehended if it is allowed to unfold. 
 According to Le Grand Robert, fréquence is a “réitération, répétition.” Enter 
GHOST (1.1.38). Exit Ghost (1.1.50). Enter GHOST (1.1.124). [Exit Ghost] (1.1.140). 
Thus the ghost of Hamlet’s father enters and re-enters the stage, amidst waiting men, 
some of them soldiers, some of them scholars, some of them both. First there is 
speculation as to its existence, later there is speculation as to what its appearance might 
mean. What is certain, however, is that the ghost’s first stage-entrance is a return. 
Derrida: “everything begins in the imminence of a re-apparition, but a reapparition of 
the specter as apparition for the first time in the play” (Specters 2). The spectre is a 
“revenant,” Derrida writes, “because it  begins by  coming back” (11). For Derrida, the 
ghost in Hamlet is returning “from what could be called the other time, from the other 
scene, from the eve of the play, the witnesses of history fear and hope for a return, then, 
‘again’ and ‘again’, a coming and going” (11). The frequentation of the ghost is a 
frequency, a repetition: “repetition and first  time, but also repetition and last time, since 
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the singularity of any first time, makes of it  also a last time. Each time it is the event 
itself, a first time is a last time. Altogether other” (10). For Michael Naas, indeed, “any 
consideration of the phantasm ... must emphasize less the ontological status of the 
phantasm than its staying power, its returning power, I would be tempted to say its 
regenerative power” (192). Even when the ghost in Hamlet is on the stage, it does not 
belong to presence, Being or Dasein. “There is no Dasein of the specter, but there is no 
Dasein without the uncanniness, without the strange familiarity (Unheimlichkeit) of 
some specter” (125). Rather than imagining a Dasein for the spectre, we must think of 
the spectre in terms of this repetition that fissures every presence and makes every 
presence spectral; because the spectre is a revenant, there cannot be an ontology of a 
spectre, but only a spectral ontology (say hauntology).
 Frequency  is what the Grand Robert calls a période, or as the OED has it, “the 
rate per second of a vibration constituting a wave, e.g. sound, light, or radio waves.” 
Frequency  is a cycle, it counts the “nombre de cycles identiques d’un phénomène par 
unité de temps (en général, par seconde).” We cannot see the ghost, it goes beyond 
hearing and beyond sight.  The waves, periods and cycles of frequency  mark the rhythm 
that is beat out between the ghost’s re-apparitions. The ghost is not; it is a rhythm. What 
is also inscribed in the elliptical mention of rhythm in Derrida’s definition is not only 
the insistence or repetition of frequency, but also the fissuring of presence. As Derrida 
writes in “Desistance,” rhythm “belongs neither to the visible nor to the audible” (32). 
Rhythm in this sense is also what in Monolingualism is called the missing beat, the 
“incalculable origin,” which always begins “before the beginning” (48). It corresponds 
with what in “Rams” is called the “spacing that does not pertain to meaning” (165). It is 
the “rhythm, caesura, hiatus, interruption” that exceeds meaning and that makes Derrida 
“listen for something that [he] cannot hear or understand” (165, 166). What is here 
called “rhythm,” is, in other words, the possibility  of audibility and visibility  itself. 
When we listen, therefore, for the ghost and for spectral rhythms, we are listening into 
that space or spacing which, although being beyond presence and phenomena, makes 
them possible. In Specters, Derrida writes that the ghost is the “frequency of a certain 
visibility” (125). “And visibility,” like audibility, is “by its essence” not seen, “which is 
why it remains epekeina tes ousias, beyond the phenomenon or beyond being” (125). 
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Rhythm also marks the temporality of the spectre and of literature. It marks what  in 
Mémoires: for Paul de Man Derrida speaks of as a “rhythm without rhythm,” which 
does not “designate a particular rhythm, a measurable or comparable speed, but a 
movement which attempts through an infinite acceleration to win time, to win time over 
time, to deny  it” (62). One might say that this rhythm outstrips, it “gagne de 
vitesse” (“L’aphorisme” 50). It opens time and opens it for the other who has already 
been there, listening: “The poem falls to me, benediction, coming of (or from) the other. 
Rhythm but dissymmetry,” Derrida writes in “Che cos’é la poesia” (233).38 
 Frequencies mark the re-apparition of the ghost in Hamlet, and the unmasterable 
dissymmetry that separates us from it. One does not see “this Thing that is not a thing, 
this thing that is invisible between its apparitions, when it reappears” (Specters 6). The 
ghost is shielded from our sight by its full armour, what Horatio the scholar calls its 
‘warlike form’ (1.1.46). For Derrida, the armour allows “the so-called father to see and 
to speak … some slits are cut into it and adjusted so as to permit him to see without 
being seen, but to speak in order to be heard” (Specters 7). He, of course, knows that the 
ghost’s visor was raised, but for him the mere “possibility” of the visor, the possibility 
of seeing “without being seen,” suffices (8). And yet, although we cannot see “this 
Thing,” it sees us. Derrida calls this “the visor effect: we do not see who looks at 
us” (6). This ghost is therefore looking at us “outside of any synchrony, even before and 
beyond any look on our part, according to an absolute anteriority  (which may  be on the 
order of generation, of more than one generation) and asymmetry, according to an 
absolutely unmasterable disproportion” (6–7). Since we cannot see the ghost, we must, 
like Juliet in the darkness of the balcony  scene, listen for it: “we must fall back on its 
voice” (7). But since, as Kamuf argues, “the visor effect  [is] also a prior pluralization of 
every  one, everyone,” this voice is, albeit  singular, not single (Addresses 234). It is what 
in “Ulysses Grammophone” is called “a skein of voices” (278).
 The voice Derrida is interested in has nothing to do with Cavell’s “ordinary 
voice,” but it  does have to do with “tone” and “timbre” (“The Spatial Arts” 21). So 
“contrary to the nonsense that circulates in this regard, nothing interests [him] more 
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38 These accounts of rhythm echo Derrida’s discussion of fort:da and Zauderrhythmus in “To Speculate - 
on Freud,” a text that haunts Specters, particularly in how it plays on the rhythmed 
appearance:disappearance of Hamlet’s ghost, which I will turn to in Chapter 8.
than the voice, more precisely the nondiscursive voice, but the voice all the same” (21). 
Speech and Phenomena, his critique of what Simon Morgan Wortham calls Husserl’s 
desire to “understand the expressive and logical purity  of meaning in terms of logos,” 
and to understand logos as a self-given meaning, does not banish voice from 
philosophy, but rediscovers it for its use (200). Husserl’s phenomenological project, 
Derrida argues in Speech and Phenomena, is founded on the assumption that this self-
presence can then be transposed, so to speak, to the voice: “my words are ‘alive’ 
because they seem not to leave me: not to fall outside me, outside my breath” (76). 
Voice and speech give themselves out in this manner, because “I hear myself [je 
m’entende] at the same time that I speak.” “The signifier,” Derrida continues, 
“animated by my breath and by the meaning-intention … is in absolute proximity to 
me” (77). For Husserl, meaning can be self-present, because it can be present to the self, 
in a manner which is unmediated by  signs: “if ‘mental acts’ are not announced to 
themselves through the intermediary of a ‘Kundgabe,’ if they  do not have to be 
informed about themselves through the intermediary of indications, it  is because they 
are ‘lived by us in the same instant’ (im selben Augenblick)” (59). Although Husserl 
uses a visual metaphor of the Augenblick, this blink of an eye is also to be understood as 
a caesura, a moment of silence. For Husserl, meaning can be present, because the 
“relationship to self” is absolutely silent: “expressive language itself would be 
something supervenient upon the absolute silence of self-relationship” (69). In Geoffrey 
Bennington’s paraphrasis: “the internal voice with which I express myself to myself in 
the silent selfpresence of my consciousness preserves meaning in its 
purity” (“Derridabase” 66, my emphasis). Husserl’s “phonocentism” – the “unfailing 
complicity here between idealization and speech [voix]” – is paradoxically  founded on a 
silencing of voice, and Derrida’s critique depends to some extent on making this voice 
and its “silence” heard (Speech 75).
 Whenever Derrida plays on this word – frequency  – he is also playing on the 
frequentation of ghosts, who are always more than one, who, according to Le Grand 
Robert, are always a fréquence, which also means a ‘foule’, or crowd. A voice is never 
single, or present; it never belongs to a body. “Voice,” he writes there, “can betray the 
body to which it is lent, it can make it ventriloquize as if the body were no longer 
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anything more than the actor or the double of another voice, of the voice of the other, 
even of an innumerable, incalculable polyphony” (“Voice II” 161). What we are 
listening out for when we are listening for the ghost’s voice is the “writing in the voice,” 
its “differential vibration” (“Dialanguages” 140). The voice Derrida is interested in is a 
voice that vibrates with a different kind of silence than Husserl’s; it is a silence that 
allows for what Byung-Chul Han calls the “an- un abschwellenden Körpers des 
Klanges” (11).39 For Han, therefore, the “logozentrische Phonozentrismus ist nicht nur 
die Unterdrückung der Schrift, sondern auch bzw. vor allem die Unterdrückung des 
Klanges oder des Klang-Raumes” (12).40  What Han is addressing here is not (or not 
only) actual resonance, but a “spacing” allowing and inviting, indeed relying on, the 
other’s resonance. It is what in “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials” is called a “pure 
address, on the edge of silence, foreign to every  code and to every rite, hence to every 
repetition” (194). It is what Kamuf calls “donner lieu, that place-less place in which the 
impossible encounter takes place as giving of place beyond or before any give-and-take. 
A place-less place or a silent word, unballasted of even the slightest weight, a breathless 
word, perhaps....” (Addresses 131). It is what  Werner Hamacher calls “the ellipsis which 
silently accompanies any act and which may silently interrupt any speech 
act” (“Afformative” 1139).41 
The question of the identity  of the génie – “qui es tu” – which is posed at the very 
beginning of Geneses, Genealogies, Genres and Genius is also its answer (2). As 
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39 “Crescendo and diminuendo of the resonant body.”
40  “Logocentric phonocentrism not only entails the suppression of writing, but most importantly the 
suppression of sound as resonant space.”
41  Hamacher coins the concept of the “afformative” in response to the failure of classical speech act 
theory to “inquire after the conditions under which conventions can be linguistically prepared and 
established – and precisely for this reason, it cannot account for the performativity of its 
performatives” (“Lingua” 190). This “afformative” is, I believe, important if we are to understand 
Derrida’s performative interpretation of Hamlet in Specters.  What is at work in the background of 
Hamacher’s idea of the afformative as a perceivable, if silent, interruption, is not only Derrida but also 
Benjamin’s reading of Goethe’s Wahlverwandtschaften, in particular his idea of the Ausdruckslose, which 
is heavily indebted to Hölderlin’s idea of the caesura. The way this idea of the “afformative”, with its 
resonances in Benjamin, Goethe and Hölderin comes to bear on Hamacher’s “Lingua Amissa: The 
Messianism of Commodity-Language and Derrida's Specters of Marx,” and how in turn this is perceived 
by Derrida in “Marx and Sons,” merits further exploration. It would, for instance, be interesting to 
approach the question of the performative of perlocutionary effects of literature through two of the three 
instances of the Ausdruckslose which Benjamin identifies in his Wahlverwandtschaften essay: the 
sentence marking the vanishing possibility of happiness - “Die Hoffnung fuhr wie ein Stern, der vom 
Himmel fällt über ihre Häupter weg” – and Ottilie’s silent death (Wahlverwandtschaften 212). 
Beverly Bie Brahic notes, “qui es tu” is a homophone meaning both “who are you” and 
“who has fallen silent” (Geneses 92). The only  visual marker which could keep  them 
apart, namely the trait d’union between “es-tu” remains silent. Derrida addresses a 
silent genius: “‘Genius, who are you {qui es tu}?’ I am asking you this question, genius, 
hear, do you hear?” (2). He addresses this genius, which remains silent, asking it to 
listen to him and to make itself heard. This then is the stroke of the silent genius. In his 
description of the silent genius (genius who is you) Derrida seems to be ventriloquising 
the unprecedented and performative trajectory of the teleiopoetic arrow. Like the 
teleiopoetic arrow, the work of genius penetrates by withdrawing. It is what in “A Self-
Unsealing Poetic Text” “speaks to the other by keeping quiet, keeping something quiet 
from him. In keeping quiet, in keeping silence, it  is still addressing itself” (206). The 
stroke of genius – this teleiopoetic arrow – may strike with sound, but it withdraws in 
silence. “Geniusness is the uniqueness of an impossible arrivingness {arrivance} to 
which one addresses oneself which is only  to the improbable destination of the address 
– and it is always ‘tu’. A silenced {tu} instant, the instant of the eternal return” (Geneses 
78-9). To listen with our philosophical ears always means, as “Voice II” suggests, to 
“turn one’s ears to the other” who is yet to come but who is still resonating there from 
the beginning (163). 
 Genius is you, and it is silent; it is silent so that you may hear. What is inscribed in 
this moment of silence, in the spectral vibrations of every  voice, is the ear of the other. 
When Derrida, therefore, writes that “it is the ear of the other that signs,” he is, I 
believe, thinking about the play of signature and countersignature, addressed in Chapter 
5 in terms of this resonant space opened by the silent genius (Ear 51). In H.C. For Life, 
the arrival of the other through Cixous’ poetics is similarly  understood in terms of 
music: “the arrival as if by  enchantment, where the poetic song, the charm, the carmen, 
and magical power are allied to kommen lassen, make come in letting come” (79). 
When Derrida thus speaks of music he is speaking of this “chant of enchantment” this 
“song of songs,” the kind of musical opening that resounds between the text and the 
reader (79). The voice Derrida is criticising in Speech and Phenomena is the voice of 
auto-affection, the voice that we hear as we speak, the voice that  carries the full breath 
of our meaning. But this is not the voice he is listening for. As the silent caesura that 
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punctuates the voice of the relationship  to self can never be purely  idealised, it can 
never be muffled fully. If the voice with which we talk to ourselves is never silent, the 
voice with which we talk to others, which we hear, is never single. Voice never just 
sounds, it resounds. In the relationship  of self to self, there will always be resonance, or 
what Jean-Luc Nancy calls the “arch-music of that resonance”: “it listens to itself 
[s’écoute], by  listening to itself finds itself [se trouve], and by  finding itself deviates 
[s’écarte] from itself in order to resound further away, listening to itself before hearing/
understanding itself….”(Listening 35). 
 Nancy is perhaps the thinker of “deconstruction” who has dwelt most upon the 
“philosophical ear” (5), arguing that “the visual persists until its disappearance; the 
sonorous appears and fades away into its permanence” (2). Like Derrida, Nancy 
understands the process of listening as reaching beyond presence or Dasein:
 To be listening is thus to enter into tension and to be on the lookout for a relation 
 to self: not, it should be emphasized, a relationship to “me” (the supposedly 
 given subject), or the “self” of the other (the speaker, the musician, also 
 supposedly given, with his subjectivity), but to the relationship in self, so to 
 speak, as it  forms a “self” or a “to itself” in general, and if something like that  
 ever does reach the end of its formation. Consequently, listening is passing over 
 to the register of presence to self, it being understood that the “self” is precisely 
 nothing available (substantial or subsistent) to which one can be “present,” but 
 precisely the resonance of a return [renvoi]. (12)
Although Nancy at no point mentions Derrida or indeed frequencies, the terms he uses 
to speak about the sonorous are strikingly similar. Nancy  matches frequency’s waves, 
cycles, periods and rhythm, with “amplitude,” “density,” “vibration” and 
“undulation” (2). Frequencies like Nancy’s resonance allow us to make sense of the 
musical analogy and most importantly  of the moment of silence, caesura or rhythm 
encased in it. As Cobussen notes, “Derrida’s ear develops into an organ that needs to 
train itself in receiving the unpredictable, the uncanny, the ‘unheard’” (u.p.). 
Enter GHOST (1.1.38). Exit Ghost (1.1.50). Enter GHOST (1.1.124). [Exit Ghost] 
(1.1.140). The appearance of the ghost marks its frequency. But the appearance of the 
ghost also escapes frequencies. In Specters, Derrida writes that frequency also counts 
and it does so quite literally: it  is the “fréquence d’un mot,” it is the number of times a 
word reoccurs in a corpus. We might for instance be familiar with the idea of a 
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frequency of a Shakespearean word, or the amount of times it  appears in his work. Of 
all the attempts to order and categorise Shakespeare’s words, none is more ludic than 
the work done in concordances. Marvin Spevack’s Harvard Concordance to 
Shakespeare is a veritable Shakespearean treasure trove. As outlined in its 
“Introduction,” it “lists alphabetically all words exactly as they appear in Shakespeare’ 
and ‘each different word (or linguistic type) – a word is defined as a graphic unit – is 
followed by  a line of statistical information: its absolute frequency (FR), its relative 
frequency (REL FR), the number of occurrences in verse passages (V), and the number 
of occurrences in prose (P)” (v). This task is, as Spevack himself is the first to admit, 
‘not without problems’, and not  only  because mistakes are bound to occur ‘when one is 
dealing with almost a million words in a myriad of configurations’ (1974, vii). The 
problem is also Spevack’s definition of context, namely ‘the typographical line (often 
the contents of one punch-card) in which the indexed word or lemma appears’, because 
words in Shakespeare exceed their immediate context and always resonate with another 
frequency and use of that  word (vii). The first meaning given for frequency in the OED 
is ‘state or condition of being crowded’. In this sense every frequency listed in 
Spevack’s Concordance is also a frequency in the sense that it is crowded, inhabited, 
frequented if you will, by its other frequencies, or occurrences. 
 Although frequencies should not be understood as a “master term” it is, I have 
tried to suggest, illuminating for the study  of Derridean acts of reading: in comprising 
both valences of the ear and listening in his writing – both actual and philosophical or 
figural – it allows us to understand the modes of his acts of reading – characterised by 
the inter- and intratextual travel of the lettre – as directly linked to his theorisation of the 
trace. Simply put: there cannot be resonance and echoes if there is no resonant space. 
Listening to Shakespeare with Derrida, we must allow for his words to resonate 
otherwise and in places beyond either oeuvre in ways not anticipated by Nussbaum. 
Frequencies account for how words can resonate with other words, uttered, written or 
read by somebody else and in a different context. It is also what in “Anachronistic 
Reading” J. Hillis Miller calls a “future chiming,” or “an anticipatory allegory or 
prophecy, or, perhaps, a miniature apocalypse in the etymological sense of an enigmatic 
unveiling of what has not yet happened” (75, my italics). For Royle, these “peculiar 
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ways in which specific words in Shakespeare come to be traced, in a sort of ‘now 
without present,’ by other appearances or apparitions of the ‘same’ words” belong to a 
logic “of another time, a ‘dead time perhaps, or time without time. It is a matter of 
dramaturgic telepathy, the iteraphonic and iteraesthesia” (In Memory 33). This idea of 
the “iteraphonic” functions as “‘a sort of guiding thread’” of much of Royle’s work on 
Shakespeare and is in many  ways close to my notion of frequencies (37). Like 
frequencies, the iteraphonic does not only denote the telepathic echoing of something 
that could not have been heard. It also means hearing something differently, the ear 
changing something. Moreover, it means allowing for ghostly frequencies in 
Shakespeare’s corpus, like for instance Derrida’s “Shakespearean word” “relevant.” And 
it allows for an echoing of something that was never sounded; for a hearing of what is 
not yet there. This is the silent genius of Shakespeare and of literature for philosophy. In 
reading Derrida, we too must become more receptive to the resonances and 
reverberations of frequencies, which are an important aspect of his opening of 
philosophy to literature and its tympanisations.
7.2 to tympanise – philosophy
 “Is listening something of which philosophy is capable?” (Nancy, Listening 1) 
“Speech is the sperm indispensable for insemination. (Conception, through the ear, all 
of philosophy one could say)” (“Tympan” xiv).
Derrida wants “to tympanize – philosophy” (“Typman” x). As Alan Bass’ note reminds 
us, “tympaniser” in French means “to criticize” or “ridicule publicly”(x). When Derrida, 
however, sets out to “tympanize” philosophy he does not mean to ridicule it, but to open 
it up to the ear’s resonance chamber. Just like in Speech and Phenomena, at the 
beginning of “Tympan” the ear becomes a figure for auto-affection; philosophy here is 
“affecting itself without delay, on the domestic page of its own tympanum (still the 
muffled drum, the tympanon, the cloth stretched taut in order to take its beating, to 
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amortise impressions, to make the types (topoi) resonate, to balance the striking 
pressure of the typtein, between the inside and the outside)” (xii). In an expression 
which seems to echo or be echoed by the question Nancy  poses in Listening, as well as 
Cavell’s question of whether philosophy  can become literature and still know itself, 
Derrida asks whether one can interrupt philosophy’s auto-affection, or “puncture the 
tympanum of a philosopher and still be heard and understood by him?” (xii). We need 
not “philosophize with the hammer” like Nietzsche, we need not, in other words, “ihnen 
erst die Ohren zerschlagen.” Rather, we should philosophise with a different kind of 
hammer – the malleus, which, as Derrida notes, “belongs to the chain of small bones,” 
which is “placed on the internal surface of the tympanic membrane” (xii, xiii). 
 The figure of the ear discloses the resonances opened by Shakespeare and 
sounded out by the reader; likewise, the role of the ear in Derrida’s oeuvre is to suggest 
that such auricular acts of reading must become part of the philosophical endeavour. 
“Tympan” shows, both in its content  and in its style, that philosophy’s auto-affection – 
“it  has always intended to hear itself speak, in the same language” – is already  fissured, 
that philosophy’s voice is already mad, already governed by vibrations and frequencies 
(“Tympan” xii). The hammer’s role is one of “mediation and communication: it 
transmits sonic vibrations to the chain of small bones, and then to the inner ear” (xiii). 
As the vibration reaches the tympanum – which connects/separates the outer and middle 
ear – the hammer receives this vibration but its function is to “weaken the blows, muffle 
them” to protect the tympanum (xiii). The hammer, though lying further inside the ear, 
and although it  receives vibration, also acts upon the tympanum by  changing this 
vibration. The hammer is thus not only  mediator or vehicle, it is also a protector and as 
such an unfaithful mediator of sonic vibration. This balancing asymmetry is made 
possible by the tympanum itself. Derrida writes: “we know that the membrane of the 
tympanum, a thing and transparent partition separating the auditory  canal from the 
middle ear (the cavity), is stretched obliquely (loxōs),” λοξ-ός coming from the Greek 
meaning 1) “slanting, crosswise”, 2) “of suspicious looks” and 3) (of language) 
“indirect, ambiguous” (xiv-xv). According to Derrida, “one of the effects of this 
obliqueness is to increase the surface of impression and hence the capacity of 
vibration” (xv). The tympanum is what allows this self-relation, this echoing between 
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the outer and middle ear, which is in turn echoed between the middle and inner ear. 
Derrida’s virtuoso play on the ear’s anatomy, the description of its erasure of limits, not 
only illustrates the resonances of différance, but is also directed at unsettling what 
philosophy has traditionally understood to be its limit. 
To tympanise philosophy must not only mean opening it up  to the play of lettre, but 
also, and more importantly, to the ear as the organ of the text. According to Joel 
Fineman, Derrida’s conception of the ear as an “instrument of delay and deferral” is 
foreshadowed by  none other than Shakespeare (“Shakespeare’s Ear” 12). For 
Shakespeare’s contemporaries hearing is, Fineman suggests, “that which slows the 
logos, leading it astray within its labyrinthine folds and plaits” (12). For Fineman, this 
contemporary  understanding of the ear explains not only “why  for Shakespeare the ear 
is so often a figure of momentous suspense, as in Hamlet,” but also allows him to 
hypothesise that for Shakespeare, like for Derrida, “the ear is the organ of the text” (13). 
This is to some extent echoed by the typographic oddities of Derrida’s little ear of a text. 
“Tympan” is a tripartite text: the text proper starting with the sentence “To tympanize – 
philosophy”; footnotes, and the marginal long citation of Michel Leiris’ Biffures. In this 
ear of a text, themes and words bounce off one another and with every resonance 
something changes. For Mark Robson, Fineman’s argument about the ear as a textual 
organ is particularly  suggestive because “it allows us to trace a connection between 
textuality, sexuality and sovereignty” (“Looking with Ears”).42 The oreille of the text is 
feminine. In The Ear of the Other, Derrida also refers to the ear as a she (“it is to her – 
this ear – that I myself will feign to address myself”) (33). Derrida starts spelling out the 
sexual reverberations in footnote 6 of “Tympan”: 
 Without  an inventory of all the sexual investments which, everywhere and at all 
 times, powerfully constrain the discourse of the ear, I shall give an example here 
 to indicate the topics of the material left in the margins. The horn that is called 
 pavillon (papillon) is a phallus …, and the auditory canal a vagina. (xiv)
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42  In “Shakespeare’s Ear,” Fineman turns to The ‘Rainbow’ Portrait of Queen Elizabeth I, attributed to 
Isaac Oliver (c. 1600). He notes that among the eyes, mouths and ears adorning the Queen’s dress, there is 
an “exceptionally pornographic ear,” formed by two creases in Elizabeth’s dress precisely over her 
genitals (10).  When taken in conjunction with the feminised early modern understanding of the act of 
listening and Shakespeare’s accounts of voracious female ears this observation sheds new light the many 
sexual reverberatons of “Tympan,” thus allowing us draw links between Shakespeare’s and Derrida’s 
understanding of textuality (Folkerth 106). 
 When Derrida writes that “speech is the sperm indispensable for insemination” 
what is at issue here is not so much the question of gender (in philosophy), but a certain 
kind of textuality  which “Tympan” also seeks to illustrate with its tripartition (xiv). In 
“Heidegger’s Ear (Geschlecht IV)” everything circles around a short extract from Sein 
und Zeit: “…als Hören der Stimme des Freundes den jedes Dasein bei sich trägt” (166). 
For Heidegger, Dasein carries the voice of the friend bei sich. Derrida reads this bei sich 
(indicating in German “with” or “near it”, hence neither inside nor outside of Dasein) as 
a marker of marginality. Dasein can listen to the voice of the friend because Dasein 
carries this voice bei sich, because the voice of the friend is “neither in … nor outside” 
Dasein’s ear (164). Whilst  Heidegger speaks of der Freund (masculine), Derrida’s 
speaks of “une oreille” (feminine). What is marginal is not der Freund but a woman. 
Yet, “woman” cannot be separated from the “incalculable sexual differences” Derrida 
speaks about in “Choreographies” (167). As Bennington argues, he supplants a clearly 
delineated sexual difference with “invagination” which, as we shall see, “is going to 
allow us to risk paradoxes whereby the other would be no other than the same itself [le 
même même], in the doubling traced toward the double, the ghost and 
Unheimlichkeit” (“Derridabase” 221). 
What does this figure of the ear in “Tympan” mean for the kind of philosophical voice 
Derrida chooses in his writing? In “Derridas Ohr,” Han suggests that the différanciating 
of the ear is grounded in Derrida’s experience of ear pain as a child, precisely in the 
“bad auricular ringing” described by Artaud: “Die Mittelohrentzündung mit ihrem 
Ohrensausen bestimmt die bio-politische Anatomie des Derridaschen Ohrs” (Han 5).43 
Han is here referring to certain moments in “Circumfession,” when Derrida writes about 
his mother praying “each time she saw me ill ... and it was almost always otitis, the 
tympanum” (117-8). She prayed and called the name of God when “a doctor had 
threatened me with a violent  and dangerous operation, that serious operation that in 
those days left you with a hole behind your ear” (118). Although this account seems to 
uncannily echo Cavell’s narration of his damaged left ear, Derrida’s insertion of 
Artaud’s poem here points towards something rather different. Although Derrida’s 
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43  “With its concomitant buzzing, the inflammation of the middle ear sets the tone for the bio-political 
anatomy of the Derridean ear.”
autobiographical writing is also oto-biographical, Derrida’s “hematographic music” 
does not refer to a Cavellian experience of ear pain as existential separateness (Han 6). 
If Derrida’s ear writes with some blood or “hematography,” it is the blood of some 
“carnage of language” or of poetry (“Tympan” xv). The ear is, as Martin Heidegger has 
already noted, dichtend, poeticising and inventive. The ear, Derrida writes in 
“Heidegger’s Ear (Geschlecht IV)” is “poetic (dichtende) because it  hears in advance 
just what  it causes to burst forth. It gives itself to hear what it hears [Elle donne elle-
même à entendre ce qu’elle entend]” (186). In “Circumfession,” Derrida does not hear 
the logos of the voice of God, or what comes to replace it. This is not because an 
infected ear-drum keeps him from hearing “the voice of Being,” as Han suggests, but 
because there is no such voice, because voice is always spectral (9). All the ear can do is 
listen to this splintering, because it is the philosophical organ par excellence.
 In my Cavellian reading of The Winter’s Tale, I suggested three different modes 
of philosophical voice, respectively represented by Hermione, Paulina and Perdita. I 
argued that  Perdita, or more precisely  Persephone, united both elements of the quasi-
sceptical Paulina and the voiced separateness of Hermione, and thus best represented 
the kind of plurivocal philosophical voice Cavell is striving towards. It  is my belief that 
when we reencounter Persephone in “Tympan” she inaugurates a new philosophical 
voice, but one fundamentally different to Cavell’s. Indeed, the very  different  gendered 
inflections of Cavell’s and Derrida’s figurative uses of the ear illustrate the fundamental 
difference between what their philosophies aspire to achieve. Although in Derrida’s 
writings the female figure works differently than in Cavell’s oeuvre, it too is linked to 
an idea of philosophical renewal: Echo in Rogues, Khora in “Choreographies”, 
Nietzsche’s eternal feminine in Spurs, etc. As we have seen in Part  One, the “female 
voice,” which is able to remarry the estranged couple of ordinary  language and 
philosophy, is constituted by an ability, shared by both men and women, to voice one’s 
separateness. Although Cavell insists that “the female voice” is not a gendered concept, 
it is still wound up in the gendered inflections of his account of the infant’s traumatic 
separation from the mother. The “female voice” still operates in a system of gendered 
binaries, where woman is origin, patience, acknowledgment and where man is 
knowledge, violence and scepticism. As Persephone’s marginal role in “Tympan,” as 
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well as Derrida’s figural use of the ear, illustrates, Derrida’s philosophical voice, too, 
wants “to change the sensibility of the reader,” albeit not by being sensitive to or 
expressive of separateness; rather the act of reading Derrida is after is one which is 
forever listening into the resonant space – perhaps not unlike the margin in “Tympan” – 
opened by the splintering of Being (Davidson 234). 
 In “Tympan,” Persephone emerges from the Michel Leiris’ Biffures in the margin 
of the very first page (x).44 Leiris extracts “the entirely floral and subterranean name of 
Persephone … from its dark terrestrial depths” (x). Persephone is herself an ear. In her 
name Leiris hears “the concha of the ear, the sinuous curves of a path, everything that is 
wreathed, coiled, flowered, garlanded, twisted, arabesque” (xii). Here, Persephone has 
become what The Ear of the Other calls, an “invaginated fold” and “involuted 
orificality” (36). We are again faced with an “invaginating loop” (“Law of Genre” 238). 
We have thus re-encountered meurtrières which, as Royle points out in In Memory of 
Jacques Derrida, not only mean “murderess” or “murder-hole,” but also 
 ... generate a sense of strangeness, not only to do with the oblique  evocation of 
 the uncanniness of the female genitals and ghostly feminisation of 
 Shakespeare’s act of keeping watch over the English language, but  also to do 
 with an act (the act of murdering) that is prescribed but has perhaps not (yet) 
 taken place’”.(3) 
Here invagination, as Derrida suggests when writing about the hymen in 
“Choreographies,” “no longer simply designate[s] figures for the feminine body” (181). 
As Maud Ellmann points out, biologically “invagination” designates the “folding-up 
process” by which the “cortex of the brain is formed in utero” in a “folding-up process” 
or “by the introversion and reticulation of the surface of the embryo” (218). In 
“Choreographies,” invagination is what has “always been reinscribed in a chiasmus”: it 
is thus what makes a clear establishment of boundaries, whether these be between text 
and reader, literature and philosophy – or, as I will go on to suggest, life and death – 
impossible (182).
 Persephone has something of the spectral mole about her. As Thomas Dutoit notes 
in “Mythic Derrida,” “as Proserpine, she is the figure of the serpentine zigzag between 
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44  It would also be important to account for Persephone’s reappearance in Faith and Knowledge, as 
discussed, for instance, by Naas in Derrida From Now On.
the underworld or death and the upperworld, which constitutes the cycle of 
seasons” (105). She is between the dead to be inherited and the living to inherit. She is 
the one who is alive and yet brings death, or the one who though dead is allowed to 
walk among the living. Persephone is thus no-one other than that “glorious cadaver” 
Derrida speaks about at the end of “Tympan” (xxix). As we shall later see in Hamlet’s 
Cellarage scene, there is an affinity  between “the deep country  of hearing” and 
Persephone’s “subterranean kingdom”, not only “by  virtue of the cartilaginous cavern 
that constitutes its organ, but also by  virtue of … all the pockets hollowed out of the 
terrestrial crust whose emptiness makes them into resonating drums for the slightest 
sounds” (xvi). In Leiris’ marginal text, all “the chthonian divinity, the insect piercer of 
pits, the matrix in which the voice is formed, the drum that each noise comes to strike 
with its wand of vibrating air” becomes one (xix). Indeed, Dutoit thinks of Persephone 
as a singer: “Taken from Sicily  to death by Dis, Persephone screamed loud enough for 
her mother, who was not in Sicily, to hear the dying voice, and ultimately  to retrace its 
echo to her daughter in the underworld” (105). A singer is “emerging from the moist 
earth of a hothouse stretched out in breaking glass filament.” What emerges is “one of 
the creatures more readily called cantatrices than chanteuses (even though cantateur is 
an unknown species)” (“Typman” xxiii).45 Derrida expands in a footnote: “Cantatrice 
has the sense of an opera singer, a diva (a hothouse, glass-breaking voice), while 
chanteuse is simply a female singer. There is no masculine form cantateur 
corresponding to cantatrice” (xxiii). Persephone’s subterranean realm is hence not only 
an ear, but also a mouth, a bodiless spectral voice fissuring philosophy’s ear.
 Like Persephone in “Tympan,” Derrida’s writing sings. In an interview 
published as “From the Word to Life: A Dialogue between Jacques Derrida and Hélène 
Cixous” Derrida notes that his writing “models itself on voice” (1). Whether he writes 
for a seminar, “as well as for texts which are not meant to be pronounced,” Derrida 
writes with and for voice, both “à voix haute” and “à voix basse” (1). In all of his 
writing, he continues, “I try out in advance the rhythm and the tonality of what, 
pretending to improvise, I will ‘vocalize”’: “I listen to myself, or I listen to the dictation 
of another voice, of more than one voice: staging, therefore, dance, scenography of 
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45 I modify Alan Bass’  translation here, because it contains a typopgraphical mistake. The correct word 
is not cantratrices but cantatrices, from cantare, “to sing.”
terms, of breath and of ‘changes in tone”’ (1). Derrida thus “never write[s] in 
silence” (1). We might add that he never writes in a silence that is not the silence of the 
silenced genius – a silence that allows the other to resonate. It is, I believe, precisely  this 
mechanism in Derrida’s writing that Cixous addresses she when speaks of Derrida’s text 
on Artaud – La parole soufflée – or more precisely “in this bivalence of the soufflée: a 
word whispered/given by someone else, and a word stolen, whisked away” (“From the 
Words to Life” 2). We can indeed, to reappropriate a Cavellian term, take Derrida’s 
breath away, because, as he replies to Cixous, “the parole soufflée is also the dictation 
of more than one voice (masculine and feminine). They weave together, intertwine, 
replace each other. Always more than one voice that I let resonate with differences in 
pitch, timbre, and tone: so many others, men or women, who speak in me. Who speak 
(to) me” (2). Derrida’s writing sings because it lets us breathe, following the “trajectory 
of obscure circumvolutions” which circumscribe each time a space in which the other 
already resonates. At once, “other unconsciouses also intervene, or the silhouettes of 
known or unknown addressees, for whom I speak and who let me speak [me donnent la 
parole], who give me their word [me donnent leur parole]” (2). 
 Derrida’s knack for writing in many voices, for allowing other voices and the 
voices of the other to resonate in his writing means, so suggests Herman Rapaport, that 
when reading Derrida “one has to think contrapunctually, much as a conductor does 
when conducting a fugue” (96). In this scene of voices, of Cixous reading Derrida, we 
have once more returned to Hamlet and to Specters, for it  is “through literature” that 
Derrida gave Cixous “access to philosophy, showing me its arrow slits and draw-
bridges; I slipped through underground passages” (5). The image of arrow-slits or 
meurtrières is therefore not  only useful to think about how Shakespeare keeps watch 
over Derrida, but also how Derrida keeps watch over us. We might say the same of 
Hamlet’s ghost and its frequencies. As Cixous states, “in describing in Specters of Marx 
the visor effect, he makes his own self-portrait” (3). During their first encounter Cixous 
did not see him, she only “heard him” (3): “it was at the Sorbonne, he was taking his 
agrégation, I was way in the back of the lecture theater, I ‘saw’ only his back. I saw 
only his voice. He was speaking of that which has eternally  interested me: the question 
of death” (3). When we listen to Derrida we are always dealing with the visor effect: 
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“He has a helmet [heaume] (what word of words: home homme heaume, om), a natural 
visor, he looks without being seen. Unheimlich. The being, this man, stays back and 
looks at you. All you have is the letter” (3). All we have is the lettre, Shylock’s bond, 
which is also Derrida’s bond, what Cixous calls “his hypersensibility to what French 
[and I would add English] words conceal both follitterally and philosophonically” (6).
Shakespeare’s génie speaks polyphonically, yet its silence is our eloquence. Like 
Hamlet’s ghost, it can only be apprehended by frequencies which mark both the 
dissemination of sounds and syllables discussed in the previous chapter, as well as the 
caesura, or moment of silence, which allows the génie to sound the other out and to be 
sounded out by  him. It  “engineers a habitation without proper inhabiting” (Specters 20). 
In “Shakespeare Ghosting Derrida”, Cixous suggests that Shakespeare “can be more 
easily incorporated than others with whom Derrida weaves an alliance (Blanchot for 
instance)” because he “does not exist.” “Shakespeare,” she continues: 
 ... is the name of a corpus, of an infinite, unlimited body without ego, 
 without an absolutely identifiable owner, it is the name of the skull which had a 
 tongue which is the whole tongue, Hamlet Derrida gathers him in the 
 graveyard which houses [où demeurent] the archives of his innumerable 
 melancholy affects. (17)
In the words of “Demeure,” Shakespeare “does not remain at home, abidingly [à 
demeure] in the identity  of a nature or even of a historical being identical with 
itself” (28). “Deconstruction is just visiting” Derrida suggests in “The Time is Out of 
Joint” (29). What is at stake when Derrida writes about Shakespeare, “visit  upon visit,” 
is hence “the recurrence or returning, the frequency of a visitation,” because “visitare,” 
Derrida reminds us, is the frequentative of visere (to see, examine, 
contemplate)” (Specters 126). No frequentation of Shakespeare without the visor effect 
and Derrida’s analysis of the spectralisation of every  voice. No reading of Derrida 
reading Shakespeare, indeed no reading Derrida, without this realisation that no oeuvre 
can escape the logic traced by  his chain of quasi-synonymous terms to which 
“frequencies” now also belongs. And as I will suggest in my next chapter with an 
analysis of how Derrida plays on the appearance:disappearance of Hamlet’s ghost in 
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Specters, his inheritance of Marx depends on the differential tones that can re-sonate in 
the space opened by Shakespeare’s frequencies. 
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Second Interlude 
For a while now I have been listening, it seems, with two different ears. One of my 
tympani is scarred and perceptive to the separateness in the other’s voice. The other is 
listening out for the frequencies of the spectral voice and of the génie of literature. Can 
these two modalities of thinking as listening [entendre] listen to each other? Cavell and 
Derrida met at least four times.46 The first meeting occurred in 1970 (one year before 
the publication of “Signature, Event, Context”) when Cavell was invited to Paris to 
discuss “Must We Mean What We Say?” Also present was “a certain Jacques Derrida, 
with whose views, my  host was interested to tell me, my book bore a number of 
affinities” (Pitch 57). Cavell hoped that these affinities would trigger a stimulating, if 
heated, debate on Austin. But the event never lived up to its promise:
 One morning of the three or four days of scheduled conversation with Derrida 
 was to be devoted to a discussion of my title essay, and as I entered the seminar 
 room I noted my  book in Derrida’s hand. Again my exposed essay  did not come 
 into discussion, this time because no one present, so far as I could tell, besides 
 Derrida and me, was much interested to think about Austin. (57)
Although Cavell assumed that he must have read his book, Derrida remained silent and 
the possibility  for a dialogue fizzled out. According to Bell, author of Sounding the 
Abyss: Readings Between Cavell and Derrida, there were at  least three subsequent 
meetings: one at “a study group during the academic year 1985-6 at The Institute for 
Advances Studies at Hebrew University” (109) the proceedings of which, Languages of 
the Unsayable, would include Cavell’s “Naughty Orators” and Derrida’s “Languages of 
the Unsayable” (109); one in March 1987 in San Francisco at “a session of the 
American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division entitled “The Philosophy of 
Jacques Derrida” at  which Cavell was one of two commentators on the program (the 
other being Rodolphe Gasche)” (119-120); and finally in 1988 at Cavell’s Carus 
Lectures in Jerusalem (111). 
 Despite his silence on their first meeting, Derrida engaged with Cavell’s work on 
at least two occasions. Derrida’s response to Cavell’s presentation of “Naughty Orators” 
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46  This does include the period between 1956-57 when, so J. Hillis Miller tells us, Derrida was an 
exchange student at Harvard from the École Normale Supérieure and also attended Austin’s lectures, 
which ultimately proved to be so seminal for Cavell (Speech Acts 61-2).
in 1986 is recorded in the “Postscript 1988,” printed in Contesting Tears: he observed 
“that ‘gas’ and the fateful German Geist (‘spirit,’ ‘mind.’ etc.) are related words” (73). 
In 1988, on the other hand, so Cavell writes in Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, 
“it fell to Derrida to tell me, in response to my emphasis in the first lecture on 
Emerson’s hand in ‘handsome,’ that he had written a text on the hand in Heidegger 
(‘Geschlecht II’)” (xii). Bell is interested in how “Derrida’s first response to Gaslight, 
was still playing itself out in San Francisco, foreshadowing Derrida’s second response 
to come the following year back in Jerusalem,” and indeed how Cavell integrated or 
failed to integrate these responses. Bell takes this echoing and haunting as an occasion 
to put forward an “audacious idea” that “Derrida might have written the ‘text’ of 
Cavell’s comments [in 1987]” (120). Although I am not sure how seriously Bell wants 
us to consider his hypothesis, it is representative of a certain desire to fill a silence, or to 
adjust an asymmetry: “while Cavell has gone into print on Derrida, Derrida hasn’t done 
the same for Cavell” (ixx). The dissymmetry  of their dialogue thus sets the tone for 
much of the work done in this area, where scholars either “stand in” for Derrida, as Bell 
does, or indeed only listen to Cavell’s side of the story (ixx). 
 Perhaps the most benevolent characterisation of the discrepancies between 
Derrida’s and Cavell’s reading of Austin is offered by Cavell himself, in certain 
passages of Little Did I Know; in “Counter-Philosophy  and the Pawn of Voice” in A 
Pitch of Philosophy; and “What Did Derrida Want of Austin?” and the “Seminar on 
‘What Did Derrida Want of Austin?’” in Philosophical Passages. In his reading of How 
to Do Things With Words, Derrida overlooks Austin’s reference to Hippolytus – much to 
Cavell’s dismay. Derrida’s “misreading” of Austin surprises Cavell, since both Cavell 
and Derrida want  to “dismantl[e] the metaphysics of Western philosophy,” both of them 
“find philosophical procedures that  are neither those of commentary  nor of 
interpretation … but ones of what Derrida calls going through texts,” in order “to 
produce an exemplary text in response …, to show how to think in the aftermath of 
some destruction of thinking” (Philosophical Passages 47-8). Derrida also appreciates, 
he adds, that “Austin’s analysis of the performative may  be seen to be motivated 
precisely  as an attack on what deconstruction attacks under the name 
logocentrism” (49). Indeed, the reason why Cavell writes about Derrida’s reading of 
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Austin is that he “felt both that he understood something in Austin that others missed 
and also that he was not interested in something else in Austin which I regarded as 
fundamental” (67). Another way to think of it would be “to note that the way Austin 
draws differences does not make differences for Derrida” (70). This is, Cavell writes, 
hardly  surprising: “In foreign territory you sometimes just  cannot hear a change of 
vowel” (70). If we want to sound out the actual differences between Cavell and Derrida, 
and thus the differences between their philosophical uses of Shakespeare, we must prick 
our ears up to the different ways in which they learn to listen to Austin.47 
Cavell’s encounter with Austin was, as already noted, seminal. It  was “the occasion for 
[him] to ask …, whether he was serious about philosophy”: whether, as he puts it later, 
he “could speak philosophically and mean every word [he] said” (43). It was only after 
the encounter with Austin that he refocused his philosophical inquiries on existential 
questions of existence, posed by, among other things, Shakespearean drama. When he 
therefore describes a mode of speaking philosophically  and meaning every word, he is 
not claiming that a philosopher can actually mean what he says (separateness, in fact, 
makes this near impossible); rather, he is suggesting that, even when we speak 
philosophy, we must mean what we say, that we cannot escape our finitude and the 
bonds of our words that trace our responsibility  towards our interlocutors and ourselves. 
What Cavell learns from Austin is the acknowledgment “that the most casual of 
utterances may be irretrievable: so my tongue swore without my heart – nevertheless I 
am bound” (62). For Cavell, Austin does not deny  “that I have to abandon my words, 
create so many orphans, but  is affirming that  I am abandoned to them, as to thieves, or 
conspirators, taking my breath away, which metaphysics seeks, as it were, to 
deny” (64). In his reading, Austin’s idea of “tethering” hence “reverses Derrida’s picture 
of philosophy’s concept of writing as extending the limits … of the voice or breath …; 
turns it so to speak into one of limiting the inevitable extension of the voice, which must 
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47  No critic working on the interface between Cavell’s and Derrida’s work has,  as far as I am aware, 
focused on questions of the ear. Despite the title of Bearn’s “Sounding Serious: Cavell and Derrida” 
suggesting otherwise, he does not dwell on questions of the ear in either philosopher.  Whilst Bell often 
touches on the ear, for instance in “Autobiographically It Comes Down to Austin: Cavell Puts an Ear to 
Sec,” his concern with how the resonances between Nietzsche and Emerson may bridge the abyss 
between continental and analytic philosophy at times cloud his ability to pick up the differences between 
Cavell’s and Derrida’s acts of listening.
always escape me and will forever seek its way back to me” (64). As Moi puts it: whilst 
“both traditions agree that mishaps, mistakes, misunderstanding, and accidents will arise 
in human communication ... deconstruction draws the skeptical conclusion, namely that 
this means that we can never really be sure that we know what a word or sentence 
means” (“Different Worlds” 812). 
 Moi’s defence of Cavell is typical of the approach taken by many scholars 
looking at the relationship from the side of ordinary language philosophy. Although she 
is absolutely  right to draw a definitive line of separation between Derrida and Cavell, 
she does not make such a distinction between Austin and Cavell. In her account, she 
presents a Cavellian Austin, who is further removed from Derrida and his argument in 
“Signature, Event, Context” than is actually the case. Indeed, when Cavell notes that he 
can “hear the traditions scrape as they pass each other,” much of this scraping happens 
in his own ear (Pitch 74). In Philosophical Passages, Cavell is thus not only, or not 
primarily, defending Austin, but himself. In Bell’s words: “one senses that for Cavell, 
what was at stake was not so much a defence of Austin, as of this new voice Cavell was 
hearing emanating from himself” (150). Cavell seems to suggest that although Derrida 
listens to Austin, he misses the essential difference between the voice Austin is writing 
with and the metaphysical voice Austin is writing against. For Cavell, Derrida does not 
understand “the way  in which Austin is at odds as much with his tradition as Derrida is 
with his tradition,” because he does not have “an ear for, or patience for, certain 
dimensions of Austin” (69, 70). Derrida might turn a deaf ear to one part of Austin, but 
he listens to another; we might say that Derrida’s ear is attuned to a different poetical-
philosophical tone that Cavell, in turn, does not hear.
  As one of my ears listens to Hippolytus’ “my tongue swore so, but my heart did 
not” (Austin 9-10), I cannot help but hear Derrida’s take on Shylock’s insistence on his 
bond – “I stay here on my bond” (4.1.238). Like Austin and Cavell, Derrida affirms 
that, once given, “the human tongue … cannot loosen” the bond (“Relevant” 185). The 
oath, whether this be Hippolytus’ or Shylock’s, whether hearts were heaved into mouths 
or not, is a “bond” that is stronger than language. We are, it seems, in Cavellian 
territory: an oath is not only a performative, but  also a passionate utterance. But the 
ground of our inquiry  has radically shifted. Derrida is interested in seeing what happens 
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to Austin’s idea if we assume that  a self-presence at the heart of Cavell’s idea of 
separateness, no matter how fleeting or hard to obtain, does not exist. If, J. Hillis Miller 
argues in Speech Acts in Literature, “the sign is already  divided within itself by 
iterability, and if it  can act and be readable both in the absence of its ‘origin’ in an 
emitting consciousness and in the absence of any determinable or ‘intended’ receiver, 
then my intention to say  something ... has, distressingly, no power to control the 
meaning of what I say” (92). 
 For Cavell, Derrida’s “deafness” to certain nuances in Austin (and also 
Wittgenstein) is a wilful one, one fuelled by the very human sceptical position in which 
an unbearable metaphysical finitude is exchanged for a problem of knowledge: 
“Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s surprises of the everyday are not ones for which Derrida 
has much ear, or much patience. But who could be exempt from turning a deaf ear, 
sometimes, just here?” (Philosophical Passages 90). Thus Derrida’s overdetermination 
of Austin’s performative is often taken to be a form of scepticism, of a Hippolytan 
scheme to escape from the bond of our words, even if these are the words of literature. 
In Stanley Cavell and Literary Scepticism, Michael Fischer spells out what are often 
thought to be the consequences of such a “sceptical” reading of literature: “Instead of a 
living body infused with meaning and consciousness, the text becomes a hollow shell 
or corpse” (43). Thus for Fischer “the deconstructionist’s problem” is not the text’s 
“absence” but its “presence”: “He wants the hollowed-out, indecipherable text that he 
gets” (78). For Fischer, the arguments made in “deconstructive” literary theory, as 
presented by  Derrida, but also J. Hillis Miller or Paul de Man, resemble other-minds 
scepticism and thus have deleterious ethical consequences: “like the other-minds skeptic 
[the deconstructive literary theorist] feels limited to merely indirect, arbitrary 
signs” (75). Both the sceptic and the “deconstructive” literary theorist “suspect that our 
criteria for interpreting these signs are disappointingly provisional or local,” and like the 
sceptic he will “leave other people ineluctably hidden behind unreadable signifiers, 
blank looks, and dense barriers” (75). In this view “the other turns out to be 
unintelligible, inanimate, empty” (75). As a true Cavellian sceptic, Derrida and others 
would therefore, in Fischer’s account, cling on to “epistemological assumptions” to 
“free us from ethical dilemmas: from being there for another, from acknowledging 
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someone’s pain or evading it, from hiding violence or expressing it, from giving in to 
desire or repressing it, from overcoming shame or succumbing to it” (77). This widely-
held image (at least amongst scholars of Cavell) of Derrida as the sceptic is inaccurate, 
and arises precisely from listening to Derrida with ears attuned to Cavell. 
Reading Cavell and Derrida reading Shakespeare I, perhaps, must not necessarily be left 
with a ringing in my ears. I have been listening to two singular and very distinct 
philosophical voices which, far from being dissonant to each other, exist in entirely 
different modalities. Let’s return to my  double-eared reading of Shylock and 
Hippolytus. What for Derrida is at stake in Shylock’s insistence on his oath is not the 
metaphysical outlet Austin feared, quite the opposite. Whilst Cavell hears separateness, 
there is one passage in “Heidegger’s Ear” which clearly highlights the pitfalls that 
Derrida might have found in such an approach: “to prick up the ear is not to hear 
auditory sensations and noises, sonorous complexes, acoustic phenomena that  could 
give rise to a psychology. No, we prick up our ear toward what is beyond the ear, the 
open ear ....” (178). What Derrida is interested in is the open and resonating ear of the 
other; it is not the pathos of separateness, but what in “Che cos’é la poesia” is called “a 
certain passion of the singular mark, the signature that repeats its dispersion” (235). The 
oath is, to pick up Hippolytus, not in the heart, but, as Derrida writes, “in the human 
tongue” (“Relevant” 185). The “bond,” “promise,” or “fidelity” due not to a 
metaphysical being, but to the “word given in its original letter,” or “la parole donnée 
dans sa lettre originale” (183/33). Our bond is not only with the mot, or the meaning of 
the word, much less with the utterer’s separateness, but also with its parole, even more 
specifically its lettre, and how it can sound and resound differently across texts. 
Derrida’s sensitivity to the way the lettre haunts is in this sense not a symptom of his 
sceptical dodging of responsibility  to the other (whether this be a text or a person, or 
indeed a text and therefore a person); rather, for Derrida, our responsibility to the other 
begins with this fidelity – this fidelity as infidelity – to the (Shakespearean) idiom.
 Just like for Cavell, for Derrida the “ethical” significance of literature is bound 
up with his understanding of the act  of reading. But whilst the Cavellian act of reading 
is sensitive to the other’s constant presentness and the separateness that hinders our 
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(direct) access to it, the Derridean act of reading is responsive to the resonant spaces 
opened by  a text and the differential readerly tones they allow for. To return to where we 
left off in the previous chapter, Derrida’s attention to the lettre does not constitute the 
stance of the sceptic who is deaf to others and their ethical demands. Rather, it forms the 
differential tones of Derrida’s philosophy that trace what, in Of Grammatology, Derrida 
calls a “nonethical opening of ethics” (140). 
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8. Differential Tones
To hear what Derrida does with Marx we must listen to the “differential tones” of 
Specters of Marx, which resonate in the space between Derrida’s reading of Marx and 
his reading of Hamlet. Amongst Derrida’s texts on Shakespeare, Specters has attracted 
by far the most interest, albeit more for the fact that it  is considered to be Derrida’s most 
overtly “political” book than because it  is a book about Shakespeare. What is perhaps 
the most astonishing feature of many critical responses to Specters is that the vast 
majority  of scholars seem to ignore Shakespeare or misunderstand his role in this text. 
Specters’ wake was filled with impassioned critical responses, defending Marx and 
finding fault with Derrida’s reading. Many Marxists critical of what Derrida seemed to 
be doing in Specters took to the stage in a symposium published in 1999 as Ghostly 
Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derrida’s Spectres of Marx. Amongst 
Derrida’s critics were Terry  Eagleton and Aijaz Ahmad, both of whom took the literary 
nature of Derrida’s reading of Marx at  best as a sign of political timidity, and at worst as 
pseudo-intellectual escapism from the strictures of “real” political engagement. 
Eagleton’s “Marxism without Marxism” begins with the backhanded compliment that 
although Derrida “has always been a man of the Left,” he is left-wing “in some suitably 
indeterminate sense” (83). In contrast to the “genuine radical” whose “hearty  desire” is 
“to stop having to be so obdurately oppositional” Derrida is characterised here as “an 
exasperating kind of believer who holds what he does until he meets someone else who 
holds the same” (86, 85). For Eagleton, Derrida only reaps Marxists’ negative lessons, 
its critique, its questioning, leaving its “positivity” to Marxists like Eagleton himself. 
Starting from a single-minded idea of what “political engagement” is and can be, 
Eagleton concludes that Derrida’s “curiously empty formalistic messianism” does not 
amount to an “effective” socialism, but  merely remains an “ultimate poststructuralist 
fantasy  … a dissent beyond all formulable discourse, a promise which would betray 
itself in the act of fulfilment, a perpetual excited openness to the Messiah who had 
better not  let us down by doing anything as determinate as coming” (87). Ahmed argues 
along the same lines, but transposes Eagleton’s critique to the ear in lambasting 
Derrida’s “messianic tonal register” (90). Derrida’s handling of Marx also proved to be 
a bitter pill to swallow for Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak who, in “Ghostwriting,” struck a 
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particularly aggressive note. At the beginning of her piece Spivak admits that she has 
“always had trouble with Derrida on Marx,” according to a friend of hers it  is “maybe 
because [she] feel[s] proprietorial about Marx” (65). Like Eagleton and Ahmed, Spivak 
feels that “the ghost of Marx that Derrida is most haunted by  returns to the bosom of 
Abraham, shorn of all specificity, mark of a messianism without content, carrier of 
merely the structure of a promise which cancels the difference between democracy and 
Marxism” (66). 
 Neither Eagleton, Ahmed nor Spivak give a satisfactory account of what 
Shakespeare is doing in Specters and this is, I would like to argue, one of the reasons for 
why they  misinterpret Derrida’s project. Like in Keston Sutherland’s Stupefaction – 
which portrays the relationship between Derrida and Marx as largely  adversarial – here 
a misreading of what Derrida is doing with Marx is linked to a blindness to what 
Shakespeare is doing in Specters, indeed what, as I argued in Chapter 6, Shakespeare is 
doing to some of Marx’s own texts (10). At the same time, without an in-depth analysis 
of what Hamlet is doing in Specters, any positive reading of Specters must remain little 
more than aspirational. 
 Let us, for instance, turn to Ernesto Laclau’s “The Time Is out of Joint” and 
Christopher Prendergast’s “Derrida’s Hamlet.” For Laclau, “the logic of the specter” 
cannot be separated from “the category  of messianism” (87). In other words, “the 
messianism we are speaking about,” the one “without eschatology, without pregiven 
promised land, without determinate content,” is dependent on a thinking of hauntology 
as what fissures the present, “resulting from the radical opening to the event, to the 
other,” which in turn is “the very  possibility of justice” (91). Like Laclau, Prendergast 
recognises the two interconnected, deep-structural, and persistently recurring 
preoccupations of deconstruction: ontology (the philosophy of Being) and justice (the 
sphere of the politico-ethical) (44). But although Prendergast asks the right questions – 
“What is Hamlet  doing in a book about Marx and ghosts (…)?”  (44) – like Laclau, he 
does not really engage with the subject. Laclau’s and Prendergast’s readings are 
representative of most good criticism on Specters in that although they acknowledge 
what is really  at stake in Derrida’s reading of Marx, they do not explicitly link this to 
what Hamlet is doing in the text, more precisely  to how Shakespeare’s position in the 
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text opens our acts of reading to a radical re-thinking of an event or an opening towards 
the other. Put  differently, the question of how Shakespeare is imbricated in the 
hauntological textuality Specters describes – a textual hauntology Prendergast aims at 
with this question: “How is it that Derrida, citing an essay by Blanchot, in which 
Blanchot uses the expression ‘since Marx,’ can add that Blanchot’s ‘since Marx’ could 
easily have been ‘since Shakespeare’?” (44) – is never broached. Whether we criticise 
or welcome what Derrida seems to be doing with Marx, we miss something essential 
when we do not account for the differential tones of Hamlet in this text.
We cannot grasp Specters’ political and ethical import if we do not understand it 
primarily  as an act of reading. In “Marx & Sons,” Derrida’s response to the other essays 
published in Ghostly Demarcations, Ahmed is on the one hand criticised for being too 
cavalier in his admission that he only read Specters on his flight to Ljubljana a day 
before giving his response (264). On the other hand, he points out that some of Spivak’s 
“errors stem from an outright inability  to read, exacerbated here by the wounded 
resentment of her ‘proprietoriality  about Marx’” (223). Derrida illustrates this with 
Spivak’s misreading of “there will be no re-politicization, there will be no politics 
otherwise” as “We won’t repoliticize!” (Specters 109, 69). What McQuillan and 
Bennington have perhaps argued better than anyone else is that “deconstruction cannot 
account for itself within a traditional political order because deconstruction wants to 
understand and exceed all and every such order” (McQuillan 100). “Deconstruction” 
does not offer a practical politics and to demand the formulation of the latter “is 
fundamentally to miss the point of the New International and all that it  implies” (93). 
What is at stake here for Derrida is not only a lack of attention in reading, as well as a 
complete misunderstanding of his idea of political commitment, but also how the two 
are connected. When he, therefore, rebuffs his critics on the grounds that they  have not 
read him properly, he is not distancing the debate from politics, but is rather refocusing 
the debate on what “re-politicization” entails for him. 
 It is striking that in “Marx & Sons,” Derrida understands the failure to engage in 
an appropriate act of reading Specters in terms of an aural insensitivity. Both Eagleton 
and Ahmed are “insensitive … to variations of tone” in this text (234). In order to 
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understand Specters’ “re-politicization” we would have to listen to its “tone,” indeed it 
would mean obtaining “a slightly more elaborate concept of tone, of its fusion with 
concept, meaning and ... performativity” (234). One must therefore have “a finer ear for 
the differential, unstable, shifting qualities of tone – for example, the tonal value that 
signal irony or play, even at the most serious moments, and always in passages where 
the tone is, precisely, inseparable from the content” (234). For Derrida “re-
politicization” always means a re-reading which, inverting Feuerbach’s 11th thesis, 
posits that philosophers can change the world because they can interpret it. Indeed, 
central to Derrida’s reading of Marx is “an interpretation that transforms the very  thing 
it interprets” (Specters 81). For Derrida, such performative acts of reading cannot lead 
towards the formulation of political action; they rather posit the New International as 
“an inoperative community of transformative interpretation” (McQuillan 102). 
Therefore, at the heart of Derrida’s understanding of re-politicisation as re-reading lies, 
Bennington writes, “the paradox that theorising and interpretation are structurally 
interminable and can never prepare for the interruptive and precipitate moment of 
decision and action, but that the decisiveness of the decision depends none the less on 
its structural relation to interminable analysis” (Interrupting 25). I read Derrida’s 
criticism of Ahmed’s hardness of hearing, and his linked proposal of tone, as an 
indication that the interminable analysis Bennington speaks of must be understood in 
terms of both the syllabic travel of frequencies, its lettre or parole and its inter- and 
intra-textual reverberations, as well as the interminable and indeterminable resonances 
and echoes the “differential, unstable, shifting qualities of tone” effect in the resonant 
space between text and reader, between Shakespeare and Derrida. 
 Whatever tone is, its “distinctive signs are difficult to isolate,” because a tone 
never exists “in complete purity,” because the tone of this tone is constituted by gaps, by 
a “tonal differential” (29, 21). It is precisely “these gaps, this tonal differential” that 
interests Derrida when he reads and when he writes: how this tone “shifts, moves from 
one phrase to another, from one tone to another” (21, 22). What we are dealing with, 
then, when we speak of tone is perhaps what Martin Hägglund has addressed as spacing 
[espacement], or “the becoming-space of time and the becoming-time of 
space” (Radical Atheism 2). I quote again from “The Spatial Arts”: “I have written 
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many texts with several voices, and in them spacing is visible. There are several people 
speaking, and this necessarily implies a dispersion of voices, of tones that space 
themselves, that automatically  spatialise themselves” (22, my emphasis). Hägglund’s 
greatest merit in Radical Atheism is certainly his analysis of this spacing which, 
although it “defines all of Derrida’s key terms,” although it is an “ultratranscendental” 
condition, has received little systematic attention (2, 10). As for Derrida, for Hägglund 
spacing is an “absolutely general condition.” Without itself being definitely describable, 
it is “nothing in itself because it designates the spacing of time that makes it impossible 
for anything to be in itself” (3).  Hägglund’s account is nevertheless off tone. In saying 
this, I do not want to “denounce a manner of giving oneself airs,” which seems to be the 
current vogue (“Apocalyptic” 29). What I rather want to propose is that Hägglund 
seems to follow “the dream or the idea of philosophical discourse, of philosophical 
address [allocution] ... to make tonal difference inaudible” (29). 
 Despite Hägglund’s remarkable treatment of spacing, something about it is still 
evading him, something that we might think of precisely in terms of tone. In “Language 
Remains,” Samir Haddad comes closest to putting his finger on what is amiss in 
Hägglund’s book: “the strength of the book lies in its articulation of a fundamental logic 
that functions across Derrida’s writing. But this carries with it a certain weakness that I 
would describe as an indifference to language” (139). For Haddad, Hägglund can only 
“sustain his view of deconstruction as an enterprise free of evaluation,” because he 
overlooks the evaluative forces always already at work in language (143). Hägglund has 
given a convincing answer to Haddad’s query, but  a different aspect of Haddad’s interest 
in language still remains unresolved.48  Hägglund’s indifference to language is less 
expressed in his disregard of the evaluative structure of language, than in the question of 
“tone.” By abstracting one common movement – spacing – from Derrida’s “non-
synonymous substitutions,” Hägglund is missing out on the nuances between Derrida’s 
uncanny  treatments of différance, supplement, trace etc.. What he overhears are, in 
other words, the specific and singular acts of reading from which this chain of “non-
synonymous substitutions” emerge (“Différance” 12). It is, however, precisely in these 
differential tones, in the way Derrida responds and appropriates, performatively 
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48  See Hägglund’s “The Challenge of Radical Atheism, A Response.” The Centennial Review. 9.1 
(2009): 227-252.
interprets the terms of the texts he reads, that the opening towards the “to come” lies. 
Put differently, since Hägglund shuts his ears to the differential tones of Derrida’s 
writing, he undercuts the very idea of a non-ethical opening to ethics for which he is 
arguing. If we want to understand the vanishing point of Derrida’s reading of Marx, 
with its idea of a justice and ethics “to come,” we must listen to the differential tones 
that resonate in Derrida’s acts of reading Shakespeare. 
8.1 Resonances of Shakespeare
At the beginning of the “Exordium,” we hear a voice ringing in the dark. It belongs to 
“you or me,” Derrida writes, and says: “I would like to learn to live finally [je voudrais 
apprendre à vivre enfin] “(xvi/130). At once this “mot d’orde” is linked to Shakespeare. 
Peggy Kamuf’s translation of mot d’orde as “watchword” immediately resonates with 
the image of the genius Shakespeare watching over the English language by shooting 
flèches at  it. This watchword, indeed, Derrida continues, “vibrates like an arrow in the 
course of an irreversible and asymmetrical address, the one that goes most often from 
father to son, master to disciple, or master to slave (‘I’m going to teach you how to 
live’)” (xvi). In Hamlet and in Specters, everything turns on this desire to speak with 
this spectral voice and its mot d’orde. Again, the visor effect and its frequencies are 
quivering. For Derrida, there is no inheritance, no scholar to come without such an 
asymmetrical address and if we do not listen to the frequencies that create it and which 
spring forth from it. 
 How do we listen to this voice which is also the voice of the ghost, the voice in 
every ghost, as well as the voice of the “Thing Shakespeare” that Derrida is listening to?
Whilst most scholars believe that “looking is sufficient,” one of the most radical claims 
made by Specters is that  in order to respond to Marcellus’ call for the scholar of 
tomorrow, we must not only look at but also learn to listen to the spectre (11). Let us 
return to Hamlet, whose theatre of the night in the Cellarage scene is also a theatre of 
what Nancy calls “acousmatics, or the teaching model by which the teacher remains 
hidden from the disciple who listens to him” (Listening 3). This scene is characterised 
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by a strange polyphony and counterpoint  of Horatio and Marcellus’ voices, speaking as 
one and then after the other. There is a strange repetition or circularity about Hamlet’s 
demands, based perhaps on a distinction between sight and hearing and on a desire to 
match the word (swear) to the deed (the laying of hands on swords). The strangest 
element is, however, the contretemporal voice of the ghost. The scene is marked by 
both a temporal and a spatial disjunction: the Ghost’s “Swear!” always comes after 
Hamlet’s “Swear!” and the Ghost is under the stage, in the Cellarage, while Hamlet is 
on at  least two different spots on the stage, as he asks Marcellus and Horatio to follow a 
curious choreography. As Samuel Weber has argued, the cellarage “suddenly reveals 
itself to be the haunt of a ghost allows his voice, echoing words of the others, to 
interrupt and impede the action they intend” (184). For Weber the ghost’s “utterance is 
both eminently  theatrical, bringing into play – in the play – all of its theatrical elements, 
and eminently  antiperformative: it renders impossible the performance of an act and the 
continuation of the plot” (184). I would like to suggest instead that despite punctuating 
the performance of the oath, the ghost’s resonant and re-verberating voice marks the 
performative nature of the act of reading that posits Specters’“re-politicization” (my 
emphasis).
! Asking Marcellus and Horatio to swear, Hamlet speaks of the spectre, but  he 
also speaks to the spectre, replying, himself, to the spectre’s injunctions. Hamlet’s 
words, to the spectre and of the spectre, however, do not return to him as his own but 
return strangely altered and only after a delay. The Ghost’s Cellarage is a veritable 
resonance chamber. The Ghost's first interpunctuating “Swear” comes three whole lines 
after Hamlet's “Nay but swear’t” (1.5.149, 144). The ghost’s second “Swear” is again 
heard three lines after Hamlet's “Consent to swear” and one line after “Swear by my 
sword” (1.5.155,152,154). Before they are allowed to resonate, the Cellarage’s 
resounding membrane keeps Hamlet’s words a while. Finally  the spectre is made or 
allowed to speak: Hamlet’s “Swear by  my Sword” is echoed as “Swear by his 
Sword” (1.5.158,159). Like at the beginning of Hamlet, where our ears are haunted by 
resonating and intermingling voices, in the Cellarage scene we are not dealing with two 
distinct and corporal voices. We are not listening, or not only listening, to the voice(s) of 
the spectre, but also to the spectral voice, the voice that resounds whenever a self, in 
Nancy’s words, “listens to itself [s’écoute],” and thus “resound[s] further 
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away” (Listening 35). By “differing/deferring itself,” by speaking “at the same time 
several times – and in several voices” this spectral voice also says: “choose and decide 
from among what you inherit” (Specters 18). It says: choose what you listen to, choose 
what to echo. 
 Letting the spirit speak, Hamlet also speaks with and to the ghost. As in 
Derrida’s account of Echo in “Veni,” in the Cellarage scene we are not only confronted 
with an echo, but with iteration. In “Resonances of Echo: A Derridean Allegory,” 
Pleshette DeArmitt points out that  what Derrida “hears in Echo’s reply to Narcissus is 
by no means an empty reduplication or a hollow reverberation of the same … but  a 
unique and inventive response” (95). In Derrida’s words: “Echo thus lets be heard by 
whoever wants to hear it, by  whoever might love hearing it, something other than what 
she seems to be saying” (“Veni” xii). Just as Echo who “might have feigned to repeat 
the last syllable of Narcissus in order to say something else or, really, in order to sign at 
that very instant in her own name,” in allowing the ghost to speak and to echo him, 
Hamlet obeys the injunction by “tak[ing] back the initative of answering or responding 
in a responsible way, thus disobeying a sovereign injunction” (xi–xii). In DeArmitt’s 
reading, Echo can “passionately” open herself “to the future, to what is to come” (95), 
precisely because, as Derrida writes in “Psyche: Inventions of the Other,” she passes 
“through the economy of the same, indeed while miming or repeating it” (45). It is just 
in this moment of resonance, this “intersection of repetition and the unforeseeable,” that 
we find “the call for a thinking or the event to come, of the democracy  to come, of the 
reason to come” (“Veni” xii, xv).
Enter GHOST (1.1.38). Exit Ghost (1.1.50). Enter GHOST (1.1.124). [Exit Ghost] 
(1.1.140). As Attridge reminds us in “Ghost Writing,” it is not only “possible to talk 
about the ghost in literature; we can say  that the ghost is literature (as long as we’re 
cautious about that word ‘is’)”(224). When Derrida asks us to listen to the ghost’s voice 
in Hamlet, he is also asking us “to make or to let a spirit speak” (Specters 11). We must 
“speak of the ghost, indeed to the ghost and with it,” meaning that we must not only 
speak of, to and with the ghost in Hamlet but also the ghost of Hamlet (xviii). We must 
look at the minutiae of Derrida’s reading of Hamlet to sound out how he allows himself 
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to be ghosted by Shakespeare; indeed, how he ghosts him in turn. And it is precisely  this 
reciprocal haunting that the theatre of Derrida’s philosophical-literary writing opens that 
marks how different Derrida’s use of Shakespeare is compared to other philosophers’. It 
is, so Timothy Clark argues, “one thing to come up  with a general defence of the 
institution of literary writing” it  is “another thing, however, to put  such thinking in 
practice in the minutiae of how to read, interpret and talk about specific texts” (130). In 
Specters, “the Thing Shakespeare” is made to, or let speak, in particular through an 
intricate play on the appearance:disappearance of Hamlet’s ghost. In the first  two parts 
of Specters, the ghost’s appearance:disappearance is evoked three times. What we lose 
in translation is that when echoing the ghost’s frequencies Derrida always echoes 
Shakespeare’s English. The first time is in the “Exordium”: “Furtive and untimely, the 
apparition of the spectre does not belong to that time, it does not give time, not that one: 
‘Enter the ghost, exit  the ghost, re-enter the ghost’ (Hamlet) [‘Enter the Ghost, exit the 
Ghost, re-enter the Ghost’ (Hamlet)]” (xix/17). The second time is at the beginning of 
“Injunctions of Marx,” the part of Specters in which Derrida interweaves Hamlet and 
Marx most tightly, when, answering his own question of “what goes on between these 
generations?” Derrida responds: “An omission, a strange lapsus. Da, then fort, exit 
Marx [Da, puis fort, exit Marx]: (3/23). The third time is also in “Injunctions of Marx,” 
where Derrida notes that “this first theatrical apparition already marked a 
repetition” (11). Again, Derrida inserts Shakespeare’s English in parentheses: 
“(Marcellus: ‘What, ha’s this thing appear’d againe tonight?’ Then: Enter the Ghost, 
Exit the Ghost, Enter the Ghost, as before) [Puis: ‘Enter the Ghost. Exit the Ghost, Re-
enter the Ghost N’)]” (11/32). 
 The ghost  is in the detail. In the first play on the ghost’s frequency, Derrida does 
not italicise Hamlet, whereas the translator Peggy Kamuf does. What enters and returns 
is thus not only  Hamlet the father of Hamlet, Hamlet the ghost, but also Hamlet the 
play. What returns are also the resonances of this play, and the differential vibrations of 
Derrida’s rendition of them. In the third reiteration of the ghost’s enter:exit, Kamuf 
changes Derrida’s “Re-enter the Ghost” to “Enter the Ghost, as before.” It is, I believe, 
crucial to hold on to Derrida’s original rendition, because we cannot think of this 
reading scene without this “re-.” Let us return to the flèches we thought about at the 
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beginning of this second part, the “re” in “re-jette,” the porpentine’s “re-semanticization 
of the letter” (“L’aphorisme” 134; “Istrice” 311). This “re-” which has been haunting us 
ever since Nancy’s resonance, through to Derrida’s “re-politicization” that Spivak 
misheard (Listening 40; Spivak 69). What do we make of this “re-”? Nancy writes: 
“Meaning consists in a reference [renvoi]” (Listening 7). According to Le Grand Robert, 
renvoi is 1) le fait de porter une affaire devant un autre juge, the recourse to another 
judge; 2) marque invitant le lecteur à se reporter, or in other words a footnote or 
reference; 3) le fait de renvoyer, or a revocation; 4) le fait de retourner; 5) action de 
renvoyer; 6) un ajournement. Renvoi: a return, a sending back, a dismissal, a 
suspension, a postponement, a cross-reference, even a footnote. In music, a renvoi is a 
da capo sign. The common denominator of renvoi’s meanings might be understood as a 
certain movement traced by the prefix re-: a movement indicated by the OED as one of 
repetition or return to a previous state (first meaning), one of mutuality (second 
meaning), one of coming behind or after (third meaning), and finally a movement of 
frequentative or intensive force (fourth meaning).
 Here the “re-” marks the resonating space of the arrow and the inauguration of a 
different understanding of time, what Nancy calls a “sonorous time,” a ‘“present in 
waves on a swell, not in a point on a line; it is a time that opens up, that is hollowed 
out” (Listening 13). In this reverberation chamber, the present is made to resonate as a 
“successive addition of presents” where every “reprise” of present is both past and 
“(still) to come” (18). It marks a time that opens a “spatiality  by which, at the same 
time, I am penetrated, for it opens up in me as well as around me, and from me as well 
as toward me” (14).We must understand the “Re-” of “Re-Enter the Ghost” as “a 
Derridean performative,” which in J. Hillis Miller’s words, “creates an absolute rupture 
between the present  and the past. It inaugurates a future that Derrida calls a future 
anterior, or an unpredictable à-venir” (For Derrida 152). The re–politicisation at the 
heart of Specters lies in the “re-” and in the resonances of Derrida’s performative acts of 
reading Shakespeare. Without such acts of reading there will be “no future, no time-to-
come [à venir], no other, otherwise; no event worthy of the name, no revolution. And no 
justice” (“Marx & Sons” 251).
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 In an academic context renvoi can also mean expulsion (Grand Robert). We 
must listen to the ghost and balance on the suspended edge of this ‘re-’ – at once 
expulsion and reincorporation. Friends and scholars lend me your ears: it has never been 
more important to learn “not how to make conversation with the ghost but how to talk 
with him, with her, how to let them speak or how to give them back speech, even if it is 
in oneself, in the other, in the other in oneself” (Specters 221). I would like to learn to 
speak to and with the ghost. Faced with the ghost, Marcellus refers to Horatio: “Thou art 
a scholar – speak to it, Horatio’” (1.1.41). At first Horatio does his best “to call it, 
interpellate it, interrogate it, more precisely, to question the Thing that it still 
is” (Specters 12–3). He says: “What art thou that usurp’st  this time of night” (1.1.45). 
Who or what is this ghost? The scholar does not receive an answer; the ghost remains 
silent. What or who is a scholar? For Kamuf, “taking account of the general condition of 
spectrality has to displace the limits of scholarship and even redefine altogether the role 
of scholars” (Addresses 239). In Derrida’s reading, Marcellus calls for “a reader, an 
expert, a professor, an interpreter,” a “scholar classique,” who might even have had to 
jump through one or two institutional hoops (Specters 11/33). As Sutherland points out, 
here “Derrida’s use of an English word in italics cannot be unimportant” (8). Perhaps, 
Derrida suggests, Marcellus was “anticipating the coming, one day, one night, several 
centuries later, of another ‘scholar,”’ a scholar who would know all about how in this 
drama of the night  the who and what bleed into each other. For Derrida, this scholar 
“would finally  be capable, beyond the opposition between presence and non-presence, 
actuality and inactuality, life and non-life, of thinking the possibility  of the specter … he 
would know how to address himself to spirits” (Specters 13). How does such a scholar 
come into being? In Elizabethan England, a scholar was also someone “who had studied 
at the university, and who, not having entered any of the learned professions or obtained 
any fixed employment, sought to gain a living by  literary  work” (OED, meaning 2b). In 
the future, the avenir, the scholar must learn to think beyond this opposition of “fixed 
employment” and “literary work,” beyond complicity with and opposition to a system; 
and so does the university.
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8.2 Postscript: “Come”
Come, we are back where it all started: Shakespeare’s arrows. There is what in “Of an 
Apocalyptic Tone” Derrida calls “an apocalyptic pli [fold, envelope, letter, habit, 
message]” in their trajectory (58). Their pli which induces “a tonal change 
[changement] and an immediate tonal duplicity  in every apocalyptic voice,” is also a 
folding back to its beginning where the other already resounds (58). Listen: “Come!” It 
does not speak of separateness, it is “not itself a full presence; it is differential, that is to 
say, it is relayed through the time and the gradations or gaps of tonality” (“The Spatial 
Arts” 21). Instead, “come” is always said to the other, and the other already “re-”sonates 
in its undecidable address:
 .... the voices, the places, the routes of ‘Come’ traverse the partition [paroi] of 
 a song, a volume of citational and recitative echoes, as it [ça] began by 
 responding. And in this traversal or this transfer(ence), the voices find their 
 spacing, the space of their movement, but they nullify it with one stroke [d’un 
 trait]; they no longer give it time. (“Apocalyptic Tone”63) 
It is all a question of the speed of the “re-jette”: not of the speed of the arrow’s or 
missile’s flight, but rather the speed which propels it (“L’aphorisme” 134). 
 The speed of the arrow’s re-jette is what, to return to “Aphorism Countertime,” 
confuses our understanding of an act of reading as linear. In “Of an Apocalyptic Tone,” 
Derrida writes that “come” comes “from the other already as a response, and a citation 
without past present” (65). Derrida’s play  on the appearance:disappearance of the ghost 
opens Specters up to the strange temporal mode Derrida recognises in Shakespeare’s 
watch over the English language: “Qui ouvrit ainsi l’une de ces brèches, souvent des 
meurtrières poétiques et pensantes, depuis lesquelles Shakespeare aura veillé sur la 
langue anglaise [...]” ( Spectres 42). Futur antérieur or future prefect. In “This Strange 
Institution Called Literature” Derrida says:
 I would very much like to read and write in the space or heritage of Shakespeare, 
 in relation to him I have an infinite admiration and gratitude; I would like to 
 become (alas, it’s pretty late) a “Shakespeare expert”; I know that everything is 
 in Shakespeare; everything and the rest, so everything or nearly. (67)
In French, Derrida inserts this English term “Shakespeare expert.” What is a 
Shakespeare expert? An expert is someone who has “a special skill at  a task or 
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knowledge in a subject” (OED). This term resonates with the trappings of professional 
academia, the professionalisation of research and of thought. It smacks of the 
categorisation of research interests, of the ticking of boxes on forms, of key  word 
searches. Experts of Shakespeare, declare yourselves if you want to be counted! This is 
not the kind of Shakespeare expert Derrida desires to be, and indeed, already  is. 
Deriving from expertus, the past participle of the Latin experiri, an expert is one who 
has already has gained the experience, already gathered the knowledge of many  failed 
and successful attempts. As the past tense perhaps suggests, an expert is done trying and 
attempting, he already is in the know.
 Derrida, he himself readily admits, is no “Shakespeare expert.” In “Derrida’s 
Event,” Royle notes that the inverted commas here not only  suggest “a characteristic 
sense of irony and comedy,” but also “draw attention to the connotations of trying, 
testing and experimentation that belong with the word ‘expert’” (39). Derrida’s work 
shows that the space opened by Shakespeare must always remain something of the 
future, yet to be tried and experienced.  And the same may be true for readers of Derrida 
(reading Shakespeare) who are faced with the Derridean event of reading, an event, 
Bennington writes, “so worthy of its name that  it would suggest a kind of 
impossibility  ... or unthinkability” (“In the event” 33). “Derrida’s event,” Bennington 
suggests a little later, “is an ongoing series of after-the-event reprises and iterations of 
an event” that “never quite or entirely happened, or finished happening, and is to that 
extent still to come” (34). Just as one cannot become a Derrida expert, one cannot 
become a Shakespeare expert, only  a experiendum, one who will experience and try his 
luck with Shakespeare. “Everything,” Derrida writes, “is in Shakespeare; everything 
and the rest, so everything or nearly” (“Strange Institution” 67). Derrida’s wish to 
become a “Shakespeare expert” is hence articulated as a wish to “read and write in the 
space or heritage of Shakespeare” (my emphasis). The territory of the Shakespeare 
expert would hence not only be the corpus of his oeuvre but also what is written after it, 
what belongs, in other words, to “the rest” which is already in Shakespeare and the rest 
of Shakespeare still to come.
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Conclusion 
This thesis started by outlining Nussbaum’s representative exposition of what a 
sophisticated literary-philosophical investigation should do: it should illuminate the 
world of the plays, actually do philosophy and account for why  literature can do 
something for philosophy that it cannot do for itself. I have tried to show that both 
Cavell and Derrida meet these criteria. The reasons and reasonings of scepticism 
illuminate the plays, Cavell’s act of reading itself aspires to acknowledge the texts and 
its characters, and his observations about what demands Shakespearean drama makes on 
us, together with his account  of this drama’s substitution of religion, show why 
literature can help  philosophy do something that it cannot do for itself. Similarly, the 
logic traced by Derrida’s “quasi-identical synonyms” not only illuminates certain 
moments in the plays – whether this be Romeo and Juliet’s balcony scene, or Hamlet’s 
dis-jointed mourning – but also the plays’ reverberative effect on us, thus outlining the 
reasons for why a philosopher may  find something in his readings of Shakespeare that 
he cannot find in philosophy alone.
 Yet, philosophy and literature alike are deaf to what is most singular about 
Cavell’s and Derrida’s acts of reading Shakespeare: their clairaudience. And it is 
precisely be giving heed to their clairaudience – by  becoming clairaudient ourselves, 
perhaps – that we may outline how different Cavell’s and Derrida’s acts of readings are 
to those described by Nussbaum. An analysis of the role of the ear in Cavell’s reading 
has shown how his readings exceed Nussbaum’s criteria. Discovering the experience of 
separateness, Cavell’s interest in Shakespeare is fundamental to his philosophical 
endeavour. The ear’s marking of separateness in Shakespearean drama, and in Cavell’s 
reading of it, furthermore suggest that  in turning to literature, Cavell does not  simply 
engage with a precinct of thought that  is affine to philosophy; rather philosophy and 
literature are both aspects of a modality of thought seeking to alleviate separateness. 
Shakespeare’s importance thus resonates throughout Cavell’s oeuvre even in places 
where he does not write about him. Furthermore, what the ear discovers as the root 
cause of scepticism also dictates a modality  of thought underpinning Cavell’s acts of 
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reading. Moreover, it  is a textual model which also informs his own philosophical 
writing style, his pitch of philosophy. 
 Like Cavell’s readings of Shakespeare, Derrida’s ear can not only pick up actual 
sounds and silences; it also becomes a figure for the act of reading. His extraordinary 
attention to sounds, rhythms, echoes and reverberations of and in Shakespeare is thus 
inextricably linked to his use of the ear as a figure for a textual model explaining the 
relationship  between Shakespearean text and reader. In allowing his acts of reading and 
writing to be haunted by the lettre and sounds of the Shakespearean idiom, Derrida’s 
texts on Shakespeare do philosophy, albeit  in a way  perhaps not anticipated by 
Nussbaum’s criteria. For Derrida, Shakespeare’s oeuvre is not merely a neighbouring 
precinct of thought; in texts written on Shakespeare (and as his translation of Hegel’s 
Aufhebung shows, not  only on Shakespeare) thought is pushed forwards by  and thanks 
to the “philosophonic” haunting of the “porpentine.” Here Shakespeare haunts, 
translinguistically becoming the mot d’orde (watchword or rather a word ringing in the 
dark), putting in motion differential tones and inaugurating a performative act of 
reading central to Derrida’s notion of the “democracy to come.”
 After reading over Derrida’s and Cavell’s shoulder, we can thus propose three 
new criteria to be added to Nussbaum’s: First, the philosopher’s act of reading must 
resonate beyond the conventional boundaries of philosophy and literature. The 
conviction that an act  of writing is never accomplished once and for all, and that it 
always demands that the reader rethink it (Derrida) or improve his position towards it 
(Cavell) not only also radically redraws the way  we think about philosophical writing, 
but also how we think about the reverberative range a literary text can have on 
philosophy. Second, if a philosopher wants his engagement with literature to interest us, 
his account needs to be based on a textual model describing how the very encounter 
between text  and reader can become part of the philosophical endeavour. Third, this 
realisation must be internalised in the very way philosophy is written. Both Cavell and 
Derrida thus see the encounter between philosophy and literature not as something that 
happens once, but something that fundamentally changes the way we think and write 
philosophy. For both philosophers, the literary becomes a modality of thought, shifting 
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parameters of “philosophical” inquiry and thus orchestrating idiosyncratic but pivotal 
changes in philosophical style. 
This thesis did not set out to suggest that  either philosopher is better at  reading and 
listening to Shakespeare, or indeed that the things they  hear are or are not in 
Shakespeare. Everything (or almost  everything) is if we listen hard enough. It was 
rather to suggest that whoever is interested in the border between literature and 
philosophy, and indeed whoever wants to shake off a conventional understanding of 
interdisciplinarity, would do well to turn to Cavell and Derrida. Although the thesis has 
argued that  Cavell’s and Derrida’s clairaudient acts of reading Shakespeare propose a 
new way in which we can think of the relationship between literature and philosophy, it 
has also sought to suggest that  we are far from having sounded out the difference and 
similarities between these two philosophers. Possible avenues for further exploration 
would be the role of autobiography in their writing, their reading of music and opera, 
their thoughts on animals and, finally, their readings of Samuel Beckett. The most 
important comparative study, however, would have to examine the different yet  similar 
ways in which they  think about the relationship between the arts, ethics, and politics via 
their inheritances of Austin’s “perlocutionaries.” The question of the perlocutionary and 
how it  is influenced by phone is particularly important because it is the basis for the 
different, although equally intriguing, cases they  make for a radically new 
understanding of the performative and transformative powers of literature. Cavell’s 
notion of “passionate utterances” on the one hand, and Derrida’s practice of 
“performative interpretation” on the other would perhaps allow us to propose two 
frameworks for understanding how the “ethical” import of literary  and dramatic works 
besides Shakespeare may be linked to their use of sounds, music or voices.
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